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Rhetorical and Textual Organization of English and Arabic PhD Dissertation Abstracts in Linguistics

Abstract

This study compares English and Arabic PhD dissertation abstracts in the field of linguistics in an attempt to study the rhetorical and linguistic variations between the abstracts written in English and those written in Arabic. To this end, we have analyzed the rhetorical components that constitute the macrostructure of fifty English PhD dissertation abstracts written by English native speakers and those underlying fifty Arabic PhD dissertations written by native Arabic speakers following Swales’ (1990) CARS model of RA introductions and Bhatia’s (1993) IMRD move structure. The results showed differences between the two sets of data in generic structure preferences in terms of the type and frequency of moves and the linguistic realizations of these moves. The rhetorical variations across the two languages are most likely due to socio-cultural and academic expectations. The differences related to certain linguistic realizations such as voice and tense choice are ascribed either to inherent linguistic differences between the two languages or to academic practice. The study highlights the importance of teaching abstracts writing skills to PhD candidates.

1. Abstract genre as an academic practice

The abstract that accompanies research articles and dissertations is a notable practice in academic research as it constitutes a gateway to the reading or publication of a research article or a thesis (Lores 2004: 281). Salager-Mayer (1992) perceives this genre as a distinctive category of discourse intended to communicate factual new knowledge for members of different academic communities. The abstracts play a pivotal role in professional reading as they help readers decide on the relevance of an article to their interests (Busa 2005) and give researchers an adequate view of whether a particular longer text is worth reading. Similarly, Martin-Martin (2003, 2005) notes that abstracts function as a time saving device by informing the readers about the content of the article, indicating whether the full text merits further attention.
PhD dissertation abstract writing is an academic practice that all candidates from different fields have to adopt when they write a full PhD thesis while doing their postgraduate course or research. In most cases writing a PhD dissertation is only attempted once in a graduate student’s career. The great majority of dissertations are prefaced by an informative abstract, which contains a “factual summary of the much longer report, and is meant to give the reader an exact and concise knowledge of the full [dissertation]” (Bhatia 1993: 78).

The dissertation and research article abstract, as a genre, is a recognizable situated linguistic behavior in an institutionalized academic setting, having a set of communicative functions mutually-understood by established members of the academic community. Irrespective of the subject they serve, abstracts function as being “advance indicators of the content and structure of the following text” (Swales 1990: 179). The abstract is meant to function as a representation as in Bazerman (1984: 58), front matters as in Swales (1990: 179), as a summary as in Bhatia (1993: 78) and Kaplan et al. (1994: 405).

Though each dissertation is prefaced by an abstract and both are prepared by the same author, meant for the same readership and share the same contextual configuration, the abstract is thought of as a distinct and independent discourse genre of an associated text (i.e. dissertation or research article). Each genre has a well-defined communicative purpose articulated by its overall rhetorical organization. As stated by Van Dijk (1980), the abstract can be viewed as an integral piece of discourse; it can appear in abstracting journals and in on-line retrieval systems which publish paper abstracts. Its appearance in abstracting journals is designed to lead the readers back to the original text (Swales 1990). Given this merit, information scientists have been interested in the standards that would increase the quality and retrievability of abstracts (Chan & Foo 2004) and that would assess the content of a publication and facilitate the retrieval process (Lin et al. 2006). For Ventola (1994: 333), abstracts “have become a tool of mastering and managing the ever increasing information flow in the scientific community” as they are the first part of the dissertation or the research article to be read.
2. **The features of abstracts in previous literature**

Previous studies have mainly focused on investigating the rhetorical and linguistic features of research article abstracts attempting to identify and describe the relation between the different moves that constitute this genre and the linguistic features that indicate each of its component moves. Some of these studies focused on research article abstract in specific disciplines, other studies shed light on variations across disciplines and cultures, and others examined the possible impact of language choice in abstracts. For instance, Salager-Meyer (1990, 1992), Busch-Lauer (1995), Anderson & Maclean (1997) and Lin et al. (2006) focused on the rhetorical structure of medical English abstracts; Huckin (2001) on biomedicine; Gibson (1993) explored certain linguistic variables that affect the success of abstract in the field of information and library science; Santos (1996), Hyland (2000), Dahl (2004) and Lores (2004) investigated the textual and rhetorical moves along with some of the linguistic features that express abstracts in linguistics, and Pho (2008) considered the rhetorical moves and the authorial stance in the fields of applied linguistics and educational technology.

Variation of abstracts across disciplines has been studied by different researchers (e.g. Melander et al. 1997, Hyland 2000, Huckin 2001, Samraj 2002, Stotesbury 2003, Dahl 2004, Bondi, 2005, and Busa 2005). For example, Melander et al. (1997) examined the possible impact of language choice in abstracts from three different disciplines and find that linguistics and biology abstracts produced in “the American context are different in their overall organization”. Huckin (2001) found that biomedical research article abstracts often do not include the purpose move. Along the same lines, Samraj (2002) showed that the centrality claim moves are more crucial in the abstracts of Conservation Biology than those in Wildlife Behavior. Stotesbury (2003) demonstrated that evaluation attributes were twice as common in the humanities and social science abstracts as in those from the natural sciences. Bondi (2005) found that scientific procedures are foregrounded in economics abstracts. This tendency was also confirmed by Busa (2005), who confirmed a preference for the thematization of discourse products and procedures in economics abstracts. In contrast, psychology abstracts, as reported by Busa, reflected a preference for the foregrounding of the discourse objects over discourse products and procedures.
Martin-Martin (2005) pointed out that the choice of certain rhetorical options to convey knowledge claims vary across a number of dimensions, including languages and cultures. Regarding language, there has been a number of contrastive or comparative studies that have investigated variations in rhetorical strategies of written abstracts in English and those in other languages (e.g. Melander et al. 1997; Martin-Martin 2003; Martin-Martin & Burgess 2004; Bonn & Swales 2007). In an attempt to find the impact of language choice in abstracts from three different disciplines in the United States and Sweden, Melander et al. (1997) reported that linguistics abstracts showed strong national and cultural differences, and biology abstracts produced in “the American context are different in their overall organization”. Martin-Martin (2003) investigated the rhetorical variation between the research article abstracts written in English and those written in Spanish in the field of experimental social sciences. The results revealed a strong tendency on the part of Spanish writers to exclude the Results section as opposed to the high frequency of this unit (86%) in the abstracts written in English. Likewise, Establishing a niche was selected in 42% of English abstracts whereas it is considerably lower (15%) in Spanish abstracts. The researcher relates the latter differences to socio-cultural factors such as the relationship between the writer and the academic community he addresses. In a subsequent study in the field of experimental social sciences, Martin-Martin (2005) offered an account of how the rhetorical practices including hedging devices, the use of first pronouns and the expressions of criticism that academics in English and Spanish use in the area of phonetics and psychology are a reflection of the social relations between writers and readers within different discourse communities and different cultures.

In a comparison between Spanish and English abstracts, Martin-Martin and Burgess (2004) found that English abstracts showed more criticism than their Spanish counterparts. In particular, English abstracts tended to make more use of impersonal and indirect ways of criticizing than their Spanish counterparts. In their analysis of English and French abstracts selected from English and French monolingual journals, Bonn and Swales (2007) found that French abstracts displayed less instances of use of first person singular pronouns; instead, they preferred using first person plural pronouns even though all the abstracts were single-authored,
whereas in the English abstracts, the choice was determined by the number of authors.

All of the studies of abstracts considered so far have focused on what has been written in English and other languages, apart from Arabic. Except, perhaps, for books compiling PhD dissertation abstracts in Arabic (e.g. Ali 1979) and another about abstracting as a genre in Arabic (Abdel Hadi and Zayed 2000), no published studies, as far as we know, appear to have specifically analyzed PhD abstracts written in Arabic in terms of their sequential component organizational patterns and the lexico-grammatical exponents used to express these patterns. Abdel Hadi and Zayed (2000) proposed schematic patterns as pedagogic tools that may present potential advantages for novice writers by giving them a picture about the different types of abstracts and their components, and how to prepare abstracts in terms of style, length and content, as well as how information is typically organized.

The literature review has revealed that research article abstracts have been the focus of a number of studies. Despite the fact that writing a PhD dissertation accompanied by an abstract is considered a formidable task for any graduate student and as such deserves greater attention, no work of which we are aware has attempted to analyze the rhetorical components of the dissertation abstracts in Arabic and English linguistics or has looked for the linguistic and socio-cultural norms and options that govern their rhetorical organization. Therefore, this paper is an attempt to examine comparatively the generic structure and the linguistic options in English PhD dissertation abstracts and those written in Arabic, with the aim of finding out the generic options and linguistic choices that characterize the two academic communities (i.e. the writers of English dissertation abstract and Arab writers). A further purpose of this study is to find out to what extent the linguistic and socio-cultural factors may condition the writers’ rhetorical and linguistic choices.

3. The construction of the corpus

A total of 100 PhD dissertation abstracts written in English and Arabic were used in the present study. The corpus in English is made up of fifty English abstracts written by native speakers of English and submitted during the period 1984–2009. Seventy percent of the texts were selected
from seventeen American universities, and thirty percent were from seven British universities. This unequal distribution of English corpus (i.e. 70% from US universities and 30% from British ones) would be more representative of the data than taking 50–50% if we take into consideration the percentage of population of these two countries. It is worth noting that the British and American writers of abstracts do not have a completely homogeneous culture. However, they are likely to maintain the generic structure of abstracts irrespective of cultural values in order to operate in a manner acceptable to the members of the academic community who share core academic discourses, textual practices and organizational generic patterns, irrespective of stylistic or linguistic variations, which are beyond the scope of this study. The English corpus was collected from ProQuest Dissertations & Thesis Databases (http://www.proquest.com/en-US/catalogs/databases) and The Linguistlist (http://linguistlist.org/pubs/diss/index.cfm).

The corpus in Arabic consists of 50 PhD dissertation abstracts written by doctoral Arabic native speakers from Jordanian universities and submitted during the period 1994–2009. All the texts collected were in paper-written format, most of which were collected from the Theses & Dissertation Depository Center in the University of Jordan Library. This Center contains thousands of PhD dissertations from different well-known universities in the Arab world. Surprisingly, we found that not all Arabic linguistics dissertations deposited in this center included abstracts, especially those deposited from Arab countries other than Jordan. The major criterion guiding the selection of Arabic abstracts was ‘accessibility’ of the data. Since the Jordanian PhD candidates in linguistics were the only ones who were found to include abstracts in their dissertations deposited in the center, the Arabic sample was selected only from Jordanian public universities that have PhD programs in Arabic linguistics, such as Yarmouk University, The University of Jordan and Muta University.

Considering that the rhetorical structure of linguistic features of one discipline can be different from those of other disciplines, and in order to avoid variations across disciplinary boundaries (Al-Ali 2010), the researchers gathered the sample only from texts belonging to the field of linguistics. According to Gnutzmann & Oldenburg (1991), the degree of uniformity of textual structures depends on the discipline to which the texts belong.
4. Theoretical framework and procedure of data analysis

The present study is conducted within the framework of genre analysis. According to Miller (1984), genres are developed by communities around sets of communicative events. The essence of the notion of genre analysis is to consider a genre text as a recognizable communicative event characterized by a set of a communicative purpose(s) reflected in the cognitive structuring of the genre (Swales 1990; Bhatia 1993).

The data analysis of this study drew mainly on Bhatia’s (1993) four-move model (i.e. introducing purpose, describing methodology, summarizing results and presenting conclusions) mirroring the structure of the research article (RA) and Swales’ CARS (Creating a Research Space) model for research article introductions, which consists of the following three moves, each made up of different constituent steps:

Move 1 Establishing a territory: claiming centrality, making topic generalization, reviewing items of previous literature.
Move 2 Creating a niche: counter-claiming, indicating a gap, question raising, continuing a tradition.
Move 3 Occupying the niche: outlining purpose or announcing present research, announcing principle findings, indicating RA structure.

However, the researchers found that Swales’ and Bhatia’s models did not accommodate all the component moves found in the data analyzed. That is to say, the Arabic and English texts analyzed were found to include some component moves that have not been identified in Swales’ and Bhatia’s data. Therefore, the researchers found it necessary to modify some of these moves and add other new components to the model of analysis. For example, the researchers added the ‘Promoting thesis’ move to achieve a strategic function specific to the Arabic abstracts and the ‘Introducing benefits’. Furthermore, we modified Step 4 of Swales model, which came to be termed ‘Indicating thesis structure and content’. Likewise, we modified Bhatia’s ‘Describing methodology’ and ‘Presenting conclusions’, which came to be termed ‘Describing methodology and analysis procedures’ and ‘Presenting conclusions and recommendations’, respectively.

The rhetorical structure of abstracts of the current study was analyzed in terms of the component moves that make up each individual text. The
Term ‘move’, as used by Swales (1981, 1990), varies in length but at least contains one proposition that may be conveyed by one sentence or more and sometimes by a clause or a phrase, as noted by Bhatia (1993), Holmes (1997) and Al-Ali (1999, 2004). Therefore, it is difficult to identify move boundaries on formal linguistic criteria only. Consequently, assigning a function for a particular move is mainly guided by both implicit knowledge (Sandig 1986, quoted in Szurawitzki 2008) of generic conventions and explicit lexical items and phrases signaling information contained in each text portion (i.e. move) (Al-Ali 2009). Implicit knowledge, according to Sandig (1986: 132), might be brought about by drawing on the textual conventions of a particular genre, establishing relations of different textual elements and the theme and understanding how textual elements are related in a greater linguistic context. When we turned to the examination of the constituent moves of this genre, we drew on our background knowledge of the generic rhetorical organizational conventions, inference from content and knowledge of the context. That is because, according to Bhatia (2004), the schematic generic patterns of a text are the result of the conventions of the socio-cultural contexts in which genres are written. However, we noted that most of the moves have been signaled explicitly in indicative lexical phrasal expressions. For example, lexical signals like ‘the aim or purpose of the study’ indicate occupying the niche move, whereas ‘the methods used to collect data’ signals describing methodology move. Likewise, lexical items such as find, reveal, indicate, et ct. suggest summarizing results move, or presenting conclusions. Since move analysis involves a degree of subjectivity that is perhaps unavoidable (Holmes 1997: 325), another trained linguist was asked to identify the component moves of fifty abstracts selected randomly from the sample. Then the researchers themselves and the other linguist set together to check the degree of conformity in their analysis. There were slight differences found, but a consensus was reached after discussing the differences. The researchers compared and contrasted the Arabic corpus with the English corpus in order to find the similarities and differences between the two groups in terms of the type, frequency, number and language used to express the component moves employed by the writers.
5. Results of data analysis

5.1 Component Moves of English and Arabic PhD dissertation abstracts

The results of the generic structure of dissertation abstracts revealed the component strategic moves that tend to occur in the corpus texts analyzed (see Table 1). Each component will be defined, illustrated and exemplified by instances from the corpus. For purposes of illustration, examples of linguistic exponents and signals are often italicized or underlined.

Table 1. Component Moves of English and Arabic PhD dissertation abstracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component moves of English abstracts</th>
<th>Frequency of moves (%)</th>
<th>Component moves of Arabic abstracts</th>
<th>Frequency of moves (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Claiming centrality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. Claiming centrality</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Referring to previous research</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Indicating a gap</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4. Indicating a gap</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Announcing present research or Outlining purpose</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5. Announcing present research or Outlining purpose</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Describing methods and Analysis Procedures</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7. Describing methods and Analysis Procedures</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Summarizing results</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8. Summarizing results</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Promoting thesis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Introducing benefits</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10. Introducing benefits</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Presenting conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11. Presenting conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1 Claiming centrality

Authors, in this move, appeal to the peer members of the academic discourse community that “the research about to be presented is part of a lively, significant or well-established research area” (Swales 1990: 144). The frequency of occurrence of this move in Arabic abstracts (12%) is
relatively higher than that in English corpus (6%). Our analysis of this move indicated that the authors use more than one strategy to claim the centrality of their work; they utilize ‘claiming importance of the research to be reported’ as in examples 1 and 2, and ‘indicating continuing interest’ as in 3. In the following examples the lexical signals indicating this move are italicized.

1. Neutralization is a fundamental construct in the history of phonological theory. (EA 11)

2. ‘The phenomenon of disagreement in Arabic grammar is one of the prominent issues that have been dealt with in grammar research.’ (AA 38)

3. ‘Media is a topic of increasing importance...’ (AA 31)

As is shown in the examples above, the writers tend to indicate the importance of the topic by using the key signal lexical items: fundamental or ‘prominent’, whereas the continuing interest claims are expressed by the lexical item ‘increasing importance’.

5.1.2 Making a topic generalization

The second option of introduction openers is making “statements about knowledge or practice” (Swales 1990:146). This component occurred in 30% of Arabic data, whereas it occurred in 24% of the English sample. Typically, the following examples express in general terms the current state of knowledge or techniques (i.e. tools) as in the case of example 4, or refer to phenomena as in instances 5 and 6.

Both English and Arab PhD candidates in linguistics used subjects that refer to a general topic in the field associated with verbs in the present tense. In the following examples the lexical signals indicating this move are italicized and the tenses are underlined.

4. Propositions are one of the tools languages can use to work and distinguish roles associated with… (EA 23)

5. تمثل ظاهرة الخلاف الصرفي نوعا من التطور اللغوي... (AA 30)
‘The phenomenon of morphological deletion represents a type of language development’

(6) (AA 24)
‘Grammatical deviation in the Qur’anic context is considered a stylistic phenomenon…’

5.1.3 Referring to previous research

The aim of this move is to indicate that the thesis derives from a lively tradition of established works in the field (Nwogu 1997: 126). This component move was found in 20% of English abstracts, but it was not present in the Arabic texts. The analysis revealed that English PhD candidates in linguistics either specify the names of other researchers, as in example 7, or refer to previous studies in general (e.g. recent debates, previous studies…). The verb tense accompanying these subjects is the present simple.

(7) Bickerton (1981) and others claim that children can become proficient in a language even when they are exposed only to non-proficient speakers. (EA 3)

5.1.4 Indicating a gap

This move points out that the previous research has some limitations that need investigation. The data revealed that this component occurred in 12% of the Arabic data in contrast to 16% in the English sample. Representative abbreviated examples with the lexical signals italicized and the tense underlined are given in examples 8 and 9.

(8) Existing research has focused on abstract mental representation of grammar, and little is known about…(EA 17)

(9) (AA 34) لا نجد دراسة وصفية احصائية وافية لكل مظاهر بناء الجملة. ‘We do not find a comprehensive descriptive and statistical study of the different aspects of sentence structure…’
To express this move, English PhD candidates in linguistics tend to use restricting quantifiers such as little, as in example 8, or other qualifying expressions indicating negative meaning, such as short. The Arab PhD candidates in linguistics, on the other hand, negate the verb phrase by making use of negative articles such as لا (lāa) as in 9, or لم (lamm) both of which mean ‘not’. We also notice that English and Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to use the simple present tense to express this move.

5.1.5 Announcing present research or Outlining purpose

According to Swales’ CARS model, after indicating a gap in the related literature, research writers are expected to fill this gap (i.e. occupying the niche). This move was found to be almost obligatory (96%) in the English abstracts, while it occurred in 86% of the Arabic ones.

One of the most likely options a writer could employ to occupy the niche is to announce the research to be presented, which occurred in 76% of the English and Arabic data. Utilizing this option, English PhD candidates in linguistics describe what they consider to be the main features of their research using English verbs such as investigate, describe, present and defend, examine, address, provide, explore, survey, show, deal with, argue, discuss and analyze, without using a purposive lexical item like aim or purpose, while Arab candidates utilize verbs like تَحْبِس ‘investigate’, ﻓِ筝 ‘aims’, ﻓِ筝 ‘deals with’ and ﻓِ筝 ‘discuss’. The second option is outlining the purpose of the study, where the writers tend to use purposive statements containing lexical items such as aim, goal, purpose, هدف ‘the purpose’, ﻓِ筝 ‘it aimed’ to state the purpose explicitly. This option was seen only in 24% of the data.

The onset of this move is typically marked by the use of deictic references to the present text, which is either the genre or the type of inquiry. The common deictic elements used in English data are: this (86%), and the/present (14%). The cases where the deictic refers to the genre (e.g. dissertation, thesis (70%)) are more frequent than those where it refers to the type of inquiry (e.g. study, investigation, research, work (30%)). In contrast, in Arabic there is a strong tendency (70%) for the two deictic signals (the demonstrative pronoun ﻓِ筝 ‘this’ and the definite article ﻓِ筝 ‘the’ to occur together (e.g. … This research deals with…’), whereas the definite article ﻓِ筝 (the) (e.g. … The research deals
with…) was only used in 14%. It is worthwhile noting that in 16% of Arabic abstracts the writers refer neither to the genre nor to the type of inquiry. Furthermore, in Arabic the cases where the deictic refers to the genre are significantly less frequent (10%) than those that refer to the type of inquiry (90%).

According to Santos (1996: 489), the clear preference for this is presumably to be explained in part by the author’s effort to incorporate that abstract into the body of the paper, while the use of the suggests that the main article is viewed as standing apart from the abstract.

A further observation concerns the co-occurrence of inanimate subjects with animate verbs in both languages, but it varies from one language to another in frequency. The writers tend to use the collapsed structure, through which they use ‘Reference to writer’s own work macro-research outcome’ subjects (e.g. This dissertation examines/ provides/…) as is shown in examples 10 and 11, instead of the standard descriptive form, where they employ ‘self-reference’ subjects indicated by the first-person singular pronoun I (e.g. In this dissertation, I provide/ explore…) as indicated in examples 12 and 13.

(10) This study explores… (EA 14)

(11) (AA 43)
‘This thesis aims at…’

(12) In this dissertation, I argue… (EA 6)

(13) (AA 30)
‘In this research, I dealt with…”

It is worth pointing out that the percentage of collapsed structures (86%) used by the writers was remarkably much more than that of the standard descriptive form (14%). The English PhD candidates in linguistics used the former structure more frequently (96%) than the Arab PhD candidates (76%). However, the Arab candidates employed the standard form (i.e. the co-occurrence of animate subjects with animate verbs) more frequently (24%) than English PhD candidates who did so with the percentage of 4%. This may indicate that this tendency varies in its acceptability from one language to another.
As for the tense used in the texts analyzed, English PhD candidates in linguistics only used the present simple tense. However, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics used either present or past tense, but they showed a tendency for using the present tense. Moreover, English PhD candidates in linguistics tended to use active voice (96%) more than passive and simple present tense more than the past tense. For example,

(14) The effects of linguistic experience on the perceptual classification of phonological dialect variation are investigated. (EA 24)

However, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics employed both tenses, with a percentage of 55% for present simple and 45% for past simple, and never employed the passive voice. A further observation is that English and Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tended to initiate this move by a general statement of purpose followed by a more precise one. English PhD candidates in linguistics employed this option much more frequently than Arabs (42% vs. 8%, respectively).

5.1.6 Indicating thesis structure and content

In this move, the writers indicate the thesis structure in varying degrees of detail in terms of the chapters constituting it and they often provide a summary of each chapter. This component was found in 78% of the Arabic data in contrast to 28% in the English abstracts. A detailed analysis of the occurrence of this move showed that the onset and the type of information included in this move differ in the two sets of data. In Arabic abstracts, this move usually includes the following three component steps: Signposting, Denominating and Indicating content. The first is a one sentence step indicating the number of chapters that make up the thesis. It provides scaffolding on which writers hang the following two steps. The second step designates the title of each chapter, while the third usually indicates the purpose followed by a summary of each chapter. Example 16 illustrates this move. Sometimes, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics indicate the number of chapters followed by the title of each chapter and its content. Surprisingly, in 6% of the abstracts those writers employed a one-move abstract realized by Indicating thesis structure. Seventy-percent of this move occurs as a second move immediately after Outlining Purpose.
However, English PhD candidates in linguistics directly state the content of each chapter, as in 15.

(15) *The first chapter* proposes a unifying typology for relating types of language… *Chapter 2* provides a macrosociolinguistic account of… *Chapter 3* investigates the contemporary forces promoting large-scale contact with English… (EA 38)

(16) (AA 9) تَحْوِى هذَهِ الرِسَالَة مِقْدَمَةٌ وَثَلَاثَةٌ فُصُوْلٌ. اَما الْمُقْدَمَة فَقَدْ بِنِتَتْ فِيهَا اَنْ سَبَبْ درَاسَتِي مَوْضُوْعُ الاَخْطَأَاتِ اللِّغَوِیَة عَادٌ إلى … فِي الفِصل الْأَوْلِي بَنِتَ اِهْمِیة درَاسَة مَوْضُوْعِ الاَخْطَأَاتِ اللِّغَوِیَة وَوْضِحَت الْمِصَلَّحَاتِ الْآخرى الدَّالَّة عَلَی المِخَالِفَات اللِّغَوِیَة. اَما الفِصل الثَّانِی، فَتَناَلَتْ فِی اَتِجَاهَات تَحْلِیل الاَخْطَأَاتِ اللِّغَوِیَة: وَهُنَّ اَما الفِصل الثَّالِثْ فُهِوَ درَاسَة تَطْبِیقَیة فِی تَحْلِیل الاَخْطَأَاتِ الْکَتَابیة لَدِی مَستَوِی…

‘This thesis contains an introduction and three chapters [Signposting]. In the introduction [Denominating], I showed that the reason for studying grammatical errors is due to… [Content of Introduction]. In the first chapter, I showed the importance of studying grammatical errors, and clarified the other terminologies denoting linguistic deviations… [Content of chapter 1]. In the second chapter, I addressed the analytical views of linguistic error analysis: They are… [Content of chapter 2]. The third chapter is an applied study of the analysis of written errors at the level of… [Content of Chapter 3].’

### 5.1.7 Describing methods and analysis procedures

This move includes information about the data, methods and procedures of data analysis that are used to achieve the goals of the study. It was present in 70% of the English abstracts in contrast to 42% in the Arabic ones. The predominant tense used across the English and Arabic linguistics abstracts is the past. The abstracts displayed that this generic move tends to be realized by one or more of the following constituent components:

a) Sampling procedures: The writers tend to include information about the population of the study related to the source, setting, size and characteristics of the sample and the tools and criteria of data collection. The following examples illustrate this constituent step. The lexical items indicating this step are italicized and the verb tense and voice are underlined.

(17) *Research articles from the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, the oldest continuing journal of general scientific research, constituted the corpus of data in this study. (Sample source) (EA 30)
The data for this subject came from *map task dialogues collected from 20 native Southern California speakers…* (Source and sample size) (EA 47)

The study derived its linguistic data from *a variety of contextual text models*’ (Source and Characteristics of the sample)

b) Identifying data analysis procedures: The function of this constituent step is to specify which procedures or experimental methods and techniques were used to analyze data. The following are examples extracted from both types of data. The lexical items indicating this step are italicized and the verb tense and voice are underlined.

*Ultrasound imaging techniques and F2 measurements were employed* to see how much further front of the articulation… (EA 4)

The study showed some results after analyzing a number of Arabic and English sentences using the CSL apparatus.’

A major difference between English and Arab data is that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics always employed the active voice, whereas English PhD candidates tended to use the passive voice with a percentage of 77%, as is shown in the examples above. A further observation is that both groups of writers differ in the type of information they include in this move. While English PhD candidates in linguistics include information about the source, setting, size, characteristics of the sample, tools and criteria of data collection, Arab PhD candidates restrict their choice to one sub-component (i.e. Source Sample of the study).

5.1.8 Summarizing Results

This component highlights the achievement of some significant results. It mentions the most salient and striking findings (Salager-Meyer 1992: 105). The data showed that this move has a higher frequency of occurrence in English (82%) than in Arabic data (40%).

The analysis of abstracts demonstrated that the subjects of the sentences introducing this move differ in both groups of data. English PhD
candidates in linguistics initiate this move with subjects that refer to writer’s own work micro-research outcome as in example (22), or to objects of research and their attributes as in (23). The writers also tend to start with ‘anticipatory it’ subjects as in (24) or self-reference subjects as in (25). These subjects occurred with verbs such as show, reveal, demonstrate, confirm, find and indicate:

(22) Results confirm the strong relationship between prosodic structure and care of articulation as well as an inverse relationship between language redundancy and care of articulation. (EA 46)

(23) Utterance-final lengthening is found to be progressive. (EA 41)

(24) It is found that occlusive realizations of intervocalic /d/ are favored in word-initial, stressed syllables… (EA 25)

(25) We show how a verb’s extended projection may be extended by restructuring verbs… (EA 39)

Arab PhD candidates in linguistics, on the other hand, restricted their choices to ‘Reference to writer’s own work macro-research outcome’ subjects, as in example (26), and ‘self-reference’ subjects. Besides, they used only the verbs تٍه ‘showed’, أظٍش ‘reveal’, كشف ‘uncovers’, َخذ ‘found’, ذُصم ‘reached’ to express this move.

(26) (AA 3) أظهر البحث أن الخلاف النحوي الكوفي يكاد يشمل جميع الأبواب النحوية,…
‘The research revealed the Kufi’s controversial grammar almost includes all grammatical issues …’

Our analysis also revealed that English PhD candidates in linguistics utilized active voice more than passive (77% vs. 23%) respectively. While the active voice is accompanied with ‘Reference to writer’s own work micro-research outcome’ subjects, it is the passive voice that is associated with ‘anticipatory it’. However, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics never employed the passive voice in this move. Moreover, the distribution of verb tenses differs in both groups of abstracts. In English abstracts, there was a preference for the present simple tense (66%) in contrast to the past simple tense (73%) in Arabic corpus.
5.1.9 Promoting the thesis

In this move, the writer promotes the value of the study in an attempt to persuade the readers to read the whole thesis. This component was only found in the abstracts written by Arab authors with a percentage of 16%. It was realized by the use of predicative adjectives that describe the current research. The lexical items indicating this move are underlined in the following examples to illustrate this move.

(27) (AA 12)

رغم وجود العديد من الدراسات التي تتناول الظواهر النحوية لتفسيرات الصوتية لكنها لم تكن بهذا التنظيم والسعه كما كانت هنا

‘Despite the presence of many studies that have dealt with grammatical phenomena of acoustic interpretations, they were not as organized and comprehensive as the study presented here.’

(28) (AA 9)

اضعم ان هذه الدراسة استطاعت في مستويي بحثها النظري والتطبيقي ان تخرج بمجموعة من النتائج مما يدفعنا الى القول ان هذا البحث كان رائدا في موضوعه

‘I argue that this study, in its theoretical and practical levels, has come up with a set of results that lead us to say that this research was a pioneering topic of its kind.’

5.1.10 Introducing benefits

This move comprises the intended or projected outcomes of the study presented in terms of their benefit to the “real world” outside the study itself, or even outside the research field (Connor & Mauranen 1999, Halleck & Connor 2006). The statement of benefit may also emphasize the theoretical importance of the study in advancing the state of knowledge in a specific area of research (Weissberg & Buker 1990). As pointed out by Weissberg & Buker (1990), this component should be included in the introductions when one writes a thesis or thesis proposal, but in reports written up as journal articles this move is often omitted. English PhD candidates in linguistics employed this move more often (26%) than the Arab PhD candidates (10%). The latter start this move with a nominal clause referring to the subject of the study itself always marked by the use of the noun أهمية ‘importance’. For example,
English PhD candidates, on the other hand, primarily initiate this move either with subjects that refer to the study itself, as in example (30), or research-related events/processes, as in (31). These subjects tend to be followed by verbs indicating advantages or benefits such as provide, develop, solve, support and help. The predominant tense used in this move was the present simple, as is illustrated in the following examples:

(30) This study solves several outstanding problems that traditional phonological constituents cannot handle. (EA 22)

(31) The interpretations which these two resultatives receive support one type of structure within the meanings of certain verbs. (EA 8)

5.1.11 Presenting conclusions and recommendations

As is shown in Table 1, this move appears in 46% of English data, while it is rare in Arabic texts (6%). In the conclusion move, the writers attempt to draw either a definite and unhedged deduction (Hopkins and Dudley-Evans 1988) indicating the generalizability of the results deduced, as in instances 32 and 34, or a hedged claim that aroused from the results. In example 34, the verb suggest carries a hedged meaning similar to that of the modal verb.

This move sometimes includes a statement about the recommendations indicating a need for further research.

English PhD candidates in linguistics initiate this move either with ‘Reference to writer’s own work micro-research outcome’ subjects (57%) or with ‘anticipatory it’ (36%). In the following examples, the subjects are italicized and the lexical items indicating this move are underlined.

(32) It [anticipatory it] is concluded that tone perception is language dependent and strongly influenced by musical expertise- musical aptitude and musical theory, not musical training as such. (EA 42)
(33) *This leads to the conclusion* that, within English, prosodic structure is the means with which constraints caused by requiring a robust signal are expressed in spontaneous speech. (EA 46)

(34) *The results* [Reference to writer’s own work micro-research outcome] *suggest* that the learners are by and large incapable of producing the L2 vowels accurately. (EA 49)

However, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to employ the grammatical subject that refers to the study itself (i.e. Reference to writer’s own work macro-research outcome). It is usually accompanied with the verb خلص ‘concluded’ that directly signals the conclusion move. The following is an example:

(35) (AA 42) خلصت الدراسة إلى ضرورة فصل الجوانب النظرية عن الجوانب التطبيقية، *The study concluded* that it is necessary to separate the theoretical aspects from the applied ones.’

It was also found that while the tense used in English data was the present, the past tense was employed in Arabic. Arab authors employed the active voice, while English PhD candidates in linguistics employed both active (64%) and passive (36%).

### 5.2 Dissertation formats

Our analysis of the two sets of data revealed that the dissertation abstracts reflected three different dissertation formats:

a) The IMRD format: This stands for the basic structural components that typically constitute a research article (Introduction- Methods- Results- Discussion) and is taken to be the standard or traditional format for the PhD dissertations (Dudley-Evans, 1999). As pointed out by Swales (2004), this structure is essentially a blown up version of the IMRD structure of research articles. This type is the most representative in our corpus; IMRD structure constitutes 86% of the total number of the English sample and 42% of the Arabic abstracts analyzed.

b) Topic-based format: The body of the dissertation is a compilation of a series of publishable articles, each of which examines a particular topic presented in a chapter, and the collection of these specific topics has a
coherent topic or theme. The writers utilize this type to “report and discuss their analysis in multiple chapters (ranging from three to seven) with topic-specific titles” (Bunton 1998: 114). A small percentage of abstracts (12%) in Arabic and (10%) in English was found to follow this pattern. The writers tended to write abstracts typically opened with a component step of the CARS structure (e.g. the general purpose of the study followed by indicating a gap in literature and/or indicating thesis structure, etc.) followed by the Methods move. They then present, in sequence, the purpose of each topic followed by the results pertaining to each topic. Finally, the writers close the sequence of topic-specific titles with a general conclusion. In this pattern, the Methods move is optional, depending on whether the core methods is used for most of the topics discussed; otherwise, the methods component, if used, is given immediately after the purpose of each topic. This structure can be represented as follows:

General purpose + (indicating a gap) + (indicating thesis structure) + (methods) + Specific purpose or title of each topic + (methods) + results of each topic… + (conclusion).

c) A third set of abstracts, with the highest representation in Arabic corpus (46%) in comparison to 4% in English, did not match either of the two structures indicated above. Forty percent of the Arabic abstracts were found to include only two components, the first of which is outlining purposes followed by indicating dissertation structure. The other 6% of the Arabic abstracts (3 instances) included only one sub-move (Indicating dissertation structure). A further analysis of the former sub-set of abstracts revealed that the writers first present the general goal of the study followed by Indicating dissertation structure, which in turn includes three component steps; a one-sentence step indicates the number of chapters that make up the thesis, the second step designates the title of each chapter, and the third usually takes each chapter in sequence presenting its particular purpose followed by a summary of its content.

6. Discussion

The analysis of the English and Arabic dissertation abstracts has shown variations in terms of the generic components utilized by the two groups of writers and the linguistic features used in the two sets of data.
6.1 Generic structure variations

Our analysis indicated that there are eleven component moves by means of which the schematic structures of dissertation abstracts are built, as shown in Table 1. A comparison between Arabic linguistics dissertation abstracts and English abstracts shows differences in the type and frequency of the component moves employed to articulate this genre. For example, we identified *Promoting thesis* move in the Arabic texts, but not in English data. However, this promotion move does not include factual promotional evidence to support this strategy. This may be used to reflect a kind of appraisal for both the writers themselves and their contribution (cf. Al-Ali & Sahawneh 2008). For English native speakers, promotion which is based simply on feelings or desires rather than on rational judgment lacks credibility and is likely to be viewed by the reader as purely subjective (Bhatia 1993: 70). As an alternative strategic component, English PhD candidates in linguistics find it necessary to exhibit the benefits and applications of their research in order to promote their abstracts to the wider international academic community employing a variety of lexical options. This component was evident in 26% of the English PhD candidates’ data as compared to 10% in the Arabic texts. The most frequent rhetorical appeals found in English abstracts were to what can be glossed as *benefit, facilitate, provide, help, support, allow and solve*. Such positive attitudinal items indicate the function of ‘promotion’ or ‘selling’. Arab PhD candidates in linguistics, on the other hand, make a very restricted use of this move and utilize only the noun *أهمية* ‘importance’ to signal the importance of their work without any specification of this importance. A further instance supporting the element of objective promotion of the English PhD candidates’ abstracts is the high frequency of the conclusions and recommendations move which is used to advance the researchers’ claims. This move occurred more often in the English data (46%) in comparison to 6% in Arabic texts. By showing the value of the results obtained to academics in the field, English PhD candidates in linguistics seem to be more persuasive since the main function of this move, as stated by Hyland (2000), is to take the reader from the text into the world by commenting on the implications of the research or its applications.

On the other hand, the English PhD candidates employ ‘Referring to previous research’, a component that is not utilized in Arabic texts. The
occurrence of this infrequent move (20%) in the English data may indicate English PhD candidates’ preference to place their work within the context of on-going research (Nwogu 1997: 126) in order to show that their research derives from a lively tradition of established related works in the field. This may be also considered an attempt by the English PhD candidates in linguistics to situate the abstracts within a wider international academic community (Bonn & Swales 2007; Martin-Martin 2003) in comparison to the reduced number of Arab readers as a target community. This distinction is evinced in the frequency of the component moves employed by the two groups of writers. One possible justification for such a tendency may be that English PhD candidates in linguistics find it necessary to justify and discuss the merits of their research, as well as to exhibit its benefits. This practice, in turn, indicates that what matters for English PhD candidates in linguistics is why (Regent 1985) and selling (Yakhnotova 2002). In contrast, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to use instances that embody general statements indicating either the scarcity or unavailability of the studies that have dealt with the author’s current study without citing previous researches.

Another significant difference between English and Arabic texts is the tendency to omit the results and methods moves in the Arabic abstracts. The frequencies of occurrence of these moves in Arabic data are 40% and 42%, respectively, as opposed to 82% in results and 70% in methods in the abstracts written in English. It is obvious that most English abstracts include a results move foregrounding the main findings, telling the readers what they can get of the dissertation and whether it will be beneficial to them. Hyland (2000) points out that, as a means for gaining the reader’s interest and acceptance, writers are anxious to underline their most central claims by including results statements in their abstracts. In contrast, Arabic abstracts, for the most part, are characterized by the relative absence of this move, which supposedly involves providing information that the readers anticipate will be given.

Regarding the methods move, English PhD candidates in linguistics used this component in 70% of their abstracts as a way of reporting their methods sections, whereas this practice is used in 42% of cases in Arabic. An English speaking reader expects that the abstract will indicate how the study was conducted because sometimes how is seen as more important than what is found (i.e. results) to the extent that this move replaces the
results move altogether in the hard knowledge abstracts (Hyland 2000). One possible explanation of the relative absence of the methods move in Arabic abstracts is that methods in Arabic data generally involve the elaboration of concepts and arguments through analogy, explanation, illustration and detailed exemplification rather than modes of inquiry that adopt empirical procedures.

Unlike English PhD candidates in linguistics, Arab PhD candidates tend to place more emphasis on what. In other words, they focus on telling the reader about the content of their research. What illustrates this tendency is the considerable variation between the two sets of data regarding the frequency of Indicating thesis structure. This move was evident in 78% of the Arabic data as compared to (28%) in the English texts. A major difference between Arabic and English abstracts lies in the fact that 40% of the Arabic abstracts in contrast to 4% in English were found to include only two moves, the first of which is Outlining purposes followed by Indicating thesis structure and content. A further analysis of the latter revealed that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to utilize three steps to articulate this move. The first step indicates the number of chapters that make up the thesis. The second step designates the title of each chapter, and the third usually takes each chapter in sequence presenting its particular purpose followed by a summary of its content. This difference in rhetorical structure leads to the argument that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to place more emphasis on giving information, particularly in the third step, where the writers focus on telling readers what factual or propositional content each chapter includes. That is to say, they tend to fulfill the transactional rather than the interpersonal function of language (Brown & Yule 1983).

A possible explanation for the high frequency of Indicating thesis structure in the Arabic data may be related to the claim that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics may have not yet developed a mature view of the component moves that are used to articulate the communicative purpose of this discourse genre. This may lend support to Swales’ conclusion regarding the high incidence of Indicating article structure in Cooper’s (1985) study of computer technology field, who found that 10 out of her 15 IEEE introductions included this move. Swales attributed the high frequency of this move to the absence of an established schema for research reporting in that new and rapidly evolving field. This may apply to
Arabic texts since abstract writing in PhD dissertations in Arabic linguistics started to surface in Jordanian PhD dissertations only in 1994. In contrast, the abstract accompanying English dissertations is considered a well-established practice and an essential part of academic writing (Salager-Meyer 1992; Hartley 2003; Pho 2008).

6.2 Linguistic features variations

An examination of the linguistic choices used to express the moves articulating the abstract genre reveals similarities and differences between the two sets of data in terms of the use of tense and voice.

Regarding the use of tense, both English and Arab PhD candidates in linguistics showed similarities in using tense in Making topic generalization, Indicating a gap and Describing methods moves. They used present tense verbs to refer to general topics in the field and to gaps in previous studies. The use of the present tense appears to be acceptable in the two languages since the main function of this move is to claim about the present state of knowledge generalization (Swales 1990; Santos 1996). Likewise, in the methods move both English and Arab PhD candidates in linguistics utilized the simple past. This is not surprising, as the purpose of this move is to report the research methodology that has already been employed in the study (Salager-Meyer 1992; Martin-Martin 2003; Pho 2008).

However, the two groups of writers showed remarkable variations in tense use in Outlining purpose, Summarizing results, and Presenting conclusions and recommendations moves. In Outlining purpose, English PhD candidates in linguistics only used the present tense, while Arab PhD candidates utilized both tenses, the simple past tense with a percentage of 45% vs. 55% for the simple present. It seems that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to use simple past to report what their research was about since they make frequent reference (78%) to the type of inquiry (i.e. study investigation) rather than the genre (dissertation or thesis). The reference to genre, in contrast, indicates a sense of the immediate physical object in front of the reader and thus takes the present tense (Pho 2008).

The distribution pattern of verb tenses in Presenting conclusions and recommendations showed a preference for present tense by English PhD candidates in linguistics. For instance, the present was the only tense used
in the conclusions move. Present tense was also utilized with a high frequency (66%) in Summarizing results. However, in Arabic abstracts the past was the only tense employed in the conclusions moves and there was a preference for this tense in the results (73%) over present tense.

According to Pho (2008), the use of present tense gives the idea that the writer is generalizing beyond the results of the study in order to give the impression that these are widely accepted findings. The use of past tense, on the other hand, leaves the reader with the impression that the writer is plainly reporting the findings of the present research. Regarding Presenting conclusions and recommendations, the present tense was employed by English PhD candidates in linguistics to make generalizations based on the findings in the results move (Salager-Meyer 1992; Pho, 2008). In contrast, the past tense was exploited in the Arabic abstracts because the study may “have not yet entered the Pantheon of received knowledge” (Heslot, 1985: 214), or the conclusions do not bear directly in terms of importance on the work described (Lackstrom et al., 1970, cited in Salager-Meyer 1992).

Regarding the choice of voice (i.e. active or passive voice), we found significant differences between the two sets of data in using the verb voice. The past passive is overwhelmingly used (77%) in English Describing methods move, while the active is the only voice used in Arabic methods moves. The frequent occurrence of passive voice conventionally functions to depersonalize the information in the methods and procedures. Our data analysis revealed that English PhD candidates in linguistics’ primary concern was placing emphasis on the entities that refer to the participants in the study, objects studied, variables and data collected (77%) followed by what was done to them; therefore, the passive was used. This tendency allows writers to omit the logical agent and place emphasis on the procedure. However, Arab PhD candidates in linguistics concentrated on using subjects that refer either to the study itself or the researcher followed by what those subjects did, thus, the active voice was exploited.

The passive voice was also used in the English results, and conclusion and recommendation moves. The ‘anticipatory it’ subjects, which is associated with passive sentences, occurred in 21% of the results and in 36% of the conclusion moves of the English sample. Since the ‘anticipatory it’ is associated with passive sentences, the more frequent use of it means the more frequent use of the passive voice. However, no instances of the passive were encountered in the Arabic sample. One possible explanation
for the greater use of the passive by English PhD candidates in linguistics in the conclusion moves is that the authors in this unit give their own interpretations that may not be the only ones. Therefore, they seem to prefer detaching themselves from the claims they made by using the passive voice as they know their claims are to be questioned (Salager-Meyer 1992).

English passive allows both the mention and the deletion of the agent. This means that English has two passive constructions: agentive and agentless. In contrast, the Arabic passive, according to (Khalill 1999), is always agentless; this means that Standard written Arabic does not allow the agent to appear. Therefore, a possible explanation of the dearth of passive constructions in Arabic texts might be found in the inherent linguistic nature of passive in Arabic, which does not allow the agent to appear, in contrast to English passive which allows the writers not only to mention the agent but also to highlight it. The fact that the Arabic passive is agentless also provides evidence for the non-synonymity of active-passive pairs.

7. Conclusion and implications

In this paper we have analyzed two sets of PhD dissertation abstracts in linguistics selected from two different languages, English and Arabic, which represent two different cultural proclivities. We have explored English and Arab writers’ available generic resources through which writers textualize their discourse in order to achieve the communicative purpose of this genre. The study has also identified generic and linguistic similarities and variation across the same written discourse genre. At the microlevel of analysis, we have identified the linguistic features used to express the genre components and attempted to justify why writers from different cultures employ different linguistic recourses. On the macro-structure level, this small scale study has shown that the generic structure of abstracts written in Arabic and English reflect rhetorical patterns showing similarity with the four basic move-model (Bhatia 1993) and the CARS structure (Swales 1990), as well as the third alternative pattern drawing mainly on both, the CARS and IMRD structures.

However, the macro (i.e. generic structure) and micro levels (i.e. linguistic representation of genre components) have revealed some of the
ways dissertation abstracts vary across different languages and cultures. The comparison shows differences in the type and frequency of the component moves employed. For example, in the Arabic texts we identified unsupported promotional claims that are not based on factual evidence indicated by *Promoting theses* move. This strategic component was not found in English. However, the English PhD candidates in linguistics make use of objective promotion claims, especially in the conclusions and recommendations move. They find it necessary to foreground the value of the results obtained and exhibit the benefits and applications of their research in order to promote their abstracts to the wider international academic community. Another significant difference is that English PhD candidates in linguistics tend to utilize *Referring to previous research*, a component that is not utilized in the Arabic abstracts, to show that their research derives from a lively tradition of established related works of the target academic community. In contrast, Arab PhD candidates do not justify their research by the naming of specific researchers in the selected area. Instead, they tend to utilize other alternative strategies to justify their research, such as making topic generalizations about current knowledge in the area by using (component move 2) and/or addressing the centrality of the general topic by means of (component move 1); such tendencies are more frequent in Arabic texts than in the English. A further possible explanation is that the writers of Arabic texts tend to focus on providing information more than on justifying their research. This was evident in the high percentage of *Indicating thesis structure* (46%), which was evident in Arabic texts in comparison to (4%) in English.

A further difference between the two sets of data is the strong tendency to include the methods move in the English texts to indicate *how* the study was conducted. Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to place more emphasis on *what*. This tendency is reflected in the high frequency of *Indicating thesis structure* move, in which Arab candidates present a summary of the chapters constituting a thesis. This difference in rhetorical structure leads to the argument that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics tend to place more emphasis on *telling* readers *what* content each chapter includes rather than on *selling* their research to their peer academics in the field. Consequently, it appears that Arab PhD candidates in linguistics have developed a practice of abstract writing different from the well-established
practice developed by English native speakers in order to articulate the communicative purpose of the discourse genre. At the same time, Arab PhD candidates also need to learn how to foreground objectively the value of their research to the wider international academic community by learning the generic options that are used to articulate this promotion purpose. There is a need for guides which show PhD candidates the kind of generic options that occur in authentic texts and provide a rationale for the various choices writers might make (Swales & Feak 2000). Students also need to be instructed on the particular values of the abstracting services and the importance of including abstracts in Arabic dissertations.

The analysis at the micro-level carried out in this study indicates that the abstracts written in both languages share some linguistic features as regards the use of simple present tense in Making topic generalization, Indicating a gap moves, and the use of simple past in Describing methods moves. The use of present tense is acceptable in both languages to generalize about the state of knowledge; likewise, the past tense is used in the methods moves to report the research methodology that has already been employed. However, there are variations in tense use in the other moves that can be attributed to socio-cultural expectations, as indicated in the Discussion Section. The greater use of passive in English in contrast to its scarce use in Arabic texts might be attributed to differences in the linguistic resources and stylistic conventions. In contrast to English passive, which allows the writers not only to mention the agent but also to highlight it, the inherent linguistic nature of passive in Arabic does not always allow the agent to appear.

It is hoped that the findings of the current study can be used to familiarize both native speakers and non-native speakers of English and Arabic with the generic options, as non-native speakers may lack not only the necessary level of language proficiency, but also the necessary genre knowledge (see Bhatia 1999 and Paltridge 2002) required of PhD candidates to succeed in writing abstracts. Furthermore, it is not enough to teach all students from different fields the rhetorical structures suggested by the general abstracting guidelines; instead, students should be taught according to the conventions of abstract writing in their own fields (Stotesbury 2003: 340). It would also be interesting to carry out cross linguistic studies to compare the use of verb tenses and passive constructions in other languages with their use in English.
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Grégory Furmaniak

On the Emergence of the Epistemic Use of *Must*\(^1\)

Abstract

This corpus-based study of the emergence of epistemic *must* in English aims to reassess Sweetser’s (1990) account of the conceptual and historical links between root and epistemic meanings and defends an alternative view of the category of epistemic qualification. After discussing the problems posed by the metaphorical hypothesis, it proposes a frame-based account of modality and of the various meanings of *must* in the light of which the historical data is re-examined. It is then suggested that the problems with Sweetser’s analysis spring from the commonly-held view that epistemic meanings are conceptually derived from root ones. The hypothesis is formulated that epistemic qualification, unlike root modality, does not pertain to the schematic system of force-dynamics and that there is no conceptual basis for postulating a general semantic category (known as modality) subsuming root and epistemic meanings. The rise of epistemic *must* is explained by the fact that root meanings are underpinned by complex conceptual frames which, beside their core force-dynamic structure, also contain components that pertain to epistemicity and which, in certain contexts, become so prominent that they take over the primary root interpretation.

1. Introduction

This case-study of the emergence of epistemic *must* aims to reassess Sweetser’s seminal work (1990) on the conceptual and historical links between root and epistemic meanings. Sweetser’s use of metaphor to explain both the evolution of the English modals and the conceptual relationships between the two categories has often been criticised (cf. Hopper & Traugott 1993; Bybee et al. 1994; Pelyvàs 1996, 2000, 2006;)

\(^1\) I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the first version of this paper. Any remaining errors are mine.
Yet, her account of epistemicity in terms of force dynamics is still widely endorsed – at least partially – in the field of cognitive linguistics (cf. Achard 1998; Talmy 2000; Mortelmans 2001; Langacker 2002; Radden & Dirven 2007, inter alia). Beside theoretical objections, a number of critiques have also been levelled at Sweetser’s (1990) description on account of its empirical inadequacy (see, in particular, Pelyväs 1996; Goossens 1999, 2000 and Traugott & Dascher 2002). Although some scholars (cf. Goossens 1999 and Traugott & Dascher 2002) have since provided accounts of the emergence of epistemic must based on more solid diachronic evidence, the absence of consensus on the origin of this use suggests that the debate is not over.

Based on a fine-grained analysis of must in a sample of dramatic texts from the 17th to the end of the 19th century, this study therefore proposes an alternative account of the historical shift from the root to the epistemic uses of must as well as new insights into the category of epistemic qualification. It demonstrates that the data do not corroborate Sweetser’s metaphorical hypothesis and suggests that the rise of epistemic must was permitted by a shift in the distribution of attention (cf. Talmy 2007) within the semantic frame (or script) underlying root meanings. Building on various frame-based approaches (Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1991; Furmaniak 2010), it claims that root must refers to a complex conceptual frame which, from the start, contained an epistemic judgement concerning the occurrence of the modalised state of affairs and that, in certain contexts, this backgrounded epistemic position became foregrounded and conventionalised into a separate sense of the modal.

This hypothesis lends credence to the view held by Lampert & Lampert (2000) and Nuyts (2001) that epistemic qualification is better analysed as a semantic category distinct from root modality.

The first section reassesses Sweetser’s hypothesis in the light of the recent literature. The second part describes the methodology used in this study. The results of the corpus-analysis are then given which add weight to the arguments against Sweetser’s theory and lead to an alternative characterisation of epistemicity. In the final section, it is shown that this new analysis provides an account of the emergence of epistemic must that is consistent with the historical data.
2. Discussion of the metaphorical hypothesis (Sweetser 1990)

2.1 Sweetser’s (1990) account

Drawing on Talmy’s analysis (1988) of root modality, Sweetser (1990) suggests that the epistemic uses of modals derive from the extension of force-dynamic values pertaining to the socio-physical domain to the epistemic domain. She argues that

[previous historical changes in this domain, then, were shaped by a general semantic linkage which probably has inherent psycholinguistic motivation. [...] Thus we view our reasoning processes as being subject to compulsions, obligations, and other modalities, just as our real-world actions are subject to modalities of the same sort. (1990: 50)]

For instance, she claims (ibid.: 61) that (1), where must has its deontic meaning, can be paraphrased as (2), while (3), where the modal is epistemic, should be glossed as (4).

(1) **You must come home by ten. (Mom said so.)**
(2) **The direct force (of Mom’s authority) compels you to come home by ten.**
(3) **You must have been home last night.**
(4) **The available (direct) evidence compels me to the conclusion that you were home.**

In (3), the necessity bears neither on the state of affairs denoted by the VP, as in (1), nor, for that matter, on an event pertaining to the socio-physical world, but on the speaker’s reasoning. According to Sweetser (ibid.), the speaker is construed as being compelled, by the available evidence, to conclude that the state of affairs holds. The main claim, then, of what can be called the metaphorical hypothesis, is that the English modals construe epistemic modality in terms of semantic schemas that primarily apply to (the cognizer’s representation of) entities belonging to the socio-physical world and which are mapped onto entities of the mental world.
2.2 Arguments against the metaphorical hypothesis

Attractive as it may be, the metaphorical hypothesis has been challenged in the recent literature.

From a historical perspective, first, Traugott & Dascher (2002: 111) have questioned the role of metaphor as a factor of linguistic change. Instead, they have argued that the main mechanism of change is metonymic in nature and consists in the strengthening of pragmatic inferences in certain contexts. In a similar vein, Goossens (1999, 2000) has suggested that semantic changes originate in gradual shifts of uses.

Another problem, noted by Langacker (1991) and Pelyvás (1996), is that the metaphorical hypothesis only applies to a handful of modals, namely, must, have to and may, while the epistemic uses of will, would, might, should and ought to cannot be accounted for in those terms. Neither does it apply, in fact, to the class of epistemic adjectives, adverbs and verbs, most of which exhibit no link whatsoever with the system of force dynamics. In that respect, the hypothesis fails to provide a unitary description of the grammatical class of the English modals and of the semantic category of epistemic qualification. Nor does it explain the near-synonymy of (5) and (6).

(5) He must be mad!

(6) He is probably mad!

Other scholars (cf. Lampert & Lampert 2000; Nuyts 2001) express some doubts concerning the close conceptual link between root and epistemic qualifications that is implied by the metaphorical hypothesis and suggest that epistemic qualification is best treated as an independent semantic category. They argue that epistemicity exhibits properties that are inconsistent with the metaphorical hypothesis. Among these is the gradability of epistemic expressions (e.g. very likely/probable/probably or may/might well), a property which, Westney (1986) and Nuyts (2001) have remarked, is not shared by root expressions (e.g. *very obligatory/2

In fact, Pelyvás (ibid.) also questions the validity of Sweetser’s account of the rise of epistemic may, which, he suggests, derives not from the sense of “permission” but from a now extinct sense of “ability”.

3 Palmer (1990: 68) argues that the role of well is to “strengthen the possibility” expressed by the modal.
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permitted). If epistemic meanings were just metaphorical extensions of root meanings, Pelyvàs (1996, 2000, 2006) argues, they should preserve the conceptual structure of the latter. Even if there is some truth in this argument (epistemic expressions do tend to be scalar, unlike root expressions), it could be objected that gradability is more a property of expressions (and of the type of construals they encode) than of the semantic category itself. After all, with the exceptions of well and just (cf. Palmer 1990: 68), epistemic modals are seldom qualified, while root modals sometimes are (e.g. you must really/absolutely see that film!). However that may be, even though the question of scalarity does not totally undermine the metaphorical hypothesis, it is an issue that it fails to address.

Sweetser’s claims are mainly based on historical evidence but she also invokes crosslinguistic arguments, underlining “an evident crosslinguistic tendency for lexical items to be ambiguous between those two sets of senses” (1990: 49). However, this commonly-held view is disconfirmed by the findings of van der Auwera & Ammann (2005) who show that polyfunctionality (i.e. the capacity for a modal expression to have both a root and an epistemic meaning) is not the rule across languages. Of the 241 languages they have examined, 51% do not have polyfunctional expressions.4

The last theoretical argument against the metaphorical hypothesis has to do with the informal paraphrase (4) used by Sweetser to make explicit the underlying semantic structure of epistemic must. Although her analysis is meant as an improvement to Tregidgo’s (1982), it is in fact liable to the same kind of criticism. Tregidgo argues that the difference between the root and epistemic senses of modals can be explained by a change of predicate in the underlying semantic representation of the sentence. Thus, while root must can be formalised as (7), where the agent (Y) is compelled by the deontic source (X) to cause the state of affairs (ab), epistemic must has the semantic structure in (8), where the speaker (Y) is compelled by the evidence (X) to state that the situation (ab) holds.

(7) Root must: a must b = X DEMAND Y – Y CAUSE ab

(8) Epistemic must: a must b = X DEMAND Y – Y STATE ab

4 This, of course, does not prevent speakers of these languages from conveying epistemic judgements.
The problem posed by this analysis – and rightly observed by Sweetser – is that nothing forces the speaker to actually state that the proposition is true. Stating is indeed a voluntary act and there is little sense of deciding in sentences with epistemic must. But in fact, much the same objection can be raised against Sweetser’s paraphrase in (4). In (3), nothing compels the speaker to actually conclude that the state of affairs holds. Concluding, like stating, conveys a sense of decision which is absent from (3). As a matter of fact, even in strict truth-conditional terms, (3) is not equivalent to (9).

(9) I must conclude that you were home last night.

Given the list of arguments against the metaphorical hypothesis, it seems justified to reassess it in the light of a more thorough investigation of the historical data.

3. Methodology

Insofar as Sweetser’s argument rests mainly on her own interpretation of the historical evolution of the English modals, I re-examine her conclusions in the light of a sample of English texts ranging from the 17th to the end of the 19th century (cf. appendix for details about the corpus). This is all the more necessary as Sweetser’s analysis does not seem to be based on a thorough and fine-grained corpus-analysis, while Goossens (1999, 2000) and Traugott & Dascher (2002) disagree as to the origin of the epistemic use of must.

My corpus is composed of dramatic texts by English-born authors dated from 1600 to 1899, the period during which the epistemic use of must is thought to have emerged (according to the OED and Goossens 1999). Each century is divided into five spans of 20 years so that each century is evenly covered. Each 20-year period contains two texts of equivalent size (15,000 words ± 5%) by two different authors of the same generation (i.e. aged between 21 and 40 on year 1 of the period).

As underlined by Langacker (1991: 273), Sweetser’s glosses “are obviously not intended as serious paraphrases”. In particular, they are not meant to account for the specific construals underlying the uses of modal auxiliaries. Yet, as glosses, they are expected to be at least truth-conditionally equivalent to the sentences they paraphrase.

This parameter guarantees that any author whose lifetime spans over two or more periods appears in one period only.
Thanks to the AntConc 3.2.1 software, all the occurrences of must in the corpus were extracted. Interrogative and negative forms were excluded because, as is well known (cf. Palmer 1990), must is never epistemic in the interrogative and rarely so in the negative (until recently, at least). The remaining 954 occurrences were sorted out according to their meanings.

4. Back to the data

In this section, I first present a brief overview of the literature on the origin of the epistemic use of must. I then describe the theoretical framework I work with and the semantic classification I use for must.

4.1 On the origin of the epistemic use of must

There is no consensus in the literature as regards the source of the epistemic use of must and the date of its emergence.

According to Sweetser (1990), epistemic must comes from the sense of “obligation”, while Goossens (1999) claims that two parallel paths may have been involved and therefore proposes two different sources: the deontic interpretation (“obligation”) and a meaning he calls “inferable necessity” or “objective inference” where “must expresses an inference which is not defeasible” (1999: 196). For Traugott & Dascher (2002), the modal’s epistemic use was derived from a meaning of “general necessity”, which they however fail to define precisely.

As for the first occurrences of this use, the dates range from the end of the 14th century (cf. Visser 1966) to the middle of the 17th century, according to The Oxford English Dictionary. Traugott & Dascher (ibid.) suggest that there were already instances of epistemic must in Old English (5th to 12th century) but that they were rare, ambiguous and that they always expressed objective epistemic modality. The unambiguous occurrences of epistemic must they found in Middle English (13th–14th centuries) were also of the objective type. They date the use of must as an expression of subjective epistemic modality to the 16th and 17th centuries, one century earlier than Goossens (1999).

One reason for this lack of consensus is that scholars use different semantic categories which, moreover, are not always clearly defined.

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7 As we shall see, subjectivity for Traugott and colleagues is concerned with the expression of textual and expressive meanings (cf. Traugott 1989: 35).
Before embarking on the analysis of the data, I therefore find it important to precisely characterise the various meanings I shall be referring to as well as the theoretical framework on which this semantic typology is based.

### 4.2 Theoretical background

According to Talmy (1988, 2000), concepts that are connected to causation and root modality are generated by the schematic system of force dynamics. Deontic obligation, for instance, corresponds to the following scenario: an antagonist (the speaker in (10)) wants the event denoted by the modalised clause to occur and exerts some pressure (which can be physical, social or psychological) on the agonist (denoted by the subject) to get him/her to act accordingly. The agonist however has an opposite tendency – which results in an opposition of forces whose outcome (called the Resultant) is the realisation or non-realisation of the event.

(10) **Sus.**: Settle here! — oh, dear me, how happy I am. [...]  
**Chas.**: Yes, we shall be so happy.  
**Sus.**: Oh, quite: only you must promise me, now, you won't flirt with the girls, nor dance with Sally and Mary at our village dance.  
**Chas.**: No, no, with none but you. (Beazley, 1826)

Nevertheless, this basic force-dynamic configuration is nothing more than a blueprint which fails to fully characterise the various meanings and shades of meaning that root *must* can convey (cf. Antinucci & Parisi 1971; Lakoff 1972; Larreya 1984).

In order to capture the rich semantics of root modality, I therefore propose that any given modal meaning (such as “obligation”) is underpinned by a much more complex conceptual structure or frame (cf. Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1987) whose components (whether they are explicit or not) are key to characterising the concept fully. As figure 1 suggests, there is more to the sense of “obligation” than a force-dynamic opposition between two participants with opposite tendencies (a simplified version of the frame is given here\(^9\)).

\(^8\) The source of the example (author and date) is indicated in parentheses.  
\(^9\) For a fuller account of the “obligation” script, see Furmaniak (2010).
Two types of components are at work within this frame (or script\textsuperscript{10}). Those that are related to force dynamics (in bold), which constitute the core of the frame, and those more peripheral elements which do not pertain to force dynamics but to what Talmy (2000, 2007) calls “cognitive state”\textsuperscript{11} (in italics). The force-dynamic part, which I assume to be structured as a causal chain, reads as follows (from top to bottom): The antagonist wants the state of affairs denoted by the sentence (noted “SoA”) to take place and therefore exerts some pressure (noted “ACT ON”) on the agonist. This hypothetically (hence the dashed arrows and box) causes the agonist to agree\textsuperscript{12} to act in the manner described by the verb (noted “ACT\textsubscript{V}”) and from this compliance normally results the state of affairs.

As for the schematic system of cognitive state, a distinction must be made between the interior of the conceptualised scene (where the antagonist is conceived as wanting as well as expecting the event to occur) and its exterior where the cognizer – who is often but not necessarily identical with the speaker\textsuperscript{13} – is presented as being aware of the force-

\textsuperscript{10}The notion of \textit{script} is due to Schank & Abelson (1977) and is used for a frame with a sequence of events.

\textsuperscript{11}This schematic system generates notions like intention, evidentiality and, of course, epistemic qualification (Talmy 2000).

\textsuperscript{12}On the reason why the agonist’s agreement is a force-dynamic notion, unlike the antagonist’s act of wanting, see Furmaniak (2010).

\textsuperscript{13}It is useful to distinguish the speaker – the “actual person physically producing an utterance” (Brisard 2006: 48) – from the cognizer (or conceptualizer) who “refers to the instance that defines the (conceptual) viewpoint or perspective on a given scene” (ibid.). Although the speaker’s viewpoint is usually adopted (one of the exceptions being
dynamic situation and as expecting the event to happen. That the realisation of the state of affairs is the expected outcome of its necessary character is crucial for what comes next and has already been noted by Traugott (1989) and Radden & Dirven (2007). As pointed out by Traugott (ibid.: 50), the fact that \textit{You must go} entails that the speaker expects that the event will take place is evidenced by the oddness of (11).

(11) \textit{He must go but maybe he won’t.}

I only differ from Traugott in that she sees this judgement as a pragmatic inference, whereas I argue that it is an essential component of the concept of “obligation” and of other types of root necessity. This is supported by the fact that if the event is not expected to take place, \textit{should} or \textit{be supposed to} is used instead of \textit{must}. In that respect, I follow Brisard (2006) who considers that

\[
\text{[s]uch associations may have greater or lesser degrees of prominence, depending on things like frequency and context, and thus they may vary in the necessity with which they are felt to accompany the use of a particular item. But that is no reason to call them pragmatic, if pragmatics is the study of particular meaning effects related to a speaker’s intentional, strategic behavior. (Brisard 2006: 63)}
\]

4.3 The meanings of \textit{must}

I agree with Sweetser (1990) that the three root meanings of \textit{must} which I distinguish refer to force-dynamic situations in the socio-physical world: an antagonist exerts some pressure on the agonist, which normally results in the occurrence of the state of affairs. In order to clearly differentiate these three uses, two parameters will be considered:

(i) The desirability of the modalised state of affairs. As shown by Larreya (1984), Pelyvàs (2000) and Cotte (2003), volition is indeed one of the main criteria for distinguishing between different modal meanings.
(ii) The nature of the agonist and whether s/he (or it)\textsuperscript{14} is explicit or not. Within a cognitive framework, the formal realisation of a sentence (e.g. whether the agonist is expressed or not) reflects the construal of the scene represented and therefore affects meaning.

4.3.1 “Obligation”

The sense of “obligation” is exemplified by (12–14). The source of the obligation can be deontic, as in (12), circumstantial, as in (13), or dynamic, as in (14) (cf. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 181–185).

(12) You must behave yourself, dear.

(13) In order to walk you must first get up and make your first steps.

(14) He must do that kind of things!

As the subject of the sentence, the agonist is explicitly presented as coerced by the antagonist into acting in the way described by the VP. The necessary action can be desirable \textit{per se} (because the antagonist wants it to happen, as in (12)), or as desirable relative to some purpose,\textsuperscript{15} as in (13). Example (14) is a special case of “obligation” which can be called “compulsion”. It is a kind of “obligation” because the agonist is explicitly staged as a potential agent while the event is understood to be demanded by the antagonist. What sets this use apart is that the antagonist is a part of the agonist himself/herself (cf. Talmy’s theory of “Divided self” (2000: 431–432)). Example (14) may indeed be glossed as (15).

(15) He can’t help doing that kind of things.

\textsuperscript{14} As we shall see, the roles of agonist and antagonist can be filled by inanimate and even abstract entities.

\textsuperscript{15} This use, usually referred to as the anankastic conditional, has been extensively studied in formal semantics (cf. von Wright 1963; Søbø 2001; von Stechow et al. 2006, inter alia). On the basis of this body of works, I consider that even though the initial cause of the necessity may be a physical law, this type of sentences crucially involves a mediating – albeit hypothetical – desire to reach the goal expressed by the infinitival clause and, consequently, to accomplish the necessary action. In other words, these sentences mean that if the goal is desirable, so is the modalised state of affairs, since it is a necessary condition for the accomplishment of the goal.
4.3.2 “(Wide-scope) necessity”\(^{16}\)

When the modal expresses “wide-scope necessity”, as in (16–18), the modalised state of affairs can be either an event or a state.

(16) Dap.: Shall I not have it with me?
   Sub.: O, good sir! There must a world of ceremonies pass;
   You must be bath'd and fumigated first:
   Besides the queen of Fairy does not rise
   Till it be noon. (Jonson, 1610)

(17) I must and will have a kiss to give my wine a zest. (Gay, 1728)

(18) You must be 18 to enter.

As in the previous case, the state of affairs is desirable because some entity wants it to take place, as in (16–17), or it is desirable relative to some purpose, as in (18). However, this use differs from the sense of “obligation” in that the subject does not refer to the agonist. Even when an agent can be retrieved – as in (17), from which it is possible to infer You must and will give me a kiss – the fact that s/he is obliged to carry out the described action is backgrounded. The focus is therefore on the necessary character of the situation as a whole.

Although in most cases, as in (16–17), the agonist is simply “demoted” (cf. Talmy 2000: 442) but retrievable, the state of affairs is sometimes presented as necessary without implicating any agentivity. A case in point is example (18), which conveys no sense of pressure on the subject (or an unexpressed agonist) to act in a given way. Yet, although (18) might be thought to exemplify a different use of the modal, it appears, in fact, that it owes its specificity to the meaning of the VP, which refers to a property that cannot be acquired through a voluntary act.\(^{17}\) With more prototypical states, however, sentences are always open to the implication that the realisation of the necessary condition requires that an (implicit) agonist act in the appropriate way. Example (19), for instance, gives rise to the inference that it is the stage director’s responsibility to arrange the scene so as to make it open.

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\(^{16}\) I use the term “wide-scope modality” after Depraetere & Reed (2011).

\(^{17}\) Part of the same class are VPs such as be tall, be small, be white, have blue eyes, etc.
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4.3.3 “Inevitability”

When it expresses the sense of “inevitability”, as in (20), the modal indicates that the state of affairs is bound to occur because it is part of the normal course of events. This use differs from the previous ones in that the state of affairs does not appear desirable. In fact, the opposite implication is often conveyed, as is clear from (20).

(20) A few hours more, and she will be lost to me for ever. And shall I remain to witness the happiness which must destroy mine? No, no – my determination is fixed. This letter to my old Colonel will secure Frederick promotion. I will dispatch it, and depart without again seeing Cecilia. (Beazley, 1821)

In such sentences, the subject is not conceived as compelled to act in a specific way and therefore does not refer to the agonist. Neither is there an unexpressed agent who could be seen as under obligation to cause the described state of affairs. On the contrary, the event is assumed to be beyond human agency – hence the nuance of fatality – and to be caused by some unidentified force (which can be fate, circumstances or natural laws). Since neither the agonist nor the antagonist correspond to human entities, the force-dynamic pattern takes on a more abstract form, which can be accounted for in terms of Langacker’s “Dynamic Evolutionary Model” (1991: 275).

My claim is that the force-dynamic configuration that has just been described still pertains to the socio-physical world but that instead of involving entities belonging to the world, it concerns the world itself – or, more accurately, the cognizer’s representation of it. Here, I follow Langacker’s distinction between the world, a “stable framework within which situations arise and events unfold” (ibid.), and what happens within it. According to him, “there is an essential force-dynamic aspect to our representation of [the world’s] structure, which we see as constraining and influencing the events that unfold within it” (276). In other words, the world at a given moment is conceived as making some events possible, others impossible and others still, necessary. In the conceptual structure
underlying the meaning of “inevitability”, the antagonist is therefore equated with the world at a given time while the agonist corresponds to evolving reality at some subsequent time, which is constrained into conforming to the situation denoted by the proposition. However, I wish to challenge Langacker’s (2002: 336) assumption that the modal in sentences like (21) – and he would probably analyse (20) in the same way – expresses an epistemic meaning.

(21) *The way things are going, we should finish by noon.*

I do not deny that in (20) and (21) the state of affairs is under the scope of an epistemic judgement. As we have seen, root *must* implies that the speaker expects the necessary state of affairs to hold. But I claim that if Langacker’s account of (21) and my analysis of (20) along the same lines are correct, then, these sentences are essentially about a force-dynamic situation holding in the socio-physical world, which, in my view, is a defining feature of root modality.

4.3.4 “(Strong) probability”

In the use illustrated by (22), *must* conveys a high degree of probability which is inferred from available evidence (cf. Palmer 1990: 54). In this example, the speaker’s inference is explicitly based on the fact that his master “scrambled, neck or nothing, into this infernal place”.

(22) *Oh dear! I am half mad; my master must be quite mad, or he'd never have scrambled, neck or nothing, into this infernal place. I'm sure I caught a glance of him but an instant since.* (Fitzball, 1827)

With this use, we leave the domain of root modality and, I argue, of force dynamics, to enter the realm of epistemic qualification, which is concerned with the cognizer’s evaluation “of the likelihood of the state of affairs” (Nuyts 2001: xvi).

Having thus characterised the four main uses of *must*, I now present and discuss the results of the corpus-analysis with particular emphasis on the rise of epistemic *must* and on the conceptual link between root and epistemic meanings.
4.4 Results of the corpus-analysis

Table 1 gives the distribution in absolute and relative values of the different uses of *must* in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. It shows that the epistemic meaning increased significantly over the period. Starting as a minor use in the 17th century (2.2% of all examples), it then expanded significantly in the 18th century, to reach the proportion of 16.4% in the 19th century. Over the same period, the sense of “inevitability” declined in inverse proportion to the epistemic use.\(^\text{18}\)

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<th>Obligation</th>
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<th>Inevitability</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Let us now consider the case of *must* followed by the perfect infinitive,\(^\text{19}\) as illustrated by (23).

(23) *Pray, tell me, Sir! You must have lost your wits or all sense of shame. How could you think of giving Lucetta such a sum? A thousand pounds!* (King, 1763)

As the construction is known to be highly compatible with the epistemic reading of the modal (cf. Palmer 1990; Bybee et al. 1994, among others), there is a possibility that it played a role in the emergence of the sense of “probability”. Evidence of this is found in table 2 which shows that the construction developed in the 18th century (with, from the start, a high proportion of epistemic meanings), that is, in the very same period that saw the sharp increase of epistemic uses (cf. table 1).

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\(^{18}\) The reasons for this decline are not totally clear at this stage and will be the object of some future research. It is perhaps significant that the two meanings whose frequencies decreased in the 19th century (namely: “necessity” and “inevitability”) are those in which the speaker’s role is minimal – in the sense that s/he is construed as an external observer of a force-dynamic situation. However, to back up the claim that the increase of the speaker’s role is (one of) the determining factor(s), it must be shown that, within the sense of “obligation”, there was a similar decrease of occurrences in which the speaker was not the deontic source.

\(^{19}\) The corpus contains no occurrence of *must* followed by the progressive form.
Table 2. Evolution of the uses of *must* followed by the perfect infinitive (1600–1899)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>

As reported in tables 1 and 2, there are a number of examples whose meanings were found indeterminate, that is, instances where two or more readings of the modal were possible (and compatible\(^\text{20}\)). The relevance of such cases for diachronic studies is now well-known (cf. Hopper & Traugott 1993; Goossens 1999; Heine 2002; Traugott 2006, inter alia), insofar as they provide the “transitional uses” or “bridges” showing “what the precise basis for the development may have been” (Goossens 1999: 196). Of special interest to us, therefore, are those examples in which the epistemic sense of *must* co-exists with another interpretation.

Interestingly, while indeterminacy affects all the uses of the modal, the epistemic meaning only combines with the sense of “inevitability”. This partially confirms Goossens’ (1999, 2000) finding and deals a serious blow at the metaphorical hypothesis, since the agent/speaker mapping that was crucial to it turns out not be supported by the data. The indeterminacy between those two meanings is illustrated by (24–25).

(24)  *But I must explain to you, Sir, that my risibility, just now, was excited by the remembrance of the stately tribe that have stalked thro' life, in that mansion. I'll be bound that not a soul of them, from generation to generation, was ever detected in any thing beyond a simper. Well! Rest them – merry, I was going to say – but that is impossible – they must be grand and melancholy, even in Paradise.* (Holman, 1811)

(25)  *After placing the proctors at the table in the parlour, and supplying them with necessaries for the work, I was going up the back stairs to my own apartment the garret, when, bless my eyes! What should I see but your uncle. A scream testified my surprise, and my immediately running from him must have increased his. I believe he will follow me if he can muster so much strength.* (King, 1763)

Although Goossens (ibid.) recognises the sense he calls “objective inference” – which is analogous to the meaning I refer to as “inevitability”

\(^{20}\) I distinguish “indeterminacy” thus defined from “ambiguity” which refers to the possibility for an expression to convey two conflicting interpretations.
as the main source of the epistemic meaning, he also suggests that the
deontic use may have played a role in the rise of epistemic must, arguing
that verbs that “can be taken to be both non-controlled or controlled (or at
least controllable)” (1999: 199) – e.g. remember, know and, occasionally,
be – provide another type of transitional context. I find this debatable for
two reasons. First, these are clearly not cases of indeterminacy but of
ambiguity —which, I would suggest, is a consequence and not a cause of
semantic change. Although it is true that You must know p can be
interpreted either as I have to tell you that p (deontic) or as You probably
know p (epistemic), these are radically different and incompatible
interpretations (why should I have to tell you p if I think that you already
know p?) which are therefore hard to regard as metonymic bridges. Indeed,
Goossens himself defines transitional contexts as “contexts in which the
two interpretations are simultaneously relevant” (ibid., 195–196). Second,
it is usually possible to disambiguate the modal by taking the wider context
into account. In (26), for instance, although You must know the first thing I
did is potentially ambiguous,21 the context leaves no doubt that the deontic
reading is the intended one.

(26) Buckthorn.: At what [were you surprised], Mrs. Matron!
Posset.: Why, Sir, as I was chafing the Ladies’ temples (as I was telling you) –
but you must know the first thing I did, was to hold a looking-glass to their
mouths. (Bacon, 1757)

The data therefore adds weight to the critique of the metaphorical
hypothesis developed in the first section, and it is therefore justified to look
for an alternative account of the epistemic category and of the conceptual
and historical links between root and epistemic meanings.

5. Redefining epistemicity

The main inconsistencies in Sweetser’s (1990) theory stem from the
premise that epistemicity is conceptually derived from root modality. Most
of the aforementioned problems disappear if this postulate is abandoned
and if root modality and epistemic qualification are taken as two
independent semantic categories.

21 Although this point is hard to prove, I suspect that the ambiguity perceived in cases
like (26) may be due to hindsight bias.
Following Lampert & Lampert (2000) and Talmy (2007), I make the hypothesis that root values pertain to the schematic system of force dynamics while epistemic meanings are generated by the schematic system of “‘cognitive states and processes’, which includes the structural representation of volition and intention, expectation and affect, and perspective and attention” (Talmy 2007: 267), in other words, notions which are concerned with the cognizer’s attitude towards the state of affairs. That epistemic qualification belongs to this set of attitudinal categories is clear from the way it is usually defined in the literature. For instance, Palmer (2001: 8) considers that “with epistemic modality speakers express their judgements about the factual status of the proposition”, while for Nuyts (2006: 6), it “concerns an indication of the estimation, typically, but not necessarily, by the speaker, of the chances that the state of affairs expressed in the clause applies in the world”.

Note that, as Nuyts rightly observes, epistemic judgements do not always emanate from the speaker: it is not rare for a sentence to convey another cognizer’s epistemic judgement on a state of affairs (e.g. Mary thinks that John is mad expresses Mary’s belief that John is mad).

What I would suggest, however, is that any utterance conveys the stance (or attitude) of a cognizer who is, by default, equated with the speaker. While this attitude is often epistemic (e.g. I believe/know/suspect that...), it may also have to do with the speaker’s desire to have the state of affairs realised, as in (27).

(27) Go to bed now!

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22 Although Talmy (2000: 443) seems to endorse Sweetser’s extension of the force-dynamic analysis to the epistemic domain, in his more recent work (cf. Talmy 2007), he seems to have taken his distance from the metaphorical hypothesis.

23 Nuyts (2006) argues that deontic modality is also an attitudinal category. It cannot be denied that it does contain an attitudinal component inasmuch as the antagonist and the cognizer are presented as respectively wanting and expecting the state of affairs to hold (see the obligation-script in figure 1). Yet, deontic meanings differ from epistemic meanings in that they involve a force-dynamic component that is central to their underlying conceptual structures.

24 Radden & Dirven (2007: 236) call this attitude “directive”. I believe the term is too “hearer-oriented” to cover all cases where the speaker wants the situation to hold (e.g. optative sentences). “Volitional attitude” might be more fitting but this question cannot be handled in the limits set to this paper.
In examples such as (27) and (28), the speaker’s attitude is conveyed explicitly. The imperative construction and the embedding clause (I believe) encode the speaker’s will and his/her epistemic judgement, respectively.

(28) I believe that Peter is here.

In many cases, however, it is left implicit, and my claim is that, in such examples, the default epistemic stance I KNOW THAT is inferable (on the basis of Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quality). (29), for instance, implies (30).

(29) Peter is here.

(30) I know that Peter is here.

This idea of course is not a new one. The hypothesis that there exists an implicit embedding clause expressing the speaker’s stance can be traced back to Austin’s Speech-acts theory (1962) and, in the field of syntax, to Ross (1970), in what is known as the performative hypothesis. Hare’s neustic and tropic components (1970), taken up by Lyons (1977), share the same background assumption. My analysis differs from these authors’ however in that what, after Hare (ibid.), I shall call the “neustic component”, refers to the speaker’s mental attitude (that is, whether s/he knows, believes or wants the state of affairs to hold) and not to the act accomplished by the utterance (i.e. its illocutionary force). In the cognitive framework within which I am working, this neustic component has to be an element of the conceptual content that is communicated by – or, at least, inferable from – the sentence. It can in no way be a speech-act, since, by definition, speech-acts are not part of what utterances say but are descriptions of what they do. 25

Note that the above analysis of the epistemic category gets rid of the problems plaguing Sweetser’s theory.

First, it permits us to account for the gradability of epistemic evaluation. I KNOW THAT corresponds to the highest degree of the scale while I DO NOT KNOW IF marks its lowest point. There is an indefinite number of positions between those two extremes which can be coded by such expressions as I believe, I suspect, I strongly believe, I have a hunch.

that, the odds are that, etc. Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual structures I propose for the epistemic modals *must* and *may*.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2.** Semantic structures underlying the epistemic uses of *must* and *may*

The cognizer, who, with modals, is typically equated with the speaker, is represented by a circle on the left. The horizontal arrows stand for his/her epistemic judgement (BELIEVE), which is directed at the mental image of the state of affairs (SoA), in the circle on the right. The vertical double arrows represent the cognizer’s degree of belief in the truth of the proposition. It is obviously different for *must* and *may*.

Second, the problem posed by the near-synonymy of (5) and (6) – repeated as (31) and (32) – vanishes once we stop maintaining that (31) has a force-dynamic component.

(31) *He must be mad!*

(32) *He is probably mad.*

Since neither (31) nor (32) refer to force-dynamic situations, they can be analysed along the same lines as expressions of the speaker’s strong belief in the truth of the proposition. Although this cannot be elaborated on for lack of space, I suggest that the modal auxiliary and the epistemic adverb differ in at least two respects. First, they present the epistemic evaluation from two different perspectives (cf. Westney 1986): (31) refers to the state of belief of the speaker/cognizer relative to the state of affairs (*X more or less believes that p*) while (32) describes the degree of likelihood of the state of affairs (*p is more or less likely*).
Second, as pointed out by Radden & Dirven (2007: 241), unlike the modal adverb, the modal auxiliary “informs the hearer that the assessment is exclusively or largely the speaker’s”. The epistemic assessment can therefore be described as “maximally subjective” (ibid.) in (31), whereas it is more objective in (32). Note that the terms “subjective” and “objective” are here used in the technical sense defined by Langacker who considers that

the entity construed subjectively is implicit and hence non salient – to use the theatre metaphor, it remains offstage in the audience – whereas the objectively construed entity is salient by virtue of being placed onstage as the explicit focus of attention. (Langacker 2002: 316)

A maximally objective construal of the speaker’s epistemic stance may therefore be found in (33) where the use of the first person pronoun puts the speaker onstage and thus objectivises him/her.

(33) I think that he is mad.

Cognitive verbs in the first person, modal adverbs and modal auxiliaries therefore express the speaker’s epistemic attitude with increasing degrees of subjectivity.

Note however that, if modal auxiliaries, as grounding predications (Langacker 1991), indicate, by default, the speaker’s stance, they can, in certain contexts, express another cognizer’s epistemic evaluation of the state of affairs. (34) illustrates.

(34) John thinks you must have broken the vase.

6. An alternative account of the emergence of the epistemic use of must

While this analysis of epistemic qualification overcomes most of the theoretical objections that were raised against the metaphorical hypothesis in the first section, its ability to account for the rise of epistemic must will constitute the acid test.

This account of subjectivity contrasts sharply with Traugott’s (1989) who considers that “subjectification implies an increase in the coding of speaker involvement or, in other words, an externalization of the speaker” (Brisard 2006: 57).
6.1 Hypothesis

As we have seen, in all utterances, the speaker’s attitude is conveyed explicitly or implicitly. When it is not explicitly coded, I have suggested that the default epistemic position I KNOW THAT can be inferred. Thus, when they are used descriptively (cf. Nuyts 2001), root modals fall under the scope of an epistemic judgement which can be explicit, as in (35), or implicit, as in (36), paraphrased as (37).

(35) *I know/I guess that John must come.*

(36) *John must come.*

(37) *I know that John is obliged to come.*

In order to account for the emergence of the epistemic use of *must*, I make the following hypothesis. In certain contexts (which will be described in further details), the focus of attention shifted from the force-dynamic situation (i.e. the existence of the necessity) to the state of affairs proper. This logically resulted in the foregrounding27 of the speaker’s attitude towards the state of affairs and in the backgrounding of the default epistemic judgement (I KNOW THAT) concerning the force-dynamic situation. Indeed, in (36), the implicit epistemic judgement I KNOW THAT bears on the existence of the necessity and not on the event itself. This is evidenced by the fact that (36) does not entail (38).

(38) *I know that John will come.*

The question arises, then, of what the “new” epistemic stance is and where it comes from. As will be remembered, it has been shown that, in its root uses, *must* implies that the cognizer expects the necessary state of affairs to

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27 Note that Talmy’s (2000; 2007) term “foregrounding” and Langacker’s (1991) term “profiling” are not used interchangeably. Talmy’s (2007: 272) distinction is a useful one: the *foregrounding* of a semantic component of a frame consists in placing it in “the foreground of the hearer’s attention” (ibid.: 269) thus making it more salient, while “profiling” refer[s] to the foregrounding of one portion of the set in a morpheme’s direct reference” (ibid.: 272).
occur. This was captured by the inclusion of the epistemic predicate EXPECT\textsuperscript{28} as a backgrounded element of the frame (see figure 1).

My claim, therefore, is that, in transitional contexts, this formerly backgrounded epistemic attitude became more salient and started to co-exist in the foreground of attention with the former default epistemic judgement I KNOW THAT. Ultimately, it gained in prominence and became the only epistemic stance. The result was an utterly different conceptual structure and thus an independent meaning of the modal.

6.2 From “inevitability” to “probability”: a step-by-step evolution

As we have seen in section 3.4, the conventionalisation of the epistemic use of must went through two stages. These stages are commonly referred to as\textsuperscript{29}

(i) Bridging or transitional contexts. These are contexts which make the two interpretations equally relevant. In the case of must, they are even complementary, since the speaker’s knowledge of the existence of the necessity (i.e. the force-dynamic situation) can serve as the evidential source for the epistemic judgement on the state of affairs. This semantic relatedness can be formulated as I believe that the state of affairs holds because I know that it is inevitable. Example (39) is an illustration of this.

(39) My daughter is at present engag’d in a way, that to her must be more agreeable than entertaining either you or me. (Cobb, 1788)

(ii) Switch contexts. These contexts exclude the initial meaning. In the case of epistemic must, this corresponds to sentences where the evidential source of the epistemic judgement is no longer the speaker’s awareness of a force-dynamic situation but his/her observation of some consequence of that state of affairs (noted q) from which s/he infers that it (has) probably occurred or is occurring, as illustrated in example (40).

\textsuperscript{28} It might be objected that EXPECT and BELIEVE are not fully equivalent, but although they differ in terms of temporality (the former bears on a future event, the latter on a past or present state of affairs), they refer to the same kind of epistemic judgement.

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. Heine 2002, for instance.
(40) Pray, tell me, Sir! You must have lost your wits or all senses of shame. How could you think of giving Lucetta such a sum? (King, 1768)

To summarise, the emergence of the epistemic use of *must* followed the following cline:

(i) I know that circumstances make the state of affairs inevitable.
(ii) I believe that the state of affairs holds/held because (i).
(iii) I believe that the state of affairs holds/held because I know that q holds and that q is a consequence of the state of affairs.

Stage (i) corresponds to the source-meaning of “inevitability”, (ii) to cases of indeterminacy between “inevitability” and “probability” (or bridging contexts) and (iii) to the conventionalised epistemic use of *must* (or switch contexts).

6.3 More on transitional contexts

In order to better understand the circumstances that led to this semantic change, it is useful to characterise bridging contexts more precisely by examining the cases of indeterminacy in the corpus.

It is striking that 83% of the instances of indeterminacy between “inevitability” and “probability” contain a state verb (mainly *be*) and that 67% of these sentences are generic. These two parameters are examined in turn.

6.3.1 Imperfectives

It is well-known (cf. Palmer 1990: 53) that epistemic *must* mainly occurs with state verbs. By contrast, when it expresses “inevitability”, the modal is typically followed by an event verb. It may be surmised, then, that the extension of this use to state verbs contributed to the strengthening of the sense of “probability”.

The rationale behind this evolution can be explained as follows. The preceding account of the sense of “inevitability” postulates two sub-frames (SF1 and SF2 in figure 3), one of which (SF2) was originally backgrounded and gradually gained in salience.
With event verbs (which typically designate perfective processes), the “necessary” state of affairs (SoA) is located in the future, whereas the force-dynamic situation (noted “FD situation” and paraphrasable as “the world acts on evolving reality”) belongs to the present. Thus, while the two epistemic judgements (I KNOW THAT and I EXPECT THAT) are located in the present (the point of reference from which the speaker-cognizer assesses the likelihood of the states of affairs), they are directed at scenes situated in different temporal frames. With perfectives, then, the temporal coincidence between the two sub-frames is minimal.

On the contrary, the flexible temporal profile of imperfective processes (typically expressed by state verbs) “can always be made to coincide precisely with the time of speaking” (Langacker 1987: 259), so that both the force-dynamic situation and the modalised state of affairs can belong to the same (present) time-frame. Thus, with imperfectives, the temporal coincidence between the two sub-frames is maximal. This temporal realignment, I suggest, increased the conceptual contiguity between the two sub-frames and reduced the semantic difference between the two interpretations, thereby favouring cases of semantic indeterminacy where the two sub-frames were equally relevant and salient (see figure 4).

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30 As pointed out by Langacker (1987: 254), perfectives cannot be coincidental with the moment of speaking.

31 The neustic component is necessarily coincidental to the time of speaking.
There are two reasons why this conceptual realignment affected the sense of “inevitability” and not other root senses. First, as we have seen, the sense of “inevitability” is the most abstract of the root meanings and the lightest in terms of conceptual content. This minimizes the semantic differences between the two interpretations and facilitates indeterminacy. Second, and more importantly, the meaning of “inevitability” differs from other root meanings in that the necessary state of affairs is not presented as desirable (cf. supra), which makes it compatible not only with future events but also with present and past states of affairs, that is, with both perfectives and imperfectives.

Note that the observed results concerning must followed by the perfect infinitive (see section 3, table 2) are fully consistent with this account. As evidenced by (41), the sense of “inevitability” could already combine with the perfect construction, just as it could combine with a state verb.

(41) Brief as you please – you shall have the trials in epitome – I am an excellent fellow at shortening. And so, in the first place, there was Aaron an old Jew, you must certainly have taken notice of an old greazy fellow upon the ‘Change, with a

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32 The underlying semantic frame indeed makes no reference to a deontic source that wants the state of affairs to hold or to a purpose relative to which it is necessary.
33 Root must occurs mainly with event verbs and when it combines with a state verb (as in You must be kind), the process is, so to speak, perfectivized so as to denote an activity located in the future.
34 Example (41) clearly means ‘You cannot not have taken notice of the fellow’ and not ‘You have probably taken notice of the fellow’.
SHYLOCK FACE – who is said to have raised an immense fortune by stock-jobbing and lottery-tickets – he is one that is adjudged to be DEPARTED THIS LIFE, I assure you. (Bacon, 1757)

My contention is that, just like state verbs, the perfect infinitive makes the modalised situation coincide with the time of reference, thereby causing the temporal coincidence of the two sub-frames. This may seem paradoxical insofar as, traditionally, the perfect infinitive is assumed to locate the state of affairs denoted by the past participle in the past or, at least, prior to the time of reference. Yet, as noted by Langacker (1991: 222–223), if the function of the past participle is indeed to indicate the anteriority (relative to the reference-point) of the situation described by the main verb, the auxiliary have construes the whole scene (i.e. the current relevance of the past situation) as coincidental with the time of reference and should therefore be analysed as an imperfective process.

6.3.2 Genericity

The fact that many of the sentences exhibiting indeterminacy are generic is also relevant and can also be seen, I argue, as a factor of temporal (and conceptual) realignment. As noted by Traugott (2006: 113), genericity is “another contributor to the indeterminacy, since present as well as future temporality is implied”. Indeed, generic sentences also present the force-dynamic situation and the necessary state of affairs as part of the same temporal frame, which makes them conceptually contiguous and, consequently, equally likely to be foregrounded.

6.4 Towards switch contexts

The evolution from bridging contexts to switch contexts must have been gradual and it is likely that to a stage where the two interpretations were equally salient succeeded a stage where the epistemic interpretation became more and more prominent while the original interpretation gradually fell into the background of attention to be viewed as nothing more than the evidential source for the newly foregrounded epistemic judgement (cf. stage (ii) above).

The ultimate development of this evolution (which corresponds to switch contexts) was the complete erosion of the meaning of “inevitability” (i.e. of the force-dynamic component) and the autonomisation of the sense
of “probability”. At that stage, the judgement of probability ceased to be based on the (cognizer’s knowledge of the) existence of a force-dynamic situation and the reason for the state of affairs’ strong likelihood (i.e. the basis of the speaker’s inferential reasoning) was often made explicit. Example (42) is an illustration of this.

(42) No, thank ye, Mr. Capias; but you must be doing pretty well too, I always see Mr. Wormwood employed. (Beazley, 1826)

The reference to an evidential source other than the existence of a force-dynamic situation (the underlined segment in (42)) reflects the fact that the underlying semantic structure bears no trace of the initial force-dynamic component and that the epistemic reading has become the only interpretation available.

6.5 Subjectification

This study would be incomplete without a consideration of subjectification, a process that has been largely discussed in the field of historical linguistics and to which Traugott (1989), Langacker (1991, 2002) and Goossens (2000) explicitly relate the extension of root meanings to epistemic uses.

The problem is that Langacker and Traugott (followed by Goossens) use the term in different ways which Brisard (2006) has shown to be incompatible. Thus, for Traugott (1989: 31), subjectification is the process by which meanings “become increasingly situated in the speaker’s belief or attitude toward the proposition”, while, as we have seen in section 4, Langacker uses the term in a more technical sense to refer to the “attenuation of the speaker’s prominence within a given scene” (Brisard 2006: 57).

It is not clear to me whether what I have described as a shift of attention to a backgrounded epistemic judgement should be analysed as resulting in a more subjectified construal in Langacker’s sense. As a grounding predication, must – whether it be deontic or epistemic – is more “subjective” than, say, a modal periphrasis like have to, to the extent that although it is formally – and thus conceptually – related to the Ground, it leaves it un profiled (cf. Langacker 1991: 270–271). I feel that calling epistemic must more “subjectified” than root must (on the ground that, as Langacker (ibid.: 274) says “[t]he speaker is involved (…) as the person responsible for assessing the likelihood of reality evolving in a certain
way”) betrays a slight terminological move from Langacker’s technical definition of subjectivity towards Traugott’s use of the term.

In order not to add to the terminological confusion, I would rather say, following Sweetser (op. cit.), that root and epistemic meanings pertain to different domains (without of course endorsing the idea of a metaphorical link between the two): the socio-physical world and the mental world, respectively. Thus, the force-dynamic situation to which a root expression refers is conceptualised as part of the socio-physical world (there is something in the external world that makes the state of affairs necessary) while an epistemic expression refers to the cognizer’s degree of confidence in the reality of the state of affairs.

The reason why epistemic must may seem more “subjective” (in Traugott’s sense, this time) is that the shift of attention described above was accompanied by a shift of the reference of the modal to the neustic component. With the force-dynamic situation (and the default epistemic attitude towards it) gradually fading out, the reference of the modal had to be redirected to another part of the frame. The formerly backgrounded epistemic judgement (I EXPECT/BELIEVE THAT) then logically came to replace the default judgement (I KNOW THAT) and therefore took the place of the neustic component. However, in the absence of a specific linguistic form to refer to the neustic component, we have seen that the default epistemic stance is inferred. This explains why the reference of must, whose original reference35 had fallen out of the picture, naturally (because of its grounding function) came to be reallocated to the neustic component.

7. Conclusion

We have seen that it is possible to account for the emergence of the epistemic use of must without relying on Sweetser’s metaphorical hypothesis and even without positing that the categories of root modality and of epistemic qualification are subsumed by one unified semantic category.

The principal claim of this paper is that the various meanings of an expression (e.g. “obligation”, “necessity”, “inevitability”) are underpinned

35 Note that if must does not refer directly to the force-dynamic situation (in its root meaning) or to the epistemic judgement (in its epistemic reading) – as only the state of affairs is profiled, it does refer to them indirectly, i.e. schematically.
by complex semantic networks (or frames) and that certain contexts permit the foregrounding of some components of the frame which, until then, had been backgrounded.

I therefore take seriously the claim that there may not be such a thing as a unified semantic category of modality subsuming root and epistemic meanings. Although this hypothesis challenges the commonly accepted view that the two categories should be semantically related, its supporters (Lampert & Lampert 2000; Nuyts 2001) have advanced a number of theoretical and empirical arguments that are worthy of consideration. Moreover, as Nuyts suggests, breaking the traditional unity of modality may help gain a better understanding both of epistemicity itself and of its interaction with other categories such as aspect or evidentiality. This area of investigation, in fact, can be considered to be among the most promising directions for future research in the study of TAME categories.

References

ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE EPISTEMIC USE OF MUST


APPENDIX

Sources of data

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<td>15649</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>Dryden</td>
<td><em>Wild Gallant &amp; others</em></td>
<td>15698</td>
<td>Gutenberg Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>Caryll</td>
<td><em>The English princess</em></td>
<td>15468</td>
<td>EEBO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1681</td>
<td>Shadwell</td>
<td><em>The Lancashire-Witches</em></td>
<td>15488</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<td>1686</td>
<td>D'Urfey</td>
<td><em>The Bandit</em></td>
<td>15577</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>Motteux</td>
<td><em>Farewel Folly</em></td>
<td>15413</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>Conlilvre</td>
<td><em>The Buite Body</em></td>
<td>15501</td>
<td>Gutenberg Project</td>
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<td>1728</td>
<td>Gay</td>
<td><em>The beggar’s Opera</em></td>
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<td>Gutenberg Project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1753</td>
<td>Moore</td>
<td><em>The Gaimester</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1757</td>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td><em>The Insignificants</em></td>
<td>14558</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1763–70</td>
<td>Foote</td>
<td><em>The Lane Lover : The Mayor of Garvet</em></td>
<td>15519</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1763–68</td>
<td>King</td>
<td><em>Wit's Last Stake : Love at First Sight</em></td>
<td>14637</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1788–94</td>
<td>Cobb</td>
<td><em>The Doctor and the Apothecary ; The Cherokee</em></td>
<td>15098</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>Pratt</td>
<td><em>The New Cosmetic ; Fire and Frost</em></td>
<td>15281</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800–1899</td>
<td>1808</td>
<td>Reynolds</td>
<td><em>The Free Knights</em></td>
<td>14938</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Holman</td>
<td><em>The Gazette Extraordinary</em></td>
<td>15254</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1821–26</td>
<td>Beazley</td>
<td><em>The Lottery Ticket, and the Lawyer's Clerk : Love's Dream</em></td>
<td>14979</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1824–27</td>
<td>Fitzball</td>
<td><em>The Flying Dutchman ; The Floating Beacon</em></td>
<td>15190</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>Thackeray</td>
<td><em>Wolves and the Lamb</em></td>
<td>15455</td>
<td>Gutenberg Project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Bayle Bernard</td>
<td><em>The Evil Genius</em></td>
<td>14814</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<td>1862</td>
<td>Watts Phillips</td>
<td><em>Camilla’s husband</em></td>
<td>14901</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>Marston</td>
<td><em>The Favourite of Fortune</em></td>
<td>15330</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Grundy</td>
<td><em>A Pair of Spectacles</em></td>
<td>15354</td>
<td>EProseD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Wilde</td>
<td><em>The Importance of Being Earnest</em></td>
<td>15738</td>
<td>Gutenberg Project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Abstract

This paper studies two linguistic constructions in Finnish, the go-say construction and the come-say construction. Both constructions contain a motion verb and a speech act verb in the 3rd infinitive illative case. The article focuses specifically on how the constructions express a speaker’s or writer’s affective stance. The analysis in this paper is inter-linguistic and it relies on the theories and methods used in corpus linguistics, interactional linguistics and cognitive semantics. This paper analyses, describes and explains the collocational, social and cognitive motivations behind the affective meanings of these constructions. Finally, it discusses the benefits and challenges of combining three different linguistic theories and methodologies in the analysis of a linguistic construction.

1. Introduction

In this article, affect is understood as an element of the broader phenomenon of stance and stance taking in interaction and discourse. By affect we mean the ways in which speakers or writers express their own or describe someone else’s emotional attitude through language, in talk or writing. Affect has interested linguists broadly and studies have shown how language can be used to express a speaker’s or writer’s affect in different ways. For example, studies have shown how such linguistic markers as some adverbs, verbs and adjectives, inherently express affect (see e.g. Biber & Finegan 1989; Martin 2000; Precht 2003). Others have shown how certain markers, grammatical forms or linguistic practices are functionally used to express a speaker’s affective stance in discourse (e.g. Du Bois

1 The authors thank the two anonymous reviewers for their important and constructive comments. Any remaining inadequacies and mistakes are our own.

This article analyses two linguistic constructions in Finnish whose individual formal structures do not inherently have an affective meaning, but which based on our empirical analyses belongs to the structures’ meaning potential. Thus the structures are used for expressing affect. In general this paper uses several linguistic methodologies to explain why and how the two structures possess affective meaning.

We call these two constructions the go-say construction and the come-say construction. They are composed of a motion verb, either mennä ‘go’ or tulla ‘come’, which is accompanied by a speech act verb (such as kertoa ‘tell’ or sanoa ‘say’) in the 3rd infinitive (or so-called MA-infinitive) illative case, as in mennä kertomaan ‘to go and tell’ and tulla sanomaan ‘to come and say’. Their formal structure is described in (1) and (2).

(1)  mennä ‘go’ + speech act verb in the 3rd infinitive illative case
    e.g.  mennä  kerto-ma-an
           go    tell-INF-ILL
      ‘go and tell’

(2)  tulla ‘come’ + speech act verb in the 3rd infinitive illative case
    e.g.  tulla  sano-ma-an
           come  say-INF-ILL
      ‘come and say’

This study focuses exclusively on these two deictic motion verbs for the following three reasons. First, according to Saukkonen et al. (1979) and the list of the most frequent words in Finnish newspapers, they are the most frequently used deictic verbs of motion in Finnish. Second, according to our corpus data only these verbs among motion verbs (compared to others such as lähteää ‘to leave’, rientää ‘to hasten’, and rynnätää ‘to burst’) are repeatedly used with speech act verbs in affective constructions. In other words, if other motion verbs occur together with speech act verbs they tend to maintain the concrete meaning of motion. Third, by concentrating on these two structures we can analyse them from a detailed, inter-linguistic and multi-methodological vantage point.

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2 For overviews see Englebretson (2007) and Haddington (2005).
3 See Appendix 2 for gloss conventions.
These types of structures have been studied in different languages and labelled under the terms of hendiadys (Hopper 2001), pseudo-coordinative structures and simple juxtapositions (Stefanowitsch 1999; Payne 1997: 337–338; Airola 2007). However, as Stefanowitsch (1999: 123) argues, these studies tend to focus on the structures’ formal properties. In this paper, we study how these structures can be seen to be combinations of form and meaning, and for referring to this combination we use the notion “construction”. According to Goldberg’s (1995: 4) definition, an essential criterion for a construction is that its semantic properties are not strictly predictable from the construction’s individual elements. Consider example (3) below.

(3) Kaveri-ni Roope laske-e juo-nee-nsa maailma-lla ainakin
friend-1PX Roope count-3SG drink-PTCP-3PX world-GEN at.least
viittäsata-a eri kahviplaatu-a. Vain Suome-ssa häne-lle
five.hundred-PTV different coffee.brand-PTV only Finland-INE he-ALL
on tul-tu pään naama-a selittä-mä-än, että meikäläinen
be.3SG come-PTCP against face-PTV explain-INF-ILL that our
hölli on maailma-n paras-ta.
coffee be.3SG world-GEN best-PTV
‘My friend Roope estimates that he has drunk at least five hundred different coffee brands around the world. Only in Finland people have come and claimed to him that Finnish coffee is the best in the world.’

The example exhibits the following syntactic form: a motion verb tulla ‘come’ followed by a speech act verb in the 3rd infinitive illative case. However, although the structure contains the motion verb, it seems that here the verb has lost its meaning of concrete movement. One explanation is that in the described situation the Actor\(^5\) (not specified in (3) due to passive voice),\(^6\) who has produced the speech act (selittä ‘explain’) that

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\(^5\) We use the notion “Speaker” to indicate a person who has produced the analysed utterance and who through this utterance evaluates another person’s speech act. For example, the person who has uttered example (3) is the Speaker. “The Actor”, on the other hand, refers to the person whose speech act is retrospectively referred to by the Speaker. The Actor’s speech act is thus evaluated by the Speaker via the go-say and come-say constructions. In example (3), the Actor is the implicit person who has told Roope that Finnish coffee is the best. “The Addressee”, for its part, is the person the Actor is talking to in the examples. In example (3), the Addressee is Roope.

\(^6\) Passive voice in Finnish allows the (human-agent) subject to remain unspecified yet existing (for Finnish passive, see Shore (1988)). This explains the presence of an implicit Actor in the example.
the Speaker reports, is positioned next to Roope and talking to him about Finnish coffee brands and therefore has not moved before producing his utterance. Consequently, rather than expressing motion, the verb *tulla* in this construction has another semantic function: the Speaker’s affective evaluation of the Actor’s conversational manner as belligerent. Of course, this aggressive tone gets supplementary emphasis in (3) from the adverbial modifier *päin naamaa* ‘at his face’.

Such semantic change in motion verbs is not a new finding. Givón (1973) notes that in the world’s languages motion verbs frequently undergo semantic developments: they lose the meaning of motion and start to express other semantic properties. It seems that the *go-say* and *come-say* constructions stand as good examples of such changes. It should be borne in mind, however, that the *go-say* construction and the *come-say* construction do not have affective meanings as such, because they may also refer to concrete motion which is followed by a speech act, and these are quite neutral per se. Thus, the affective readings studied in this paper are due to different (textual or social) contexts in which these constructions are used. In the following, the aim is to describe how these constructions’ affective meanings are evident in the data and to explain possible reasons behind such semantic change.

Although the verbs *mennä* ‘go’ ja *tulla* ‘come’ are basic deictic verbs in Finnish and form an intrinsic semantic pair, they are by no means semantically symmetric. They differ in meaning both in their concrete and figurative usages. For example, in the concrete sense, the verb *mennä* is said to express more extensive motion along the path than the verb *tulla* (Huumo & Sivonen 2010: 113). Also in dictionaries these two verbs are listed to have clearly different sets of meaning types. For instance, a recent and comprehensive dictionary of Finnish gives more figurative meaning types to the verb *tulla* compared to the verb *mennä* (KS s.v. *mennä*, *tulla*).

The analysis in this paper is inter-linguistic. It relies on theories and methods used in three different linguistic paradigms: corpus linguistics, interactional linguistics and cognitive semantics. It uses corpus linguistic methods to study the frequencies and phraseological uses of the constructions and in that way sheds light on the constructions’ affective meanings. The interactional linguistic method is used to investigate the social and interactional contexts in which the constructions are used and to see whether these contexts of use, for their part, can explain the affective meanings of the constructions. Finally, by using cognitive semantics, this article tries to provide an explanation of the constructions’ affective
meanings. The analysis will also show that although both of these constructions express affect, they differ in how frequently they do that, in what contexts they appear and what the cognitive motivations behind the affective meanings are.

This paper is divided into six sections. After the introduction, Section 2 describes the used databases and provides some further background to our approach. Section 3 gives a corpus-based analysis of the go-say and come-say constructions. In Section 4, we analyse how the constructions are used in everyday conversation. Then, in Section 5, our focus turns to the semantic motivation of these constructions within the framework of cognitive semantics. In the last section we briefly sum up our conclusions and then discuss the benefits and challenges involved in using three methodologies for studying the same linguistic constructions.

2. Data and methodologies: three approaches to form and meaning

The analysis in this paper is empirical and relies on several digital language databases. In Sections 3 and 5, the examples come from written language data collected from The Finnish Language Bank.\(^7\) This material consists of volumes of four Finnish newspapers and the size of this database is approx. 60 million words. The newspapers are published in different dialect areas in Finland. The normed frequency of the constructions (i.e. the structures with affective meaning) in written data was 4.8 per million words (1/205479), the absolute frequencies being 196 for the go-say construction and 93 for the come-say construction.

The spoken language data come from several audio corpora. The first database is the corpus of conversational Finnish located at the Department of Finnish Language and Literature at the University of Helsinki.\(^8\) It consists of face-to-face and telephone conversations from various dialect areas in Finland. These data are supplemented by a collection of mobile phone recordings and two short audio recordings located at the University of Oulu. The overall duration of the everyday conversational data is 10 hours and 3 minutes, which amounts to approximately 120 000 words (approx. 200 words per minute). We have also made a search for the

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\(^8\) In all, the corpus contains approximately 340 hours of conversational Finnish. See http://www.helsinki.fi/hum/skl/tutkimus/kesk_arkisto.htm (accessed August 29, 2011).
constructions in the Finnish Broadcast Corpus, which contains approx. 17 hours of broadcast talk and unfinished recordings of various radio and TV monologues and dialogues. The normed frequency of the constructions in spoken data was 141.7 per million words (1/7060). All the constructions were collected from the databases and transcribed.

The analysis in the article relies on the methods used in corpus linguistics, interactional linguistics and cognitive semantics. The basic starting points of these approaches are different. Corpus linguistics uses large corpora to unravel how the meanings of linguistic forms emerge from their frequent use in discourse. Interactional linguistics studies how social actions and activities are accomplished through different linguistic practices and thus how different linguistic items receive their meaning through frequent use in everyday interaction. Finally, cognitive semantics shows how language use and meaning reflects the ways in which individuals conceptualise their perceptual experience in the world. Despite the differences, these approaches are all usage-based and empirical, and aim to investigate the relationship between form and meaning.

Our aim is to put these three linguistic approaches together on the same ground with the hope that through the analysis of the two constructions we can take a small step towards improving our understanding of the relationship between linguistic constructions, cognition and language in use. This is not the first paper to undertake such a task. For example Biber & Jones (2005) and Fillmore (1992) have discussed how different linguistic approaches could be used or merged for the benefit of getting a better understanding of language. More in line with the current paper, Etelämäki et al. (2009) provide an important theoretical discussion of the possible ways to integrate the cognitive linguistic and conversation analytic terminological toolbox (e.g. “conceptualisation” and “social action”) for getting a more elaborated understanding of the relationship between form and meaning. One of the major advantages of such inter-linguistic studies is that the analyses are based on different types of corpora (large corpora and more detailed interactional data). This means that the findings are potentially more generalisable than findings based only on introspection and provide a detailed understanding of their use in discourse. Conversely, empirically informed introspection as the main methodology of cognitive semantics can

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provide an understanding of the cognitive motivation behind the meanings of the constructions, i.e. how the individuals’ experiences as beings in the world contribute to the meanings of these constructions.

3. *Come-say* and *go-say* constructions in corpus data

In this section, the *come-say* and *go-say* constructions are analysed as cotextual units, and both the variation in the constructions themselves and in their cotext are taken into account. It is argued in line with Sinclair (1991, 1998), Tognini-Bonelli (2002) and Stubbs (1995a, 2001) that form and meaning are systematically interconnected and that words and expressions “do not live in isolation but in strict semantic and functional relationship with other words” (Tognini-Bonelli 2002: 91) or structures. The analysis of so-called extended units of meaning, i.e. words or structures with their contextual and functional information, challenges the traditional view that words are memorised as single units. Rather, corpus linguistics assumes that they are memorised as prefabricated phraseological units with lexical, grammatical, semantic and functional information encoded in them (see e.g. Erman 2007: 26). The latter view to words and structures follows Sinclair’s (1991) hypothesis of the idiom principle, which stresses the fixedness in language and strong co-selection of items. During the last 20 years, corpus linguistic research has shown that the use of large databases reveals different kinds of “hidden” lexico-grammatical and lexico-semantic choices in a language. These idiomatic patterns do not seem to be as marginal phenomena in language as has been assumed. On the contrary, prefabricated structures and fixed expressions, i.e. structures following the idiom principle, are core elements in native speakers’ language production and stored as wholes in native speakers’ memory (Sinclair 1991; cf. also Erman 2007).

The co-selection approach to investigating words and expressions involves at least five levels of analysis: the core itself, its collocational and colligational choices, and the semantic preference and semantic prosody of the item. The collocational choice is a rather concrete co-occurrence of words in the syntagmatic dimension, and it is usually analysed using statistical methods (cf. Stubbs 1995a, 1995b; Barnbrook 1996). The other syntagmatic relations are more abstract: Colligation is not a relation between two words, but a relation between a word and grammatical classes in its cotext. Semantic preference, in turn, refers to a word’s regular co-occurrence with items that share a certain semantic feature, and semantic
prosody is usually defined as a co-selection of an item and a negative or positive (or neutral) meaning (or cotext) that surrounds that item. (Sinclair 1998; Stubbs 2001).\footnote{For more precise definitions of the cotextual restrictions, see, for example, Stubbs (1995a), Sinclair (1996, 1998), and Tognini-Bonelli (2001). For semantic prosody, see also Whitsitt (2005) and Hunston (2007).}

The following sections focus on collocations and the semantic syntagmatic patterning (i.e. semantic preference and prosody) of the *come-say* and *go-say* constructions. It is claimed that corpus analysis is able to reveal repeated syntagmatic cotextual patterns that are typical to these constructions and that these patterns can be used to explain the affective meanings of the constructions. Before doing the cotextual analysis, it is worth investigating the lexical meaning of the speech act verbs used in both constructions.

### 3.1 The lexical meanings of speech act verbs in the *come-say* and *go-say* constructions

In the following, the 93 speech act verbs that are used in the *come-say* constructions are arranged into different semantic sets (see Table 1). The most common speech act verb used in this construction is SANO\footnote{Capitalised forms denote a lemma, i.e. the abstraction of all word forms.}A ‘to say, tell’. When SANO is related to other semantically close verbs (like PUHUA ‘to speak’, SELITTÄÄ ‘to explain’, KERTOA ‘to tell’ and ESITTÄÄ ‘to suggest’), we get a semantic preference\footnote{Semantic preference is originally a relation between the node and a set of collocations. Here the verb *tulla* is perceived as the node and speech act verbs as its collocates; later in Section 3.3, the whole structure (*tullamennä* + speech act verb) is seen as node.} ‘telling’ which is the most common semantic preference of the verbs used in the *come-say* construction: 44\% of all the speech act verbs share this meaning. The concordance lines also provide evidence of other, but less frequent, semantic sets. The verbs that belong to the semantic preference of ‘telling’ have a relatively neutral lexical meaning in terms of how they indicate speaker attitude. Another set of neutral verbs constructs a semantic preference of ‘asking’. The other verb sets, however, include verbs which clearly express speaker attitude. The semantic preferences ‘asking for trouble’, ‘complaining’, ‘criticising’, ‘demanding’ and partly ‘dictating’ are all verb sets that consist of lexemes containing unpleasant or negatively
The verb evaluative meanings. Thus, it seems that verbs used in the come-say construction are mostly either neutral or negative in their meaning: the proportion of verbs counted in the sets listed in Table 1 is as high as 99% (n=92) of all the verbs in the construction. Verbs expressing positive attitude (only KIITELLÄ ‘to thank’ and HEHKUTTAA ‘to boost or cheer in a positive manner’ in the data) are, then, very rarely used in the come-say construction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic preference</th>
<th>Speech act verbs in come-say construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘telling’ 41 (44%)</td>
<td>SANOA ‘to say’ 25, PÜHUA ‘to speak’ 6, SELITTÄÄ ‘to explain’ 5, KERTOA ‘to tell’ 4, ESITTÄÄ ‘to express’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘asking for trouble’ 15 (16%)</td>
<td>HAUKKUA ‘to tell off’ 2, VÄITTÄÄ ‘to insist’ 2, HAASTAA RIITAA ‘ask for trouble’ 1, RYPPIYLLÄ ‘to argue against, gripe’ 1, RÄHISTÄ ‘to brawl’ 1, SOITTA SUUTA ‘to blather’ 1, HUUTAA ‘to yell’ 1, RÄKYTTÄÄ ‘to blather’ 1, INTTÄÄ ‘to argue’ 1, INISTÄ ‘to whine’ 1, SÖNKÄTÄ ‘to stutter’ 1, NIMITELLÄ ‘to call sb names’ 1, SYYTTÄÄ ‘to blame’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘complaining’ 11 (12%)</td>
<td>VALITTTAA ‘to complain’ 9, KITISTÄ ‘to whine’ 1, RUIKUTTAA ‘to whine’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘asking’ 9 (10%)</td>
<td>KYSYÄ ‘to ask’ 6, KYSELLÄ ‘to ask around’ 2, TIEDUSTELLA ‘to ask’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘dictating’ 7 (8%)</td>
<td>SANELLA ‘to dictate’ 2, KOMENTAA ‘to command’ 2, JAKAA OHJEITA ‘to brief’ 1, MÄÄRÄTÄ ‘to command’ 1, NEUVOA ‘to advice’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘criticising’ 5 (5%)</td>
<td>ARVOSTELLA ‘to evaluate’ 2, KRITISOIDA ‘to criticise’ 1, HUOMAUTTAA ‘to remark’ 1, HUOMAUTTELLA ‘to make remarks’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘demanding’ 4 (4%)</td>
<td>MANKUA ‘to implore’ 1, VAATIA ‘to demand’ 1, PYYTTÄÄ ‘to request’ 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verb MENNÄ in the go-say construction also has a clear preference for a more or less neutral semantic preference of ‘telling’: 46% (n=90) of all the verbs in that construction share a meaning of ‘telling’ something. Similarly with the come-say construction, the verb SANOA is overwhelmingly most
frequent. Table 2 displays the speech act verbs that belong to this semantic set and the other semantic preferences of MENNÄ. However, none of the other preferences is as frequent as the semantic preference of ‘telling’. Semantic preferences listed in Table 2 cover as much as 83% (n=163) of all the meanings of the verbs used in this construction.

**Table 2.** Semantic preferences of the verb MENNÄ ‘go’ in the go-say construction (frequency and per cents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic preference</th>
<th>Speech act verbs in go-say construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘telling’ 90 (46%)</td>
<td>SANOA ‘to say’ 72, KERTOA ‘to tell’ 10, PUHUA ‘to speak’ 5, LAUSUA ‘to pronounce’ 1, MAINITA ‘to mention’ 1, SELITTTÄ ‘to explain’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘promising’ 16 (8%)</td>
<td>LUVATA ‘to promise’ 13, LUPAILLA ‘to promise’ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘suggesting’ 14 (7%)</td>
<td>ESITTÄÄ ‘to present’ 5, NEUVOA ‘to advise’ 4, EHDOTTA ‘to suggest’ 2, SUOSITELLA ‘to recommend’ 1, KEHOTTAA ‘to urge’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘criticising’ 12 (6%)</td>
<td>ARVOSTELLA ‘to evaluate’ 4, MOITTIA ‘to blame’ 3, TUOMITA ‘to denounce’ 2, KOMMENTOIDA ‘to comment’ 1, VÄHEKSYÄ ‘to belittle’ 1, KRITISOIDA ‘to criticize’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘predicting’ 11 (6%)</td>
<td>ARVIOIDA ‘to estimate’ 4, ARVAILLA ‘to guess’ 3, ENNUSTELLA ‘to predict’ 2, ENNAKOITA ‘to foresee’ 1, SPEKULOIDA ‘to speculate’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘swearing’ 6 (3%)</td>
<td>VANNOA ‘to swear’ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘confessing’ 5 (3%)</td>
<td>TUNNUSTAA ‘to confess’ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘praising’ 5 (3%)</td>
<td>KEHUA ‘to praise’ 2, KEHAISTA ‘to praise’ 1, KEITELÄ ‘to thank’ 1, LEUHKIA ‘to boast’ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘denying’ 4 (2%)</td>
<td>KIISTÄÄ ‘to deny’ 3, KIELTTÄ ‘to deny’ 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that the semantic sets of verbs in the go-say construction differ from the ones of the come-say construction. First of all, in the go-say construction there are only two sets of verbs that have a clear negative lexical meaning: verbs denoting the meanings ‘to criticise’ and ‘to deny’. Other semantic preferences of this construction are more or less neutral or positive in lexical meaning; in fact, the semantic preference ‘praising’ is a surprisingly positive, yet a relatively small group of verbs compared to the semantic preferences of the come-say construction. Consequently, it seems that the come-say construction tends to contain more negatively evaluative speech act verbs than the go-say construction.
3.2 Collocations of come-say and go-say constructions

The initial collocation sets for both constructions were retrieved within the span of four words from both sides of the constructions. In order to avoid idiosyncrasies and rare word combinations, only words occurring at least five times in the span are counted. This filtering generates 25 collocation candidates for the come-say construction and 17 for the go-say construction. To find the statistically significant collocates, i.e. to avoid taking into consideration collocations which might exist in the span due to chance, also statistical tests are computed. This analysis follows Stubbs’s (1995a: 40–41) suggestion that the results of two significance tests, e.g. MI-test (Mutual Information test) and t-test, are probably needed to identify linguistically interesting collocations. Using more than one significance test can balance the picture of collocates (Barnbrook 1996: 101).

Table 3 displays the collocates that have passed both of the two significance tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocates of come-say</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Collocates of go-say</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KUKAAN ‘no-one’**</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>PAHA ‘bad, difficult’</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOKU ‘someone’</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>MIKÄÄN ‘nothing’**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINÄ ‘I’</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>VAIKEA ‘difficult’</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME ‘we’</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>PITÄÄ ‘must’</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITTEN ‘then’</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>JULKISUUS ‘publicity’</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITEN ‘how’</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>TURHA ‘futile’</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURHA ‘futile’</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>KUKAAN ‘no-one’*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TIEITYSTI ‘of course’</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JULKISESTI ‘in public’</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Also ‘anyone’. **Also ‘anything’.

The analysis shows that the come-say and the go-say constructions share...
only two statistically significant collocates: KUKAAN ‘no-one, anyone’ and TURHA ‘futile’. Thus, these two constructions differ colliquationally. The come-say construction’s collocates are mainly pronouns (JOKU ‘someone’, MINÄ ‘I’, ME ‘we’, KUKAAN ‘no-one, anyone’), whereas the go-say construction’s collocates seem often to be adjectives (PAHA ‘bad, difficult’, VAIKEA ‘difficult’, TURHA ‘futile’). The collocational profiles indicate that the latter construction is used more often in a cotext that includes an affective adjective meaning ‘difficulty’ or ‘futility’. Some instances selected from the data are reported in Concordance 1.

Concordance 1. Adjectives PAHA ‘bad, difficult’, VAIKEA ‘difficult’ and TURHA ‘futile’ in the cotext (4L–4R) of go-say construction

| Kun tsekinkielestä on paha | mennä arvioimaan mitään, vinkit puoltavat |
| Tässä pimeydessä on paha | mennä arvioimaan, miten nokista jälkeä |
| ja häviäjistä on paha | mennä sanomaan etukäteen mitään varmaa |
| Leikas korostaa, on vaikea | mennä vannomaan, että terveillä elämäntavoilla |
| kuuluu musiikissa, onkin vaikeampi | mennä määrittelemään, sillä sukupuolta |
| yhdenkään kansanedustajan on vaikea | mennä sanomaan, että minä tein |
| on auktoriteettien aivan turha | mennä kommentoimaan, tämänhän tiedämme jo |
| riehuessa bajerilaisille lienee turha | mennä sanomaan, että paavilta viedään |
| vireessä. Sitäpä on turha | mennä ennustelemaan ennen kuin pääsen |

The come-say construction’s pronoun collocates, in turn, illustrate that the Addressee is often mentioned in the cotext. This is shown in Concordance 2, which includes examples of pronouns MINÄ ‘I’ and ME ‘we’ in allative (minulle ‘to me’, meille, ‘to us’), ablative (minulta ‘from me’), genitive (meidän ‘our’) and partitive (meitä ‘us’) cases.
**Concordance 2.** Pronouns MINÄ ‘I’ and ME ‘we’ in the cotext (4L–4R) of the *come-say* construction


Stubbs (1995a: 42) claims that statistical tests can help identify not only individual collocations, but also semantic sets in cotext. This can be proven also here, since the statistically significant collocates seem to group, at least partly, semantically. However, to get a wider picture of the semantic sets occurring in the cotext we also need to analyse the semantic preferences of the whole constructions.

### 3.3 Semantic preferences of *come-say* and *go-say* constructions

Sinclair (1996, 1998) shows that words belonging to a certain semantic preference can be found in different positions in the cotext of a node and they may even belong to different word classes. Thus, rather than studying only the constructions themselves and their collocations, it is also worth studying their semantic cotext. By consulting the concordances, we are able to find the following semantic preferences.

Of the 93 cases of the *come-say* constructions retrieved from the corpus, in 38 (40%) the cotext includes a word that expresses ‘quantity’. Quite often the word is either an indefinite pronoun KUKAAN ‘no-one, anyone’ or JOKU ‘someone’. Also the *go-say* construction has this semantic preference but it is clearly less common (16%), the most common collocate being MITÄÄN ‘nothing, anything’. Another semantic preference that dominates in the cotext of the *come-say* construction is ‘time’: 36% of the concordance lines has a word expressing ‘time’. As regards the *go-say* construction the proportion is again smaller, 18%. The constructions also

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15 See also Table 3 for the collocates.
share a semantic preference ‘futility’: the proportions are 9% for the come-
say and 6% for the go-say construction. The go-say construction also has
semantic preferences of its own: the most common is ‘difficulty’ (as many
as 24% of all the occurrences in the data), while others are ‘being able to’
(10%), ‘stupidity’ (8%), ‘publicity’ (7%), ‘must not’ (7%), and ‘daring’
(3%).

The analysis of semantic preference reveals that although the speech
act verbs in these constructions can be more or less neutral in lexical
meaning (e.g. belonging to the semantic set of ‘telling’), the cotext often
includes semantic preferences that render a very negative overall meaning
of the said thing. For example, even when a neutral speech act verb (e.g.
SANOA ‘say’) is used in the go-say construction, we may find words
indicating negative semantic preferences in the context – such as
‘difficulty’ (VAIKEA, PAHA ‘difficult’; lines 1–5), ‘stupidity’ (TYPERÄ,
HÖLMÖ ‘stupid’; lines 6–7) or ‘futility’ (TURHA ‘futile’; lines 8–9) (see
Concordance 3). Consequently, it seems that even if the speech act verbs
themselves carry a neutral meaning, the cotextual patterning of the
constructions may convey a negative attitude. This can clearly be seen in
the case of the go-say construction which, in the first place, seems to be a
neutral or positively used construction, but which, however, is often used in
negative contexts as well. However, the analysis of the semantic
preferences does not give a thorough picture of the cotextual patterning of
these constructions. The following analysis completes the description by
investigating the semantic prosodies of the constructions.

**Concordance 3.** Examples of semantic preferences ‘difficulty, stupidity, futility’ with neutral speech act verbs in the go-say construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>suomalaiseen systeemiin. On <strong>vaieka</strong></th>
<th>Mennä <strong>sanomaan</strong>, että se on</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>kunnosta on hyvin <strong>vaieka</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>sanomaan mitään.</strong> Jos tietäisi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>jäsenten kanssa. <strong>Vaieka</strong> kuitenkin</td>
<td>Mennä <strong>sanomaan mitään varmam kollegoiden</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>laumasta otukisia on <strong>paha</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>sanomaan mitään yleistiävää, edes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>on tässä yhteydessä <strong>paha</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>puhumaan.</strong> Todella hienoa ja</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>tai sukupuolesta riippumatta. <strong>Typerää</strong></td>
<td>Mennä edes <strong>esittämään</strong> tuollaista. Ehdotus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>mukaan vaikea, jopa <strong>hölmöäkin.</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>sanomaan.</strong> Tarkkaa tavoitetta hänestä</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ainakin sille porukalle <strong>turha</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>kenenkään selittämään.</strong> Yhden tai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>riehuessa baijerilaisille lienee <strong>turha</strong></td>
<td>Mennä <strong>sanomaan, että paavilta viediäin</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Semantic prosody of come-say and go-say constructions

Semantic prosody (or discourse prosody (Stubbs (2001))) is a consistent positive or negative (or sometimes neutral) “aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates” (Louw 1993: 157). The come-say and go-say constructions themselves seem to be evaluative, since the speech act verbs, especially in the come-say construction, carry mostly a negative meaning. Furthermore, we have noted that also the collocates and semantic features often show a negative meaning. The last analysis, i.e. the analysis of the semantic prosodies of these constructions reveals, undoubtedly, that both constructions have a clear unfavourable or negative semantic prosody: in the case of the come-say construction 89% (n=83) of the occurrences in the data show a clear negative prosody, and in the case of go-say construction the proportion is as high as 93% (n=183).

The items indicating the negative prosody may be the speech act verb itself (syöttää puppua ‘to feed rubbish’, example (4)), collocates that show a certain negative semantic preference (turha ‘futile’, ei kannata ‘to be not worth of’, examples (4)–(6)) or other items with a negative meaning (ero ‘divorce’, example (5); katua ‘to regret’, example (7); vetää turpaan ‘to beat up’, example (8)).

(4) Sii-nä miele-ssä on ihan turha kene-n=käään it-INE sense-INE be.3SG completely unnecessary anyone-GEN=PART yrittää-ä tul-la syöttää-mään mitään puppu-a. try-INF come-INF feed-INF-PTV any rubbish-PTV
‘In this sense, it is completely unnecessary for anyone to come and feed [us] any rubbish.’

(5) Häne-n luo-kse-en ei sitten kannata tul-la s/he-GEN to-TRA-3PX NEG.3SG then be.worth.CNG come-INF valitatta-ma-an kun ero tule-e. complain-INF-ILL when divorce come-3SG
‘It’s no use to go and complain to him when they [will] split up.’

(6) Ei=kä mu-lle kannata tul-la puhu-ma-an Jumala-sta neg.3SG=PART I-ALL be.worth.CNG come-INF talk-INF-ILL God-ELA ja taivaa-sta. and heaven-ELA
‘Nor is it of any use to come and talk to me about God and heaven.’
To sum up, the data-based analysis of the go-say and come-say constructions illustrates that both constructions carry a clear negative meaning on both paradigmatic (the choice of speech act verbs) and syntagmatic (collocations, semantic preferences and prosodies) dimensions. According to Stubbs (2001: 65–66), semantic (discourse) prosodies express speakers’ attitudes and reasons for making the utterances. It seems that one way for the Speaker to say that the Actor has said something in vain, wrongly or in an otherwise bad or inconvenient manner is to use the come-say or go-say constructions. Nevertheless, these constructions differ in terms of how the affective stance is expressed: in the come-say construction the speech act verbs themselves are more negatively evaluative than in the go-say constructions, whereas the latter construction is used in a more negative cotext, which became evident in the semantically negative collocations and in the higher proportion of negative semantic prosody.

4. Grammatical structures in interaction

Interactional linguistics analyses how linguistic structures are used in naturally-occurring talk in their actual interactional contexts (Ochs et al. 1996; Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2001: 1–3; Ford et al. 2002; Keevallik 2003). For interactional linguists “language system” and “everyday language use” are inextricably intertwined (Thompson 2001: vii). Its main starting point is to investigate “how certain syntactic and other structures can be attributed to, and motivated by, the accomplishment of interactional tasks in situated use of language” (Keevallik 2003: 23). Interactional linguistics investigates the relationship between linguistic detail and
interaction from two starting points. On the one hand, it studies “what linguistic resources are used to articulate particular conversational structures and fulfil interactional functions” and, on the other hand, what interactional function or conversational structure is furthered by particular linguistic forms and ways of using them (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2001: 3). In this section, we take the latter approach. We start from the two structures and study the social activity contexts in which they are used in everyday interaction.

4.1 The go-say and come-say constructions in spoken discourse

As the corpus linguistic analysis in Section 3 shows, the studied constructions tend to carry negative affective meanings. This became evident either in the meaning of the speech act verbs (especially come-say construction) or in the cotextual patterning of the construction (especially go-say construction). The interactional linguistic analysis below provides further evidence for this by showing how the constructions’ negative affect is closely tied to the social activity context in which they are used: in everyday conversations they are used for trouble-telling and gossiping. Although the normed frequency of the go-say and come-say constructions is higher in spoken discourse than in written discourse, they are not very frequent in spoken discourse. All in all, we found 11 examples of the linguistic forms in the 10-hour database of everyday discourse and 6 examples in the institutional discourse corpus. Generally speaking, the examples from everyday discourse were used for expressing negative affect, whereas in institutional discourse three of the six occurrences were non-affective and expressed either concrete movement or future tense.

In general, these findings align with the corpus linguistic analysis in which the cotextual patterning, semantic preferences and semantic prosody were seen contribute to the constructions’ negative affective meaning, although the construction and the elements in it may not be affective. It should be borne in mind, though, that although the majority of the go-say and come-say constructions expressed affect, we found that in naturally-occurring talk they rarely had an affective meaning alone with no indication of movement. In general, it was, across the examples, challenging to tease out those structures that were affective from those that profiled movement. In fact the only example that does not profile movement comes from political discourse. This example was recorded from the Finnish Broadcasting Company’s main TV news broadcast in
autumn 2003. The news item deals with whether and with what schedule Finland should participate in the European Union’s (EU) new common defence policy. The example is the Finnish Foreign Secretary’s response to the opposition’s Parliamentary question. The go-say construction is used twice (see lines 11 and 14 with arrows).16

(9) 1DB-225613.TextGrid: [Finland’s defense policy in 2003], 1 min 52 s
ET: Erkki Tuomioja, Foreign Secretary

1 ET: (H) Jos nämä ehdotukset, if these suggestions-PL
   ‘If these suggestions
2 ? (INDECIPHERABLE TALK)
3 ET: niinkun toista-n vielä, as repeat-1sg still
   as I repeat once more
4 <HI> men-isi-vät ‘sellaisenaan lävitse</HI>,
go-COND-3PL as.such through
   would be accepted/ratified as such
5 kun ne konventist on kirjoite-ttu,
as they conventionally be.3sg write-PTCP
   as they have conventionally been written
6 (H) niin ne ’tule-vat ’voima-an,
   so they come-3pl force-ILL
   they will come into operation
7 sillon kun tule-e ’tämä perustuslaillinen ’sopimus.
   then when come-3sg this constitutional agreement
   at the same time with the EU constitution
8 ...(0.5) Se on kakstuhat-ta kuus.
   it be.3sg two.thousand-PTV six
   which is in two thousand and six
9 ... Jos noudate-taan si-tä aivan ’oikee-ta,
   if comply.with-PASS it-PTV exactly right-PTV
   If one complies with the exactly right
10 .. teidän ’logiikka-a-nee siitä etta,
    you-GEN logic-PTV-2PL.PX it-ELA that
    your logic that
11 → <A> nyt ei pidä men-nä sano-ma-an et em-me
    now NEG.3SG must.CNG go-INF say-INF-ILL that NEG-1PL
    one must not go and say that we

16 The data in this section have been transcribed by using the intonation unit-based transcription system (Du Bois et al. 1993) in which each line represents one intonation unit. The transcription conventions can be found in the Appendix 1.
In his response, the Foreign Secretary uses the go-say construction twice. However, it does not seem to communicate strong negative affect, but rather what problematic consequences two hypothetical, alternative and future political stances could have, if they were made carelessly. The fact that the constructions do not profile movement could in fact be a feature of and specific to institutional talk which resembles planned or written discourse. However, it is hard to make a definite claim about this and further analyses are required.

In the following, we focus on the use of the constructions in everyday conversation. As regards the occurrences of the go-say construction in these data, it was sometimes difficult to tell apart the affective, the motional and future tense meanings. The come-say constructions in turn frequently expressed both motional and affective meanings. In the following sections we focus more specifically on the interactive context in which these constructions are used, and the meanings they convey. As we will show, the structures are used primarily as resources for expressing a speakers’ affective action, such as trouble-telling (4 examples out of 11) and gossiping (7 examples out of 11). These actions are also usually part of longer sequences of action, such as stories, narratives or accounts.
4.2 The *go-say* construction in everyday conversation: negative affect in trouble-telling and gossiping

In everyday conversation, the *go-say* construction is used in storytelling sequences, and mostly as part of gossips and trouble-telling. In 8 out of the 9 examples, the speaker used a zero (3 cases) or first person (5 cases) pronoun or affix in the construction, which shows that this construction is used either for expressing the Speaker’s own action or an unidentified Actor’s action. Furthermore, in these sequences the construction usually refers to a hypothetical or likely future action, e.g. whether to file a complaint or snitch on somebody in the future and not something that has happened (cf. the uses of the *come-say* construction). In these interactional contexts, the *go-say* construction is indeed an element of affect display, either displaying positive (a recount of a happy incident, in one example) or negative affect (8 examples). However, rather than expressing affect only, the construction tends to communicate motion, i.e. the Speaker moving towards the Addressee in order to say something, which is also evident in the distribution of person in this construction. Moreover, although none of the examples are used merely for marking future tense, some of this meaning is retained as part of the more prominent affect display.

All this is evident in the next example, in which three young women, Emma, Ira and Vera, are gossiping about their mutual male acquaintance, Pekka. After telling the others that Pekka has moved into his own apartment, Emma tells that he has a German girlfriend. The girl is currently in Germany, and Pekka is planning to move to Germany to play ice hockey. After this Ira says ‘Well he did act like a bachelor, there at least when I saw him in the restaurant’ (lines 1–2) and thereby questions Pekka’s credibility as a faithful boyfriend. Then Emma responds and uses the *go-say* construction twice (see lines 13–14).

(10) SG 151: [The New Year conversation], 25 min 50 s

1 IRA_1: Kyl se niin poikamiehel-t näytt-i, yes it so bachelor-ABL look-PST.3SG ‘Well he did act like a bachelor
2 siel ainkal mi-tä mie Kantikse-s si-tä nä-i-n. there at.least what-PTV I Kantis-INE it-PTV see-PST-1SG there at least when I saw him in the restaurant
3 ...(0.4)
4 EMMA: No=
   PART
Well
5 PART
No.
6 <HI>Mikä=s sii-nä</HI>,
   what=PART it=INE
   So what
7 .. tyttöystävä asu-u Saksa-s,
   girlfriend live-3SG Germany=INE
   The girlfriend lives in Germany
8 ei se saa ikinä mitää tietää-ä,
   NEG.3SG it get.cng never any know-INF
   She will never get to know anything
9 [kukaan Suome-s ei osaa puhu-u -
   nobody Finland=INE NEG.3SG can.cng speak-INF
   Nobody in Finland can speak
10 IRA_1:[Mm]?
11 EMMA: (H) Yks viiesosa osaa Savonlinna-s varmaa puhu-u
   one fifth.part can.3SG Savonlinna-INE probably speak-INF
   One-fifth of the population in Savonlinna probably speaks
12 kansalais-i-st ei niinku saksa-a,
   citizen-PL-ELA like German-PITV
   like German
13 → Et tuskin si-llle kukaa mene-e sano-ma-a,
   that hardly it=ALL anyone go-3SG say-INF-ILL
   So it is unlikely that anyone will go and say
14 → et niinku [et] selittää-mä-ä,
   that like that explain-INF-ILL
   that or like explain [to her]
15 IRA_2: [nii?]
   PART
   Yeah
16 EMMA: jos se tänne joulu-ks tule-e,
   if it here Christmas-TRA come-3SG
   if she comes to Finland for Christmas
17 et tiiä-t-kö=s mi-tä Pekka täällä on puuhail- lu (H).
   that know-2SG-INT=PART what=PITV Pekka here be.3SG get.up.to-PTCP
   that do you know what Pekka has been doing here.’

In lines 1–2, Ira says that she has recently seen Pekka acting like a single person in a local restaurant. Her gossipy turn implicates that for a person going steady with somebody, Pekka’s behaviour is questionable. In the next turn, Emma disaffiliates with Ira and provides an ironic explanation: it
is unlikely that he will be caught for being unfaithful, because the girlfriend is in Germany, and even if she came to town it would be unlikely that anyone (an unidentified Actor) would tell (i.e. snitch) her (the Addressee) about Pekka’s behaviour, because few people in town speak German. It is in this interactional context in which Emma uses the go-say construction. She says in lines 1–17 ‘So it is unlikely that anyone will go and say that or like explain to her, if she comes to Finland for Christmas, that do you know what Pekka has been doing here’. Emma uses the go-say construction (instead of sanoo ‘says’) as part of gossipy discourse and in a disaffiliative response to a previous speaker’s turn for describing the mere conjectural likelihood that anyone engages in such a highly affective action as telling the girlfriend about his boyfriend’s behaviour (i.e. reveals information, see Section 5). It is worth noting that the design of Emma’s utterance conforms to the construction’s collocational patterns in written language. The particle että ‘that’ and the pronouns se ‘it’ and kukaan ‘no-one, anyone’ collocate frequently with this construction, and the latter is also statistically significant (see Table 3). Kukaan also belongs to the semantic set indicating ‘quantity’, which is frequent in this context. In sum, the go-say construction is used as part of gossiping and for evoking not only an unlikely future action but also an affective situation in which the speech act (snitching) in itself is questionable. This also supports the findings made in Section 5 (see below), in which the Speaker considers a speech act as a questionable action.

In example (11), the go-say construction occurs in a similar interactional context. The example comes from a phone conversation. Mika has called his friend Jami, who is a lawyer, to seek advice. Mika has recently bought a new computer monitor which has broken down for the second time. Mika produces a long complaint and trouble-telling sequence in which he criticises the warranty service and then finally asks whether it would be useful to file a complaint to the consumer ombudsman: ‘Is it worth the effort to go and complain to the fucking ombudsman’ (lines 5–7).

(11) SG 122_A2: [The monitor], 0 min 40 s

1 MIKA: (H) ni ^voi-ks tollase-s niinku,
PART can.3SG-INT like.that-INE like
‘So can one like in that kind of a
2 mi- --
3 o- --
4 e- --
After the trouble-telling, Mika in line 1 starts a turn that seeks advice or confirmation in form of a yes-no interrogative. Our target utterance, the question in lines 5–7, contains linguistic evidence for Mika’s (the Actor and the Speaker) strong affective stance. He uses the verb marista ‘to grumble’ to describe a possible complaint to the ombudsman (the Addressee). He also uses the expletive vitun ‘fucking’ for displaying his frustration with the situation. In other words, the go-say construction co-occurs with linguistic elements that display the speaker’s affective stance. So similarly with example (10) (see also example (8)), the go-say construction is used in a context which describes a hypothetical and negative situation in the future, in this case the filing of a complaint. Mika’s utterance in lines 5–6 is also structurally similar with the go-say constructions in written language, since the olla verb ‘be’ is a frequent collocate and the pronoun mitään ‘anything, nothing’ is a statistically significant collocate (Table 3). The structure mitään[n] hyötyy also belongs to the semantic set of ‘futility’, which occurs frequently in this context and contributes to the general negative cotext of the construction.
In sum, in spoken language the go-say construction is used in various kinds of telling sequences as a resource for displaying the speakers’ understanding that if they (the Speaker and the Actor) do the action or take the described stance, they can in the future be held accountable for that action or stance. It is therefore used in irrealis mode for describing a speech act which is presented as occurring in a contingent world (Payne 1997). Furthermore, by using the go-say construction, speakers also display their negative affect involved in producing a speech act that has not yet been produced. In other words, they communicate a meaning that the still hypothetical affective action is possibly problematic or inappropriate. “To go and grumble” to the ombudsman basically does the action of filing a complaint and “to go and say” something about a boyfriend’s questionable behaviour in the local pub to his girlfriend equals snitching. All in all, by using the go-say construction in social interaction, the speakers display their negative affect towards the hypothetical speech act and orient to potential trouble in the future.

4.3 The come-say construction in everyday conversation: reporting a dubious action

Similarly with the go-say construction, the come-say construction in everyday conversation is used in stories and tellings. However, in contrast to the go-say construction, the come-say construction is used for describing the realis actions of a third person (the Actor) in the past. In these cases, the Addressee is the Speaker (see Section 3.2 for similar findings). This coincides with the fact that all 8 occurrences of the go-say construction are produced with a 3rd person pronoun, indicating an action done by somebody to the Speaker. In example (12) below, Teppo is telling a story of how he and his friends were robbed twice during the same evening in Amsterdam. After he has told about the first attempted robbery, he tells about the second one.

(12) SG 020 A_03: [He came and explained], 4 min 4 s

1 TEPPO: Se ol-i se kundi tul-i t- t- --
    it be-PST.3SG it guy come-PST.3SG
    ‘It was the guy who came
2 → Tul-i siihen selittää,
    come-PST.3SG there explain.INF.ILL
    came there to explain
As part of the story of how he and his friends got robbed, Teppo describes the actions of one of the robbers (lines 1–3): ‘It was the guy who came there to explain fucking something like’. The *come-say* construction is used to describe the attacker’s movement toward the Speaker, as well as the fact that the attacker’s actions were aggressive and hostile. Thus, the incident is clearly troubling for the Speaker, which explains the use of the *come-say* construction and the expletive *vittu* ‘fuck’ in line 3 that are indicative of the Speaker’s affective stance. The construction is also used in a reporting clause, which is followed by indirect speech. All in all, Teppo uses the *come-say* construction for describing the actions of a third person (the Actor) in the past in a situation in which he was the target (the Addressee) and which was frightening, and which still raises strong emotions in him.

Example (13) is similar to the previous example in that it describes the past actions of a third person (the Actor) in a somewhat dubious light. The example comes from a phone conversation between two young women who are both dog enthusiasts. Mari (the Speaker) is currently telling a story of how her mother (the Addressee), also an active dog person, had recently attended a dog show and seen a slim dog, unlike any dog she had seen before. This particular dog did not thrive in the show, after which the owner of that dog (the Actor) had gone to talk to Mari’s mother.

(13) SG122 B_01: [Dog conversation], 16 min 8 s
Mari’s utterance in line 1 is a reporting clause that precedes direct reported speech in lines 3–5. It precedes the description of the dog owner’s actions, i.e. proudly coming and talking to Mari’s mother after her dog has not done well in the show. In this storytelling and gossipy context, the utterance (including the otherwise neutral speech act verb *sanoa* ‘to say’) therefore expresses both movement and displays the Speaker’s (Mari, telling the story) affective stance towards the Actor (the dog owner) and her actions.

As in the examples above, the cotextual features between written and spoken language are again very similar (cf. *sit* ‘then’, *se* ‘it’ and *oli* ‘was’). All in all, Mari’s telling indeed conveys the dog owner’s reported talk and actions as dubious and questionable. These contextual features act as further evidence for the fact that the investigated constructions in reporting clauses tend to occur in gossipy contexts, and to be part of talk in which a Speaker expresses negative affective stance towards an Actor’s talk and actions.

### 4.4 Summary of the go-say and come-say constructions in everyday conversation

The above analysis suggests that in everyday conversation the *go-say* and *come-say* constructions are used in tellings (storytelling, trouble-telling, etc.), either in the actual story or in the reporting clauses that precede direct reported speech. Telling stories of past incidents to a co-participant, and talking about one’s troubles are both very frequent and central features of human social interaction (e.g. Jefferson 1978, 1988 inter alia). Stories, tellings and reported speech are also ways in which tellers communicate their stances toward the reported event (see e.g. Besnier 1993; Niemelä
The go-say and come-say constructions are linguistic resources for doing that. These constructions are also used, although less frequently, as affective comments to something that someone has either said or done in the immediately preceding interactional context. Indeed, 14 of the 17 examples that we found of this construction in spoken data were used for displaying affect or stance. In addition, with only one exception (not presented), all the reported speech acts were presented in a dubious, questionable or otherwise negative context. It suggests that as part of narratives and tellings the construction is used metaphorically to describe the actual difficulty of doing the speech act, or the dubiousness that is related to producing it. However, it is also possible to provide an explanation from a social perspective, and as it relates to the status of participants in social situations. In fact, Goffman (1963: 135) would perhaps argue that the construction describes a social situation that involves an undesired form of social gathering or regrouping, i.e. a “non-with”, in which someone, who is not part of a “with”, enters and trespasses a border. In the case of the go-say construction, it is the Speaker or the Actor trespassing a boundary and in the come-say construction, someone trespassing the boundary that includes the Speaker or the Actor. Further evidence for this was provided by the use the pronominal forms in these constructions: zero and 1st person forms co-occurred with the go-say construction and 3rd person forms with the come-say construction. Furthermore, none of the examples expressed affective meaning alone, but the affective meaning often coincided with the meaning of motion, thus communicating an idea of entering or trespassing a border. In sum, the construction grammatically marks unwanted social participation and involvement, i.e. “coming too close”. Also, the personal affective stance expressed through this construction is both based on a social situation and made socially salient in a narrative.

In addition to the similarities between the go-say and the come-say construction, they do possess some distinct differences. The go-say construction is primarily used for describing a hypothetical and questionable action in the future, whereas the come-say construction is mostly used in contexts which report a dubious action that has taken place in the past. In other words, the go-say construction tends to be used for describing a speech act in an irrealis world, whereas the come-say construction profiles a past action in realis world.
5. Cognitive semantics of the go-say and come-say constructions

Both the corpus linguistic and the interactional linguistic analyses of the go-say and come-say constructions show that the mennä ‘go’ verb and the tulla ‘come’ verb have partly lost their meaning of motion and began to express negative affect. As Sections 3 and 4 above show, this becomes evident through the meaning of the verbs in the constructions, their cotextual patterning and also through the social activities in which they appear (trouble-telling, gossiping, complaining) or which they report and describe (revealing information, snitching, complaining, quarrelling, threatening).

As the corpus linguistic analysis shows, sometimes the negative meaning of either construction can be explained by the speech act verb which itself conveys the meaning of an affective or even inappropriate saying (for example, mennä möläyttämään ‘blurt out’ [go + blurt in the 3rd infinitive illative case]). However, this does not explain the affective use of the construction mennä kertomaan [go + tell in the 3rd infinitive illative case] in which the speech act verb kertoa ‘tell’ itself is not affective. Kertoa is, according to Finnish dictionaries (e.g. KS s.v. kertoa), a polysemous verb that profiles a set of different meanings, but it is a rather basic speech act verb and highlights the message itself, not the manner of communication (Pajunen 2001: 345–346).

Consider example (14) which is taken from The Finnish Language Bank. A larger context of the example shows that a cleaning lady (the Actor) has told an implicit Addressee how a politician with a reputation of a lady’s man (the referent of it) had tried to have sexual intercourse with her but failed due to impotence.

(14) Ja yks siivvoojaa men-i kerto-ma-an, jotta kyllä se
    and one cleaning.lady go-PST.3SG tell-INF-ILL that yes it
    hän-tä=kin kerran elustussaunna-n laattija-lla yritt.i.

    she-PTV=PART once representation.sauna-GEN floor-ADE try-PST.3SG

‘And one cleaning lady revealed that he also tried to make an attempt at her once on the floor of a representation sauna.’

In example (14) the Actor’s motion is downplayed and instead the sentence conveys the meaning of ‘revealing’ or ‘snitching’ and thereby the Speaker’s affective and disapproving position about the reported speech act (see analyses in Sections 3 and 4). If the mennä ‘go’ verb was removed from the above example, the construction would lose its affective meaning.
One could therefore argue that the negative affect that the construction expresses is related to the lexical semantics of the verb *mennä* ‘go’. Onikki-Rantajääskö (2001: 207) and Airola (2007: 56) indeed argue that the *mennä* verb is often associated with expressions of non-canonical or negative states. For example, ‘to break down’ in Finnish is *mennä rikki* (lit. ‘go broken’). However, this feature of the *mennä* verb does not alone explain the negative meaning of the construction, because examples can be postulated in which *mennä* ‘go’ is associated with neutral tone as in *Miten menee?* ‘How are things [going]?’ and even with a positive change, as in *Kaikki meni hyvin* ‘Everything went well’.

As regards the *sanoa* ‘say’ verb, on the other hand, Routarinne (2005: 84–85) has not said that it is generally used as a rather basic and unmarked speech act verb. However, according to a dictionary (KS s.v. *sanoa*), when it is used in infinitival form, such as in *olla sanomassa* [be say-INF-INE], it can also express ‘remarking, criticising’ and ‘carping’. Therefore, it is no surprise that when *sanoa* is used in the *come-say* construction, it frequently gets the meaning of aggressive speaking. Consider example (15) which is again taken from The Finnish Language Bank.

> Suome-n maa-ssa ja tä-ssä maailma-ssa ei löydy ihmis-tä, joka vo-is-i tul-la sano-ma-an, että minä ole-n ol-lut nää-i-den kyseis-ten aine-i-den tai mi-n=kään be-1SG be-PTCP this-PL-GEN that-GEN.PL stuff-PL-GEN or any-GEN=PART mu-i-den=kaan kielletty-j-en aine-i-den kanssa tekemis-i-ssä. other-PL-GEN=PART forbidden-PL-GEN stuff-PL-GEN with making-PL-INE

‘In Finland and in this whole world, there is not a single person to be found who could argue against me that I have had anything to do with these or any other illegal substances.’

The above example reports a situation in which a famous Finnish cross-country skier was asked in a press conference if he had used illegal doping substances. In the press conference, he denied such accusations strongly and insisted that no-one could accuse him of using doping. By using the construction *tulla sanomaan*, the skier (the Speaker) is most likely not anticipating any concrete motion towards him but rather expressing that he would consider any accusations, delivered for example through mass media, as aggressive and hostile actions against him. Again, if the *tulla* verb was removed, the meaning of blaming, accusing or criticising (see
semantic preferences in Section 3) would be downplayed and the sentence would emphasise the process of saying.

Consequently, what we see here is that there is something in the constructions themselves that contribute to their negative affective meaning. This semantic phenomenon has been acknowledged before but there is little research that tries to explain how the construction gets its affective reading. For example, the recent reference grammar of Finnish (VISK § 470) only briefly states that when the verb "mennä" is followed by another verb in the 3rd infinitive illative form the structure expresses that the activity is not hoped for (see also Kiuuru 1977: 263). In addition, one may ask if there is a reason for the presence of these motion verbs in this context, or is it just an unexplainable coincidence? From the point of view of cognitive semantics these are not trivial questions. A basic tenet in cognitive semantics is that linguistic forms are to a great extent semantically motivated. Even idioms, which in other paradigms are often considered to be difficult to analyse, are from the cognitive viewpoint seen to be motivated, not arbitrary (Lakoff 1987: 450). Based on this assumption, we can expect that also the deictic motion verbs "mennä" and "tulla", when used in the "go-say" and "come-say" constructions, are not devoid of semantic motivation even though they do not express overt motion. The core of our claim is that in these cases motion is understood metaphorically through the dynamic conceptualisation of a change in a semantic dominion of control.

As Givón (1973) has shown, in the world’s languages, deictic motion verbs easily get semantic extension, for example, in the form of temporal and modal meanings. Consequently, it is no surprise that what first catches one’s eye in the constructions is precisely the deictic directionality of the motion verbs. In Finnish, the motion verb "tulla" ‘come’ profiles motion towards a stationary deictic centre, and the verb "mennä" ‘go’ motion away from it. Here we assume that the deictic centre is set to the location of the speaker, and thus that the Finnish "mennä" ‘go’ is associated with a motion away from the speaker, whereas the verb "tulla" ‘come’ profiles motion towards the speaker.

However, the speaker is capable of imagining herself into different positions of the referred situation and then to describe the event from these viewpoints. This process which utilises our mental capacity to conceive of a situation from different perspectives (compare John is going to the hall vs. John is coming to the hall when the sentences refer to the same situation but from opposite vantage points) can be seen as one manifestation of a
phenomenon called “conceptualisation”. The “new” observation point can be called a Shifted Deictic Centre (Langacker 1991: 266–267).¹⁷ We believe that the Speaker’s ability to choose different vantage points for describing a situation explains why precisely the deictic motion verbs so easily get semantic extensions: especially in figurative expressions containing motion verbs the Speaker often sets the deictic centre away from its own observation position into the location of the Trajector (represented by syntactic subject) or the Landmark (object or adverbial complement). Deixis is important for yet another reason. As pointed out by Hopper (2001: 169), the constructions that contain deictic motion verbs typically express the speaker’s attitude, and, we would like to add, not only attitude but also affective evaluation of the referred situation. For these reasons, it is not enough to base the explanation of the meanings of these constructions merely on the concept of motion, but also the deixis of these verbs needs to be taken into account.

Humans characteristically aspire to control the situations and actions around them. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 117–118) even propose that control is one of the basic human experiences, a natural kind of experience. Following Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 117–118), we assume control to be one fundamental dominion in human interaction and in how it is coded linguistically. Langacker (1993: 6, 1999: 173–174) defines “dominion” as the conceptual region to which a particular reference point affords direct access. A prototypical situation that involves dominion is possession. For instance, the sentence He deeded the ranch for his daughter can be seen as an example of abstract motion¹⁸ where the ranch metaphorically leaves the agent’s (referent of he) dominion and enters the recipient’s dominion (Langacker 2008: 394). In other words, possession is a dominion which encloses all those entities that are directly owned by the possessor. In addition to possession, other types of dominions may be postulated. For example, Huumo (2006: 41, 43) characterises a cognitive dominion which consists of what the sentient reference point perceives, thinks or knows at a particular point of time. Correspondingly, a control dominion includes things which are directly controlled by the reference point (or agent), which lie in its spherical domination, such as decision making between moving vs. non-moving and speaking vs. non-speaking etc.

¹⁷ For similar discussion on Finnish, see Larjavaara (1990: 259–260).
¹⁸ In abstract motion, a motion verb (or some other expression normally referring to concrete movement) is metaphorically used for describing a change in some entity’s state as in the sentence The milk is about to go sour (Langacker 1990: 155–156).
The control dominion links the directional lexical semantics of the deictic verbs *mennä* and *tulla* to the affective meanings of the *go-say* and *come-say* constructions. When the verb *mennä* is used in this construction, the meaning of the following infinitive speech act verb is interpreted as a place or, more generally speaking, as a ‘container’. According to Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 30–32), it is common that activities (here the speech acts) are metaphorically conceived as substances and therefore as ‘containers’ which have the capacity to “take in” other entities. Thus, the action of telling something represented by the *go-say* construction is metaphorically conceived as motion where the entity occupying the Shifted Deictic Centre (the subject of the *mennä* verb) is abstractly moving towards the ‘container’ (the speech act). The infinitive’s illative case supports the assumption of abstract motion towards a ‘container’ since the basic meaning of illative can be characterised as ‘movement into’ (cf. Huumo & Ojutkangas 2006: 13–14).

The affective meanings of ‘revelation’, ‘snitching’, and so on (see Sections 3 and 4), which are expressed by the *go-say* construction, utilise a metaphorical conceptualisation where the act of telling is conceived as abstract motion away from control dominion. If the control of an activity or situation is lost, the result may be something that is not hoped for. This we saw in the interactional analysis of the *go-say* construction in Section 4. Our assumption gains support from observations of various other metaphorical Finnish expressions containing the verb *mennä*, which, as mentioned earlier, have a strong tendency to be associated with negative states or negative results in general. Indeed, it seems that Finnish utilises a conventional metaphor where a change into an inferior situation is conceived as motion (away from the deictic centre) into a negative state. In addition, many of these expressions seem to intuitively involve some sort of loss of control (for instance, *mennä pieleen* ‘go wrong’). Also Larjavaara (1990: 261) points out that expression *mennä noloki* ‘go shamefaced’ profiles a change ‘away-from’ something “primary” or “normal”. Based on our analysis, we can define these observations by arguing that these metaphors often include abstract motion away from the control dominion. This hypothesis seems to provide a reasonable explanation for why the verb *mennä*, which profiles motion away, is often associated with negative situations.

As regards the *come-say* construction, our suggestion to motivate the affective reading of this construction is based on an assumption that one does not tolerate another active entity close to one’s own control dominion.
In the *come-say* construction, the Actor’s speech act is metaphorically conceived as abstract motion in which the Actor moves towards the control dominion of the Addressee (again see the interactional analysis in Section 4). This process is understood as a threat against the Addressee, a kind of abstract penetration. In other words, the *come-say* construction can be seen as an infringement of privacy or personal space.\(^{19}\) Due to this, the speech act of this “intruder” gets an aggressive or arrogant reading even though it is not the lexical meaning of the speech act verb in question.

6. Conclusion and discussion

This paper has analysed two constructions in Finnish: the *go-say* and *come-say* constructions. By using different linguistic theories and methods, we found that across written and spoken corpora, the *come-say* construction is frequently used to display negative affect despite the fact that nothing in the construction itself suggests this. The corpus analysis partly confirmed the negativity of the *come-say* construction in that many speech act verbs (apart from verbs meaning ‘to tell’) in this construction were semantically negative. The *go-say* construction’s meaning was less negative but its cotextual preferences (collocations and especially semantic prosody) were more negative. Consequently, these two constructions partly differed in how negative affective meaning is generated. The interactional linguistic part of the study was able to confirm the above findings. Although the spoken data did not reveal any purely affective uses of the construction, but rather combinations of affective, motional and temporal meanings, both constructions were frequently used for expressing negative affect in different kinds of telling sequences. The cognitive semantic part of the study suggested that the cognitive motivation for the purely negative affective meaning in the *come-say* construction is that it is an example of abstract motion towards a control dominion of the actual or Shifted Deictic Centre of the motion verb. This fictive movement is then considered as a threat against the Addressee and therefore the *come-say* construction has gained an affective meaning. The *go-say* construction was less negative with the meaning of revealing but it nevertheless emphasises that the referred speech act is considered inappropriate or regrettable. This meaning can again be seen as metaphorical conceptualisation in which the control over the speech act is lost. The result is that the Speaker or the Actor utters

\(^{19}\)See also the idea of “non-with” discussed in Section 4.4.
something that should not be uttered. In general, rather than expressing a neutral meaning (e.g. ‘X said’) or the Speaker’s or the Actor’s motion towards an Addressee, these constructions tend to convey negative affect towards the reported actions.

In this paper, we have relied on theories and methodologies used in three different linguistic approaches. The aim has been to see what kinds of results their differing starting points provide for the analysis of two constructions. All of these approaches are first and foremost interested in meaning and usage. They also start from the assumption that form and meaning are systematically interconnected. Moreover, they all suggest that constructions (in general and the ones studied in this paper) are memorised as larger functionally motivated chunks, i.e. phraseological units. Indeed, Sinclair’s (1991) “idiom principle”, Goldberg’s (1995) notion of “construction” and the interactional linguistic idea that linguistic constructions are stored and retrieved from memory as schematic patterns (Thompson 2002) all seem to address similar and quite fundamental aspects about linguistic constructions. They also share the idea that meaning is functionally motivated and emerges from recurrent and repetitive uses. In addition, by using the three methods rather than only a single one we were able to fortify findings that were made with one method. For example, the interactional linguistic analysis was in line with the findings regarding the constructions’ lexical and semantic collocations that were based on a written language corpus and studied with corpus linguistic methods. Also, the study of spoken language was able to confirm the cognitive linguistic hypothesis that the construction is used in gossip sequences as well as other negatively saturated interactional contexts. Consequently, in many ways, each approach fed into the others, supplemented and improved our individual understandings of the go-say and come-say constructions.

What is different – some would say even contradictory – between these three approaches is that they have different understandings of where meaning resides or where it is located. Corpus linguistic research often focuses on a construction’s immediate linguistic context (collocations, semantic preferences and semantic prosodies) and explains its meaning with this context in mind. Cognitive semantics, on the other hand, explains meaning mainly as a product of a person’s cognitive knowledge base and mental, unconscious processes. Finally, for interactional linguists, meaning arises from the repeated uses of a construction in particular functionally motivated contexts and is closely intertwined with the social action that is
produced with the help of a construction. In addition, in interactional linguistics, meaning is understood to be negotiated and constructed between and by conversationalists, for the practical purposes of accomplishing social actions.

Nevertheless, these differences perhaps were the reason why we have been able to identify features of the construction’s structure as well as its use that would not have been possible with one method only. We hope to have provided a broad view of the functional, social and cognitive reasons that motivate the constructions’ meaning. More specifically, the corpus study, which was based on a large written language corpus, was used for getting an idea of the constructions’ frequency and usage as phraseological units. Indeed, it is less likely that a cognitive or an interactional study would have been able to shed light on these questions. The interactional approach, with data coming from naturally-occurring, real-life interactions, was able to show that the constructions are used in particular, recurring interactional contexts in everyday conversations, i.e. in narratives and tellings, which cognitive semantics and corpus linguistics would not have been able to show. The major advantage of the cognitive approach, on the other hand, is that it deals with the semantic motivation of linguistic expressions. Accordingly, the cognitive semantic view makes the Finnish go-say and come-say constructions sensible by explaining why there is a motion verb, but no actual motion and also by giving a cognitive explanation to the constructions’ affective meanings. Answering these questions would be difficult if only corpus linguistic or interactional analytic methods were used. However, despite the different approaches and the dissimilar angles to the analyses of the constructions, the findings were in some respect remarkably similar. This would seem to provide evidence for the multifaceted nature of language; that language inherently contains a functional, social and cognitive dimension.

We do argue that three methods together are better than one method alone, but not in the sense that by using them together we are simply able to obtain a richer account of language. Although we believe that three methods together supplement each other when the aim is to achieve a general view of a linguistic construction, there has also been another lesson to be learned. Linguists are no doubt aware of the strengths of their own approaches. However, we have noticed during this work that the true challenge has been to understand and acknowledge that our approaches do not answer everything, but address and emphasise different aspects of language form and language in use. One debate that the authors had, for
example, concerned whether the come-say construction can have a purely affective and non-motional reading. Since no examples were found from the spoken data, the existence of this meaning was questioned, although such examples can of course be postulated. However, during the next week, the sceptic witnessed three uses of the construction with that meaning. With respect to the cognitive semantic explanation, on the other hand, we also noticed that its method is not sufficient for explaining and motivating the constructions’ use. In many ways, cognitive explanations and analyses presuppose a social situation, and thereby seem to demand social accounts and explanations of the situations in which they are used. Also, since humans do not act or make decisions in isolated vacuums, but in a dialogic relationship with their world, cognitive motivations have to be seen to be occasioned and played out in social interaction. If there are intentions and cognitive strategies at work with the use of linguistic constructions, as there at least sometimes have to be, they have to be fluid and able to respond the contingencies of social interaction. Further, we have to ask, whether the postulated examples can be found in real life and whether they are frequent, which is rarely done in cognitive semantic research. Consequently, all analyses of linguistic constructions have to critically consider what type of data is being used (e.g. large written corpora, introspection or spoken data) and how they influence or even skew the findings.

In sum, an important lesson to be learned in the writing of this paper has been to see what questions our approaches cannot answer, or to which they can only provide partial answers. The different approaches used in this paper emphasise very different aspects of language and they are not necessarily able to reveal the same things; in fact, it would be a surprise if they did. And if they did, the need to have different theories could be questioned. Along with other similar studies conducted in the recent years, we think that through discussion, debate and critical reflection they can be used in order to get an informed understanding of, for example, a particular linguistic construction.

References

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Appendix 1. Transcription conventions.

Based on Du Bois et al. (1993).

**Units**

Intonation unit
Truncated intonation unit
Truncated word

**Transitional continuity**

Final
Continuing
Appeal (seeking a validating response from listener)

**Speakers**

Speech overlap
(numbers inside brackets index overlaps)

**Accent and lengthening**

Primary accent (prominent pitch movement carrying intonational meaning)
Secondary accent
Unaccented
Lengthening

**Pause**

Long pause (0.7 s or longer)
Medium pause (0.3–0.6 s)
Short (brief break in speech rhythm)(0.2 s or less)
Latch

**Vocal noises**

Inhalation
Alveolar click
Laughter (one pulse)

**Quality**

Special voice quality
Higher pitch level

<VOX>two words</VOX>
<HI> </HI>
Allegro: rapid speech

Transcriber’s perspective
Researcher’s comment

Appendix 2. Gloss conventions.

The morpheme-by-morpheme glosses are based on the Leipzig Glossing Rules.

1 = first person
2 = second person
3 = third person
ABL = ablative
ACC = accusative
ADE = adessive
ALL = allative
CNG = connegative (verb)
COND = conditional
ELA = elative
ESS = essive
GEN = genitive
ILL = illative
INE = inessive
INF = infinitive
INT = interrogative
NEG = negation (verb)
PART = particle
PASS = passive
PL = plural
PST = past tense
PTCP = participle
PTV = partitive
PX = possessive
SG = singular
TRA = translativa
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On Mixed Categories: The Case of Free Relatives

Abstract ¹

Free Relatives (FRs) are constructions that share the essentials of core relative sentences but have no lexical antecedent (i.e. they are headless) and are subject to a matching condition which forces the relative operator to satisfy the selectional restrictions of both the matrix and the embedded verb. This paper focuses on nominal FRs in English and in Spanish, and proposes a syntactic analysis of the construction as a mixed category made out of a CP layer and a DP layer connected through a nominalizer SWITCH, the functional category NomP. FRs are therefore treated here as complex nominals whose underlying structure coincides with that of headed and semiheaded relatives (i.e. the so-called Semifree Relatives in Spanish), and whose structural peculiarities follow from the particular role that the WH-constituent plays in the activation and interpretation of the nominalizer.

1. Introduction

Standard syntactic analyses canonically make use of a number of lexical categories (VP, NP, AP, etc.) implemented by some functional projections that encode their relevant grammatical features (tense, aspect...). However, one should also consider certain categories that are not uniform (i.e. consistently verbal, nominal, adjectival...) but combine properties of two or more lexical projections. This seems to be the case of Free Relatives (FRs), which are constructions that, despite their sentential structure, display a nominal distribution and can actually appear in syntactic positions excluded to canonical sentential categories (cf. Huddleston 2002: 1069):

(1) SAI:
\[ \text{Is } [\text{what she suggests} / \text{that idea} / \ast \text{that she proposes to go alone}] \text{ unreasonable?} \]

¹ I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers of the journal for very insightful comments and suggestions. Needless to say, all remaining errors are my own.
(2) Complement of a preposition:
I am sorry for [what I did / that situation / *that you were inconvenienced]

(3) Subject of a Small Clause:
They considered [[what she suggested / that idea / *that she proposes to go alone] unreasonable]

As the examples above show, FRs (in italics) appear in DP positions and are subject to the same structural requirement than standard DPs, i.e. the need to appear in Case sensitive positions. This explains why they cannot be extraposed (4), and also why they can be the complement of a preposition as in (2), but not of a non Case licensing category such as an adjective (5):

(4) It is unreasonable *what she suggests / *that idea / that she proposes to go alone.

(5) I am sorry *what I did / *that situation / that you were inconvenienced.

The main goal in this paper is to account for the distribution and syntactic peculiarities of FRs, analyzing them as mixed categories which combine a CP and a DP projection. In Section 2, I describe the main structural properties of the construction and the standard analyses that have attempted to account for them in the generative tradition. Section 3 presents my own analysis of FRs under a theory of mixed projections along the lines of Panagiotidis & Grohmann (2005), testing it on facts of both English and Spanish. Section 4 offers some conclusions.

2. Syntactic properties of FRs

Traditionally, the semantic typology of relative clauses has included basically two types, restrictives and non-restrictives. The former are always syntactically bound to a DP, and restrict the class of entities that can be denoted by this DP. As for non-restrictive relative clauses, they modify a wide range of categories adding further qualifications to their reference; however, they do not narrow down, nor expand, their extension. Despite their semantic and structural differences, what both types of headed relative clauses have in common is that they are introduced by a relative operator
which is anaphorically linked to the antecedent: ²

(6) Please, return \([\text{the book}_x \ [\text{which}_x \ [\text{you have taken}_x \ [\text{from here}]_x]]\]

As (6) shows, the relative clause has two occurrences of a variable \(X\) connected via the relative operator \(\text{which}\), its (simplified) reading being ‘Please, return the book \(X\) such that you have taken \(X\) from the library’. In this case the relative operator is lexical, but (restrictive) headed relative clauses may also allow for non-lexical operators in English when the relativization affects the object of a verb or a preposition in the subordinated clause:

(7) Please, return \([\text{DP} \ [\text{the book}_x \ [\text{Op}_x \ [\text{(that)}_x \ [\text{you have taken}_x \ [\text{Op}_x \ [\text{from here}]_x]]]_x]]\]

In the generative tradition, the relative operator has customarily been generated in its corresponding argumental position and moved to the left periphery of the clause for interpretative reasons (i.e. to be in a local relation to its antecedent). This left periphery is articulated in the sense of Rizzi (1997) and comprises at least two obligatory projections: ForceP, which encodes the illocutionary force of the clause and has a feature \([\text{REL}]\) in relative clauses, and FiniteP, which signals its tense/mood features; for convenience, here I will use the standard term CP\([\text{REL}]\) to subsume the relevant features of the two.

Free relatives are constructions which share the essentials of core relatives (i.e. they are sentential modifiers which involve a relative operator), but do not fit in the traditional binary typology. In particular, they differ from the canonical types in that they have no lexical antecedent (i.e. they are headless), and thus the relative operator has to satisfy a dual set of requirements: those of the matrix clause and those of the relative.

Two types of constructions have been most exhaustively described in the relevant literature under the term Free Relative: the so-called Concessive Free Relatives (CFRs) and Standard Free Relatives (FRs). Despite their label, it is rather misleading to treat the former as a subgroup of free relatives. They are sentence-level adjuncts introduced by a WH-element of the \(-\text{ever}\) type, but this is the only characteristic they have in common with proper free relatives:

² From now on I restrict to restrictive relative clauses (and accordingly the term \textit{headed relative} will just apply to them), since only these are structurally and semantically connected to free relatives.
(8) *Whatever you buy in that store, you always pay too much.*

As the example in (8) shows, the WH-*ever* phrase in the concessive sentence does not satisfy any semantic/syntactic requirement of the matrix predicate, a defining property of FRs, as will be argued below. Besides, as van Riemsdijk (2006) has noted, they can even contain multiple WH-phrases, a possibility attested in questions, but not in relative clauses of any kind (see Bošković 2002 for an account of multiple WH-fronting cross-linguistically):

(9) *Whichever CD you buy in whatever store, you always pay too much.*

Therefore I will not treat these concessive structures on a par with the other type of FRs and simply assume that they have a uniform sentential structure (i.e. that they are CP modifiers).

As for Standard Free Relatives, Bresnan & Grimshaw (1978) define them as pluri-categorial constructions, relying on data such as (10)–(14) below, where the relative operator (and, according to the authors, the whole FR) is a DP (10)–(11), an AP (12), an AdvP (13), or a PP (14):

(10) *Please, return what you have taken from here.*

(11) *I’ll sing whichever songs you want me to sing.*

(12) *I’ll sing however erect you want me to sing.*

(13) *I’ll sing however carefully you want me to sing.*

(14) *I’ll sing in whatever town you want me to sing.*

Larson (1987, 1998) argues against this view and proposes that FRs can only be nominal, analyzing examples like (12) and (13) as “free comparatives”, and (14) as a preposition with a nominal FR complement. I will ignore the controversy here (see Grosu 2003 for details) and merely focus on Nominal Standard Free Relatives, because they are the best exponent of the core properties of the construction; I will accordingly
restrict the term FR to refer to them.  

Schematically, the derivation of FRs will be as in (15):

(15) Please, return [what, [you have taken what, from here]]

The relative pronoun what in the sentence is not only understood as the internal argument of taken, but also as the complement of the matrix verb return; that is, it plays the same role that the antecedent the book has in headed relatives like (6). However, despite this nominal interpretation (and distribution; cf. (1)–(5)), FRs still bear a close structural resemblance to embedded WH-Questions like (16):

(16) I wonder [what, [you have taken what, from here]]

Although WH-Questions describe states of affairs and not entities, the internal structure of the complement of wonder in (16) basically coincides with that of the FR in (15). Both are sentential categories which comprise a thematic layer (roughly vP and VP), an inflectional layer (crucially TP) and an illocutionary layer (an articulated CP). Derivationally, they are both subject to a movement operation which moves an operator of a given kind (interrogative or relative) to the left periphery of the clause, that is, to CP. It should be noted that there are languages like English, Spanish, or Finnish (cf. Manninen 2003) that basically have the same set of (WH-) elements to introduce headed relatives, FRs and WH-Questions. However, there are others, like German, which use WH-elements only to introduce FRs and WH-Questions, whereas their headed relatives are inaugurated by morphologically unrelated elements; FRs pattern in these languages with WH-Questions and not with headed relatives in this particular respect.

In view of the above, one could claim that FRs are a subset of relatives with much in common with embedded questions and with clear DP-like properties. Together with this mixed syntactic nature, another salient characteristic of FRs is the so-called matching effect, that is, the fact that the WH-phrase has to satisfy the selectional restrictions of both the matrix and the embedded verb.  

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3 There is yet another group, the so-called Transparent Free Relatives, as in He made what may appear to be a radically new proposal. See Grosu (2003) for an analysis that treats this construction as a special case of nominal FR.

4 In languages with a rich Case system WH-phrases also match in Case, but this seems to be a surface phenomenon tightly linked to the morpho-phonological form of the word.
(17) English:
   a. *I will take whatever you give me.
   b. *I will take for whatever you ask.

(18) Spanish:
   a. Prefiero a quien conocí ayer.
      prefer.PRESENT.1SG at[ACC-mark] who meet.PAST.3SG yesterday
      ‘I prefer whom I met yesterday.’
   b. *Prefiero con quien viniste ayer.
      prefer.PRESENT.1SG with who come.PAST.2SG yesterday
      ‘I prefer the one with whom you came yesterday.’

The examples in (17) and (18) show that the WH-phrase functions as a constituent shared and selected by two predicates, one in the embedded FR and another in the main clause and this peculiarity, along with the mixed categorial status of the construction, has been dealt with differently in the relevant literature.5

In general, formal analyses of FRs have adopted two different approaches to explain them:

A the FR is a complex nominal with an antecedent and a subordinate clause.

B the FR is a clausal constituent with a WH-phrase which can be somehow accessed from outside.

Among the A type analyses, there have been two competing views. On the one hand, the so-called Head-Hypothesis (cf. Bresnan & Grimshaw 1978; Larson 1987, 1998; Citko 2002), where the WH-phrase is considered the antecedent of the FR, either because it is externally merged in its surface position outside CP (with the gap inside the FR being occupied by a pronominal element deleted under referential identity with the WH-phrase, as in (19a), or because it raises from inside the CP to occupy a position outside, as in (19b):

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5 Since, as stated above, I restrict here to Nominal Standard FRs, the matching condition implies that the FR must be introduced by a DP compatible with the selectional restrictions of both, the matrix and the subordinate predicates.
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(19)  a. Please, return \[[DP\textit{what}] [CP [you have taken pro, from here]]\]
    b. Please, return \[[[DP\textit{what}] [CP\textit{what} [you have taken \textit{what}, from here]]\]

On the other hand, the \textit{COMP Hypothesis} (cf. Harbert 1983; Suñer 1983, 1984; Grosu & Landman 1998; Grosu 2003), where the link between the relative clause and the matrix predicate is not direct because there is an empty head (PRO or pro) that acts as the antecedent. The WH-phrase in these analyses eventually occupies the specifier position of the CP, as it would in headed relatives:

(20)  Please, return \[[[DP\textit{PRO/pro}, \textit{what} [you have taken \textit{what}, from here]]\]

As for the B type analyses, the underlying assumption is that the FR is not a complex nominal, but a sentential category, that is, structurally equivalent to embedded interrogatives. Initially, it was defended that what makes FRs syntactically different to interrogative clauses is that the specifier of CP could be accessed and, therefore, potentially selected from outside (cf. the \textit{COMP accessibility} hypothesis of Groos & Vam Riemsdijk 1981; Hirschbühler & Rivero 1981, 1983):

(21)  Please, return \[[CP\textit{what} [you have taken \textit{what}, from here]]\]

But an analysis like (21) runs counter the standard assumptions on thematic restrictions since a single argument, the WH-phrase, would have to be connected to two different predicates. This is why more recent analyses do not approach the accessibility of the WH-phrase in terms of selection into CP, but in terms of the role that WH-phrase plays in the connection between that CP and the matrix predicate. For example, van Riemsdijk (2006) proposes a multidimensional structure where the WH-phrase is shared by the matrix predicate and the relative CP; Citko (2011) implements his approach, proposing that this structure undergoes a further Merge operation whereby the WH-phrase eventually occupies a CP-external position (the final structure being then a variant of the \textit{Head-Hypothesis}).

Other authors focus on how the WH-phrase directly contributes to the final interpretation of the relative CP as a nominal. In this respect, Donati (2006) argues that the WH-element moves as a head into \textit{C}_0 to check the WH-feature present there and in doing so endows the clause with the D-feature required for its nominal interpretation. Similarly, Ott (2011) assumes that the WH-constituent is responsible for the relabeling of the FR
into a nominal category, not because it moves as a head, but as the result of
the cyclic transfer of syntactic structure. Her proposal is that the WH-
category as a phrase moves to the edge of a CP whose head C₀, contrary to
what happens in interrogative sentences, bears no interpretable formal
features. This forces C₀ to be transferred, together with its complement, to
the interface components (in order for the remaining syntactic object to
conform to the principle of Full Interpretation), and leaves the WH-
constituent as the only visible element at the next phase. In this analysis,
the WH-phrase will also be selected by two different predicates but at two
different derivational cycles, thus circumventing the conflict with the
thematic-criterion provided this is understood as an interface condition that
applies at the vP phase level.

In general, all the analyses above seek to offer a principled
explanation of the main properties of Free Relatives (i.e. their DP-like
properties and the matching condition), but only A type relates headed
relatives and FRs structurally. Since the relation between (6) and (10) is
quite straightforward, an analysis that captures their syntactic parallelism
seems preferable in principle. However, such an analysis must also
formalize the role of the WH-phrase, which cannot be the structural
antecedent of the relative clause in its internal structure but must serve to
identify it and, at the same time, connect the subordinate CP to the matrix
predicate. This implies that the WH-phrase must somehow contribute to
the relabeling of CP into a nominal category, as B type analyses
presuppose. Significantly, this situation (i.e. a category of a given type
turning into a DP) has been attested cross-linguistically in a number of
constructions, and therefore the analysis of FRs can be plausibly
undertaken under a more general theory of such mixed projections. This is
what I would like to propose here: an analysis of FRs that connects them a)
with headed restrictive relatives and b) with other nominalized

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6 Apart from their semantic and distributional equivalence, FRs have also been proved
to pattern with headed relatives, and not with embedded questions, with respect to
reconstruction effects (cf. Citko 2002).

7 If the WH-constituent were the structural antecedent of the relative clause, one would
have to provide ad hoc mechanisms to prevent sentences like (i) or (ii), which should be
possible under current assumptions on relativization:

i) *Please, return what.
   (cf. Please, return the book.)

ii) *Please, return what that you have taken from here.
   (cf. Please, return the book that you have taken from here.)
constructions, while still accounting for the crucial syntactic properties of the construction (among them, the matching effect).

3. The mixed category analysis of Free Relatives

Mixed categories are those that combine properties typically associated with two distinct grammatical projections. Quite recently Panagiotidis & Grohmann (2005) have drawn on previous analyses of non-uniform projections (cf. Bresnan 1997; Borsley & Kornfilt 2000; Malouf 2000, among others) to investigate the exact nature of the constituents that make them up. They crucially rely on two notions: a) the existence of a SWITCH and b) the principle of Phrasal Coherence (as initially defended in Bresnan (1997) and Malouf (2000)).

A SWITCH is a recategorizer which allows the transition from one category to another, and which constitutes a syntactic (functional) category itself. As for the principle of Phrasal Coherence, it implies that the two parts of the mixed category connected through the SWITCH must be phrasally coherent; that is, the SWITCH must relate two categorially uniform subtrees. This way, mixed categories need not be ruled by extraordinary conditions on projection, since they just consist of two standard categories “glued” together by a SWITCH.

In their study, Panagiotidis & Grohmann (2005) focus on the size and the nature of the categorially uniform constituents that make up mixed projections. They argue that SWITCHes can only take complements of the size of a Prolific Domain, this being understood as a sub-part of the derivation that spans projections sharing contextual information (cf. Grohmann 2003):

Prolific Domains:

a) Thematic domain (Θ-Domain): the verbal projections, roughly vP and VP
b) Agreement domain (Φ-Domain): the inflectional projections, crucially (a split) TP
c) Discourse domain (Ω-Domain): the illocutionary projections, an articulated CP

As for the grammatical status of the SWITCH itself, they note that there is a conspicuous absence of mixed projections in which the SWITCH takes a nominal complement and converts it into a verbal one. This implies that SWITCHes are in fact nominalizers which recategorize a non-nominal
Prolific Domain into a DP.\textsuperscript{8}

\[ \text{DP} \; \text{[SWITCH]} \; \text{[CP]} \; \text{[TP]} \; \text{vP} \]

Panagiotidis and Grohmann (2005) also contend that the SWITCH has a dual categorial specification from which the dual character of the mixed projection derives: it has an uninterpretable \([uV]\) feature that makes it a probe searching for a V target to agree with (and entails that it will not appear without a verbal/clausal complement), and also possesses an interpretable \([N]\) feature that renders it as a nominalizer and guarantees the nominal behaviour of the whole projection and its selection by a DP. They therefore see the SWITCH as a functional category which allows from the transition from one (verbal) category to another, but they do not provide any mechanism to restrict its appearance and the particular complements it may have.

Since it is clearly not the case that any Prolific Domain may serve as the complement of a SWITCH (i.e. not every verbal or clausal complement can be nominalized), I would like to propose here that for a nominalizer SWITCH to be possible (i.e. activated), it must be licensed by a nominal category of some sort in an adequate agreement configuration, a necessary move to render it a legible object at the interfaces. Besides, since the resulting DP needs to conform to the principle of Full Interpretation, it must also be somehow provided with relevant semantic features.

In what follows, I will analyze FRs along this view, treating them as mixed categories made up of a clause (the biggest possible Prolific Domain in Grohmann’s (2003) classification) switched into a DP under the conditions just explored. In particular, I suggest that the derivation of a FR will schematically be as follows:

\[ \text{8 Panagiotidis & Grohmann (2005) explore different constructions which could exemplify the combination of the SWITCH with a) a thematic domain (POSS-ing gerunds in English, or Dutch nominal infinitives) b) an agreement domain (clausal gerunds in English or Spanish nominal infinitives) and c) a discourse domain (Greek nominalized clauses). As mixed categories, Nominal Free Relatives will group with the latter, since they also result from the nominalization of the biggest possible Prolific Domain.} \]
FRs consist of two categories, a DP and a CP, connected through a nominalizer SWITCH that I will call NomP. The complement of NomP is a full clause with a relative operator that moves to Spec-CP under current assumptions, and this is what the FR has in common with headed relatives and with embedded WH-Questions.

However, FRs crucially involve a further step in the derivation: the WH-element must land in Spec-NomP and enter in a Spec-head relation there to license (and thus activate) the SWITCH. Since the head of NomP has a [N] feature, the class of WH-phrases that can sit here will be restricted to those which are nominal; therefore only WH-DPs occur in Nominal FRs, the matching condition following from this (see fn. 5). Besides, unless the language has some other independent means to do so, the WH-phrase will have to provide NomP with relevant semantic features: this is what forces this constituent to be a referential (non-anaphoric) expression itself, a restriction that equates the type of introductory elements in FRs with those in interrogative clauses. This need to identify the functional category NomP semantically may also be the reason why D-linked relatives (i.e. relative pronouns which require a nominal restriction;
cf. Citko 2004) are excluded.9

One of the advantages of the analysis just sketched is that it allows for a unified treatment of headed and free relative sentences. Both types of relative sentences consist, under this view, of a CP_{[REL]} attached to a nominal category (a lexical NP or a functional NomP, respectively) complement of a functional DP projection:10

\[ \text{Figure 2} \]

The process of relativization is also the same for both: the WH-phrase moves to Spec, CP to check the [REL] feature there, and FRs only differ from headed relatives in that they involve a further movement into Spec, NomP for interpretative reasons. Predictively it will also be possible for FRs to employ a covert operator under appropriate conditions (cf. (6) and (7)), a situation that is found in Spanish, as I will discuss in Section 3.2.11

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9 This explains why FRs introduced by relative specifiers like whose or which are not grammatical in English:

i) *I shall buy which books / whose books I like.

The forms whatever and whichever, in their use as specifiers, constitute apparent exceptions to the generalization that D-linked relatives cannot appear in FRs (cf. I shall buy whatever books / whichever books I like. (See Donati 2008 and references therein for a particular account of the issue.) In fact, FRs with WH forms of the -ever type (or their equivalent -quiera in Spanish) differ from FRs with plain forms in significant ways. Since I will not deal with the issue here, I refer the reader to Jacobson (1995), Dayal (1997), Grosu & Landman (1998), Grosu (2002) and van Riemsdijk (2006), among others, for precise accounts of their properties.

10 An analysis of this sort where the relative clause attaches just to the NP, excluding the determiner, has been standardly defended in the literature for restrictive relative clauses (cf. Ross 1967; Partee 1976; Smits 1989, among others).

11 Caponigro (2002) and Citko (2004), among others, defend an analysis of FRs where the relative clause directly attaches to a DP which has a covert head and an empty
3.1 FRs in English

Assuming the analysis of FRs as mixed categories that I have proposed above, the derivation of a sentence as (10) would be as follows:

(10) Please, return what you have taken from here.

Please, return [DP [uAcc] [NomP [DP what]k NomP[N] [uV] [CP what, C[REL] [TP you have [vP taken]]]]]

The complement of NomP is a full clause with a relative DP what, which moves to Spec-CP under current assumptions, and then to Spec-NomP where it licenses the SWITCH. As argued, what also provides the covert category NomP with the grammatical features [3rd person] and [singular], and the semantic feature [non-human]. As for the DP subtree of the mixed category, it has an uninterpretable Case feature that needs to be valued in one of the positions accessible to Case valuation, that is, in Subject or Object position, thus ensuring the nominal distribution of the FRs.

This analysis thus accounts for the double nature (nominal and clausal) of FRs. The other salient property of the construction, the matching effect, also follows from the DP status of FRs and from the aforementioned Spec-head relation between the WH-phrase and the head of NomP with no need to weaken the thematic criterion, since the matrix DP is selected (and assigned Case) inside the matrix clause and the WH-phrase inside the relative clause. To license the nominalizer, this WH-phrase must be a nominal category (DP). When this situation holds, as in (10), a grammatical sentence results; otherwise ungrammaticality is expected, as in (17b) (repeated here for convenience), with a PP in Spec-NomP:

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specifier to which the WH-phrase eventually moves. In my approach there exists a nominalizer NomP in between the two, which apparently makes the structural representation less economical. But, as argued above, this category NomP serves to capture the syntactic relationship that exists between FRs and headed relatives, on the one hand, and FRs and other nominalized constituents, on the other. Besides, the analysis posited here does not need to weaken the c-selection requirements of DP, which in English always takes a NP complement.

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As reflected in (10) and (22), the derivation will be convergent in the narrow syntax if the specifier and the head of NomP agree in syntactic features. The syntactic object is then sent to the PF component and will only be legible at that level if the morphophonological shape of the WH-phrase matches the requirements of the matrix clause (or if mismatches are resolved in an appropriate way; see fn. 4).
(22) *I’ll take for whatever you ask.

I’ll take [DP_{Acc}] [NomP_{PP for whatever}]_{x} Nom_{[N]}_{[vV]} [CP_{for whatever}, C_{[REL]}_{TP you [vP ask_{[V]} for whatever, x]]}]]

In English, one can also find FRs after verbs that select PPs as complements (cf. van Riemsdijk 2006):

(23) Tomorrow I will speak to whomever you spoke last night.

(24) Children worry about whatever their parents worry.

The analysis of FRs as mixed categories will imply a derivation of (23)–(24) along the following lines:

(25) I will speak to_{x} [DP_{[uAcc]} [NomP_{DP whomever}]_{x} Nom_{[N]}_{[uV]} [CP_{whomever}, C_{[REL]}_{TP you [vP spoke_{[V]} [[te], whomever, x]]}}]

(26) Children worry about_{x} [DP_{[uAcc]} [NomP_{DP whatever}]_{x} Nom_{[N]}_{[uV]} [CP_{whatever}, C_{[REL]}_{TP their parents [vP worry_{[V]} [[about], whatever, x]]}}]

The matrix preposition takes a FR as its complement. Since for the Spec-head agreement to be preserved in NomP the relativization process can only involve WH-DPs, the preposition in the relative clause will have to be stranded. My analysis thus coincides, mutatis mutandis, with the approach defended in Larson (1987, 1998) for this construction (see Grosu 1996, 2003 for an alternative view). Subsequently, the preposition can be optionally deleted under matching conditions (or understood as elliptical and reconstructed in the sense of Larson (1987)).

Lastly, a stranded preposition (covert this time) also seems to be involved in the derivation of FRs introduced by where(ever) or when(ever). As is well known, in English there are a number of constituents that can be considered adverbial DPs, that is, locative and temporal DPs (that day, yesterday, home etc.) that can have an adverbial reading as if they were the object of a preposition (cf. Emonds 1976, 1987; Bresnan & Grimshaw

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13 As van Riemsdijk (2006) notes, this preposition–stranding analysis is substantiated by the variants of examples (23) and (24) where the preposition has not been deleted:

i) Tomorrow, I’ll speak to whomever you spoke to.

ii) Children worry about whatever their parents worry about.
1978; Larson 198; McCawley 1988, among others); this lexically restricted class of adverbial DPs can license not only Nominative or Accusative Case, but also Oblique Case in contexts like those in (28):

(27) He frequently remembered [DP that day]

(28) They met [PP [P Ø] [DP that day]]

Significantly, FRs introduced by where or when, behave distributionally (and semantically) like adverbial DPs (examples from Caponigro & Pearl 2009: 156):

(29) Lily adores where this very tree grows. (i.e. FR understood as a DP: ‘that place’)

(30) Lily napped where this very tree grows. (i.e. FR understood as a P + DP: ‘in that place’)

If one assumes with Caponigro & Pearl (2009) that where and when are bare DP adverbs, the possibilities in (29) and (30) follow from my analysis of FRs with no further stipulation:

(31) Lily adores [DP [uAcc] [NomP [DP where] x Nom[N] [uV] [CP where x C[REL] [TP this very tree [vP grows[V] [[[pe] where,]]]]]]

(32) Lily napped [pe] [DP [uOblique] [NomP [DP where] x Nom[N] [uV] [CP where x C[REL] [TP this very tree [vP grows[V] [[[pe] where,]]]]]]

The WH-phrase where is base generated as the object of an empty preposition which will be necessarily stranded for the Spec-head agreement to be preserved in NomP.14 There where identifies the nominal projection as [locative]; as a [locative] DP, the FR will now be able to license not only Accusative Case, as in (31), but also Oblique Case in contexts like (32).

3.2 FRs in Spanish

Free Relatives in Spanish share most of their structural and semantic

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14 As in the case of (23) and (24) above, examples where the stranded preposition is lexical empirically support an analysis along these lines: *Jack dislikes where we just ran past* (cf. Caponigro & Pearl 2009).
properties with English FRs and therefore can be approached under the same lines, that is, as mixed categories involving a Discourse Domain (CP), a SWITCH (NomP) and a resulting DP. The clause contains a relative operator which, as in English, is lexical; it moves to Spec-CP in the usual fashion, and then to Spec-NomP, where it has to identify the [N] feature of the head. This is what forces it to be nominal itself (a DP), and thus explains the matching restrictions that exist with respect to the matrix predicate (cf. examples in (18), repeated here for convenience).15 The only non-anaphoric non-D-linked WH-DP in Spanish is quien ‘who’ (and its plural form quiénes), which identifies NomP as a singular/plural [human] entity.16

\[ \text{(33) Prefiero a [DP}_{\text{Acc}} [NomP [DP quien], NomP [uV] [CP quien, C_{REL}] [TP pro [vP conocí[v] a quien, ayer]]]] \]

\[ \text{(34) *Prefiero [DP}_{\text{Def}} [NomP [PP con quien], NomP [uV] [CP con quien, C_{REL}] [TP pro [vP viniste[v] con quien, ayer]]]] \]

As English, Spanish also has a set of adverbial WH-DPs (donde\textsubscript{locative} ‘where’, cuando\textsubscript{temporal} ‘when’, como\textsubscript{manner} ‘how’, cuanto\textsubscript{quantity} ‘how much/many’), and here again the FR they introduce may behave distributionally (and semantically) like a DP or a PP. The structure involved coincides with the one proposed for the English examples in (29) and (30):

\[ \text{15 The FR can be non-matching in Spanish in subject or left dislocated positions, that is, in positions which are not subcategorized, but even there their status tends to be rather marginal (see RAE 2010 where they are legislated again, favoring instead the headed version of the relative):} \]
\[ \text{i) Me gusta con quien viniste ayer.} \]
\[ \text{me like,PRESENT,3SG with whom come,PAST,2SG yesterday} \]
\[ \text{‘I like the one with whom you came yesterday.’} \]

If my analysis is on the right track, these non-matching FRs must be understood as non-nominalized CP constituents (cf. Caponigro 2002 for an approach along the same lines). 16 Spanish relatives include not only quien(es) but also Art (el/la/los/las) + cual(es) ‘the which’ and cuyo, -a, -os, -as ‘whose’, but of the three quien is the only non D-linked WH-element that can be non-anaphoric, as required in FRs (and accordingly, the only one that can also introduce WH-Questions). For a justification of the D-linked nature of el cual, see Ojea (1992).
ON MIXED CATEGORIES: THE CASE OF FREE RELATIVES

(35) No me gusta donde vive.  
‘I don’t like where (s)he lives.’

No me gusta [DP [a Nominative] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP vive[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]]

(36) Vive donde nació.  
‘(S)he lives where (s)he was born.’

Vive [uE] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP nació[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]

Together with this, Spanish allows for a construction, sometimes termed Semifree Relative (SFR), whose interpretation and distribution is equivalent to that of FRs. It consists of the definite article in any of its possible grammatical forms (el [MASC, SG], la [FEM, SG], lo [NEUTER, SG], los [MASC, PL], las [FEM, PL]), followed by a clause introduced by the complementizer que:

(37) Prefiero el que vino ayer.  
‘I prefer the one [= male/thing] that came yesterday.’

Prefiero [uE] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP nació[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]

(38) Prefiero la que vino ayer.  
‘I prefer the one [= female/thing] that came yesterday.’

Prefiero [uE] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP nació[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]

(39) Prefiero lo que vi ayer.  
‘I prefer the one [= thing] that I saw yesterday.’

Prefiero [uE] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP nació[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]

FRs and SFRs can be freely coordinated:

(40) Saludó a los que llegaron pronto y a quienes entraron más tarde.  
‘He greeted those that arrived early and those who entered later.’

Saludó [a ACC-mark] [NomP [DP donde]_x Nom[IN] [uV] [CP donde_x C[REL] [TP pro [vP nació[CP [uE donde_x]]]]]
And they are alternative options in all contexts. This is why grammatical tradition from Bello(1981) [1847] to the RAE (2010) has customarily treated this construction as a special case of FR (see also Plann 1980; Ojea 1992; Brucart 1999, among others). In fact, SFRs structurally occupy a position intermediary between headed and headless relatives, sharing with the former the type of introductory elements they allow for, and with the latter the fact they are subject to the matching condition.

\[(41) \text{Prefiero quien/el que vino ayer.}\]

\[\text{prefer.PRESENT.1SG who.SG/the.MASC.SG that came.PAST.3SG yesterday}\]

'I prefer who/the one that I saw yesterday.'

Actually, non-adverbial FRs in Spanish necessarily refer to human entities since, as argued above, they can only be introduced by quien(es) ‘who’. This implies that SFRs have to be employed otherwise, and, consequently, will serve to translate all the sentences with a FR introduced by what in English:

i) \text{Please, return WHAT you have taken from here.}\n
ii) \text{Por favor, devuelva LO QUE has cogido de aquí.}\n
Citko (2004) argues for a distinct group of relative clauses, which she calls “Light-headed relatives”, with the following properties: a) they have a (semantically light) lexical head, b) can be interpreted as definite, indefinite or negative, c) show the same introductory elements than FRs and d) are not subject to the matching requirement. Contrary to what she contends, SFRs do not belong to this class, since, as noted, they do not share any of these properties; in particular, they are always interpreted as definite, they have the same introductory elements than headed relatives and they are subject to the matching condition. It is precisely this matching requirement that distinguishes SFRs from other relative constructions with light heads which could more accurately be grouped with those described by Citko (2004) for Polish:

i) \text{*El con quien vino.}\n\text{The with whom come.PAST.3SG}\n\text{‘The one with whom she came.’}\n
ii) \text{Ese con quien vino.}\n\text{That with whom come.PAST.3SG}\n\text{‘That one with whom she came.’}\n
---

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ii) \text{Ese con quien vino.}\n\text{That with whom come.PAST.3SG}\n\text{‘That one with whom she came.’}
Table 1. Types of (restrictive) relative clauses in Spanish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of relative</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Introductory elements in CP</th>
<th>Matching effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headed relative</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>OP_{REL} que *quien / *el cual P + quien / P + el cual donde/cuando/como</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semifree relative</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>OP_{REL} que *quien / *el cual *P + quien / *P + el cual donde/*cuando/*como</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free relative</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>Covert</td>
<td>OP_{REL} que quien / *el cual *P + quien / *P + el cual donde/como</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1 shows, Spanish has a complementizer que ‘that’ which is obligatorily projected in the head of CP in relative sentences whenever the relative operator is covert (OP_{REL}), and excluded otherwise. The conditions that force the relative operator to be covert in headed relatives in Spanish do not coincide with those that apply in English. In English, the relative operator may optionally be covert depending on the syntactic function that it plays in the subordinate clause (cf. 7). In Spanish, it is the category of this operator that forces the option, and thus DP relative operators must always be covert in headed relatives unless they are the complement of a preposition (that can never be stranded in Spanish):^{19}

(42) *Prefiero el candidato quien vino ayer.
    prefer.PRESENT.1SG the candidate who come.PAST.3SG yesterday
    ‘I prefer the candidate who came yesterday.’

^{19} Accordingly, adverbial DPs can only introduce headed relatives when they have an adverbial reading in the subordinate clause (i.e. when they are the complement of an empty abstract preposition in the terms explained above):
i) Me gusta el lugar donde nació.
    me like the place where be.born.PAST.3SG
    ‘I like the place where he was born.’
This situation is reversed in the case of FRs. The reason for this, as I argued above, is that the operator in this construction needs to be lexical, not only to license NomP but also to endorse it with the relevant semantic features. But if a mechanism existed which could ensure that once licensed (i.e. categorically identified) NomP could be adequately interpreted, the option of the covert operator would again be the most economical, and thus the one to be predicted. This is precisely the case of SFRs in Spanish.

Assuming a common structure for all types of restrictive relative clauses (i.e. those with a lexical antecedent, those with a partially lexical antecedent and those with a non-lexical antecedent), the syntactic configuration of SFRs will be (Figure 3), repeated here for convenience:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3**

For the nominalizer NomP to be activated it must enter into an agreement relation with a nominal category. This implies that only DP operators can move into its specifier (matching condition), and, in this, SFRs coincide with FRs:

(45) *Prefiero el con quien viniste ayer.
prefer.PRESENT.1SG the.MASC.SG with whom come.PAST.2SG yesterday
‘I prefer the one with whom you came yesterday.’

However, even if this matching restriction holds, the operator cannot be
lexical, as shown by the impossibility of (46):

(46) *Prefiero el quien vino ayer.

‘I prefer the one who came yesterday.’

The reason for this is that in SFRs DP projects an agreeing determiner which allows its complement NomP to be properly interpreted at the interface. This means that the relative operator will only have to license the SWITCH categorially, the covert option being the most economical for the purpose:

(47) Prefiero [DP[Acc] elmasc, sing] [NomP [DP Opwh] Nom[IN][νV] [CP Op[REL] que

[TP [νP-Opwh vino[ν] ayer]]]]

English, more impoverished morphologically, lacks agreeing determiners of this sort and therefore SFRs are not a possible option here:

(48) *I prefer the that came yesterday.

Finally, since the definite article in Spanish only possesses (and transfers) the phi-features of gender and number, SFRs will ambiguously be interpreted as [human], as in (37) and (38), unless the determiner is [neuter] (as in 39). For the same reason, the article cannot identify NomP as [locative], [temporal], [manner] or [quantity], and therefore SFRs equivalent to the FRs in (35) and (36) do not exist:

(49) *Vive en el que nació.

‘He lives where he was born.’

4. Concluding remarks

Free Relatives have proven to be a fertile ground for research given the particularities of their structure. Here I have treated them as complex nominals on a par with other restrictive relative sentences and I have posited a unified analysis of all the possible types, namely headed, partially
headed and headless. I have contended that they share not only the same underlying structure (repeated here as Figure 4), but also the same process of relativization, including the possibility to employ in that process a lexical or a non-lexical operator given appropriate conditions:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4**

I argue that what makes FRs different from the other types of relatives generated by the structure in Figure 4 is the role that the WH-constituent plays in the activation and interpretation of NomP, a nominalizer SWITCH. In this respect, my analysis also captures the intuition behind most of the proposals that treat FRs as sentential categories with the same underlying structure than embedded interrogatives: that the WH-phrase introducing them is responsible for the relabeling of CP into a nominal category.

Assuming the existence of a SWITCH in FRs, my proposal also integrates them into a wider group of constructions with which they share a mixed nature as verbal-sentential categories with DP properties. This means that, despite the many overt differences existing among them, FRs will be grouped with constructions like POSS-ing gerunds in English or nominalized infinitives in Spanish, among others (see fn. 8). In this respect, I have adopted the basic tenants in Panagiotidis & Grohmann (2005) to approach mixed projections in terms of a SWITCH which takes a verbal category of the size of a Prolific Domain and allows its transition as a DP. However, I have implemented their analysis, proposing that this nominalizer SWITCH must be restricted to those contexts where it can be licensed by a [N] category of some sort that enters with it into an agreement relation. Ideally, the contexts for this relation will be reduced to Spec-head agreement, as in the case of FRs, and head-head agreement,
probably the case in other constructions.\textsuperscript{20} Of course, many details of an integrating account like this remain to be worked out, but hopefully further cross-linguistic research into the exact nature of mixed projections will help to clarify them.

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\textsuperscript{20} In this respect, a superficial look at some nominalized constructions reveals that the complement of the SWITCH may be headed by a category with a nominal origin (e.g. the \textit{-ing} participle in English or the infinitive in Spanish), and thus susceptible of being characterized as [N].
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Kontaktinduzierter Sprachwandel im Bereich der estnischen Verbrektion? Teil II: Verbkomplemente in Form von Adpositionalphrasen

Zusammenfassung


1. Einleitende Bemerkungen

Angesichts des Vorkommens von Adpositionen in allen finnisch-ugrischen Sprachen reicht allein die Tatsache ihres Gebrauchs im Estnischen in keinem Fall aus, um daraus fremden Einfluss herleiten zu können. Zwar hat der estnische Sprachreformer Aavik (1936: 92) Adpositionalphrasen mit *peal* ‘auf’, *sees* ‘in’, *juures* ‘bei’ etc. als Germanismen bezeichnet, die es aus der Sprache zu verdrängen gelte, doch deutschen Einfluss für ihre rein lokale Funktion nachzuweisen, erscheint wenig erfolgversprechend. Ein Blick in die estnische Dialetkologie zeigt, dass die Verwendung von Adpositionalphrasen mit *peale* ‘auf [+AKK]’, *peal* ‘auf [+DAT]’, *pealt* ‘von (...) herunter’ etc. anstelle der äußeren Lokalkasus in den nördlichen

Erwartungsgemäß noch häufiger waren Adpositionalphrasen in der Anfangszeit der estnischen Schriftsprache:

It is understandable that in the earlier translation tradition, where morpheme-to-morpheme translation was standard practice, it was easier to translate the German prepositional constructions into the Estonian postpositional construction than to replace them by synthetic forms (Habicht 2000: 23).

Präpositionen im Estnischen. Betrachtet werden dabei nur die Präpositionen, die im Deutschen in Präpositionalobjekten enthalten sind (Breindl 1989):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deutscher Ausdruck</th>
<th>Estnischer Ausdruck</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>an</td>
<td>Adessiv, Allativ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auf</td>
<td>peal, peale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aus, von</td>
<td>Ablativ, Elativ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mit</td>
<td>-ga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nach</td>
<td>järel, järele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>über</td>
<td>üle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unter</td>
<td>all, alla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vor/für</td>
<td>ees, eest, ette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zu</td>
<td>juurde, poole, Allativ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. *eest* ‘vor’


Für die Präposition vor lassen sich im heutigen Deutsch die folgenden Bedeutungsaspekte ausmachen:

– eine lokale Bedeutung mit einer lokativischen (mit Dativergänzung) und einer direkionalen Variante (mit Akkusativergänzung)

– eine temporale Bedeutung: vor zwei Stunden, vgl. es. kahe tunni eest ‘vor zwei Stunden’

– eine (im weiteren Sinne) kausale Bedeutung (GDS 2149ff.): zittern vor, erschrecken vor.

Der Ausdruck von Kausalität durch Lokalausdrücke ist ein universal anzutreffender Grammatikalisierungskanal, präferiert werden dabei Ausdrücke zur Angabe von Quellen (von, aus, vgl. dt. aus Angst ~ fl. pelosta [ELA]). Darüber hinaus bietet aber z.B. das Deutsche eine größere Menge an Präpositionen, die kausale Beziehungen ausdrücken können (lachen über, leiden an/unter, erkennen an). In diesem eher peripheren Bereich der Kausalität zeigen sich wiederum am ehesten übereinzelsprachliche Unterschiede, die auch schon nahverwandte Sprachen betreffen, vgl. engl. laugh at neben about, suffer from (anstelle dt. lachen über, leiden an/unter). Wenn wie hier die Entsprechungen mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit auf universalen Prozessen beruhen, ergibt sich u.U. eher die Chance, Lehnübersetzungen sicher zu bestimmen.


(1) hoidma ‘behüten’: jumal hoidis kahju eest ‘Gott schützte vor Schaden’ (WWB 105)

(2) kartma ‘fürchten’: ärge kartke minu ette ‘fürchtet nicht für mich’ (WGR 547)

(3) lukutama ‘verschließen’: ma pean kõik tema eest lukutama ‘ich muss alles vor ihm verschließen’ (WWB 551)

(4) mõõnama ‘ebben, abfließen’: kivi eest mõõnad ära, kurja suu eest ei mõõna (Sprichw.) ‘einem Steine weichst du aus, einem boshafte Munde nicht’ (WWB 622)

1 Die Verwendung einer Adposition im Zusammenhang mit Verben wie ‘fliehen’ ist, da die lokale Bedeutungskomponente noch deutlich sichtbar ist, auch dem Finnischen nicht unbekannt, wie diese Beispiele zeigen: mies läks toisten edeltä ‘der Mann ging vor (d.h. aus dem Raum vor) den anderen weg’ (Eliot 1890: 207); kansa pakeni vihollisen edeltä ‘das Volk floh vor dem Feinde’ (Fromm 1982: 242).

(5) *põgenema* ‘fliehen’: *pōgenes minus eest ärä* ‘er floh vor mir’ (WWB 105)

(6) *varjama* ‘beschatten, verbergen’: *silmade eest ärä varjama* ‘unsichtbar machen’ (WWB 1312), wörtl. ‘vor den Augen verbergen’


Der Präposition *für* sind in der deutschen Gegenwartssprache die folgenden Verwendungsweisen zuzuschreiben (GDS 2130ff.):

– eine temporale Verwendungsweise: *für zwei Jahre*

– finale(-benefaktive) Verwendungsweisen: *verwenden für, sich eignen für, ausreichen für, (austauschbar mit gegen) kämpfen für, sich entscheiden für* „Nur noch schwach ausgeprägt ist die finale Note“ (GDS 2132) z.B. bei *sich begeistern, sich interessieren für* und „fast vernachlässigbar ist der finale Aspekt“ bei *charakteristisch für, Voraussetzung für*

– restriktive Verwendungsweisen (Nennung von „Zielgruppen“): *interessant für*

³ Alle Belege aus den Predigten Müllers sind dem Korpus zur alten estnischen Schriftsprache der Universität Tartu entnommen (http://www.murre.ut.ee/vakkur/Korpused/Myller/myllerj.htm).
repräsentative Verwendungsweisen: für jemanden etwas erledigen, stehen für; (im Sinne von „Austausch“) für etwas bezahlen, für etwas loben, für etwas danken, sich für etwas entschuldigen⁴


(7) kahetsemä ‘bedauern’: ma kahetsen tema eest ‘ich bedauere ihn, empfinde Mitleid für ihn’ (WWB 183)

(8) kostma ‘hallen, sprechen’: ma tahan kosta teie ette ‘ich will mich verantworten vor euch’ (WGR 344)

(9) mõistma ‘verstehen; zuerkennen’: mis teie selle eest mulle mõistate ‘was werdet ihr mir dafür bewilligen, zugestehen’ (WWB 615)

(10) muretsemä ‘sorgen’: ta on paremine minu ette muretsenud, kui et ta tuhat rubla oleks annud ‘er hat besser für mich gesorgt, als wenn er hundert [sic!, eig. ‘tausend’] Rubel gegeben hätte’ (WGR 660)

(11) orjama ‘dienen’: maa eest orjama ‘für eingepachtetes Land Frondienste leisten’ (WWB 714)

⁴ Die GDS (2135) weist darauf, dass die Abgrenzung zwischen Komplementen und Supplementen hier besonders schwerfällt: Die für-Phrase bei loben sei wohl eher dem Supplementbereich zuzuordnen, die bei danken, sich entschuldigen eher dem Komplementbereich.
(12) põlastama ‘bedauern’: põlastas küll tema eest ‘er bedauerte ihn wohl’ (WWB 861)

(13) seisma ‘stehen’: külap seisab kalja eest ‘es kann wohl für Dünnbier gelten’; ma tahan see eest hea seista ‘ich will dafür bürgen’ (WWB 1027)

(14) tänama ‘danken’: tänan leiva rooa eest ‘ich danke für Brot und Speise’ (WWB 106); tänas öömaja eest/ette ‘er dankte für das Nachtlager’ (WGR 547)

(15) taganema ‘zurückgehen; bürgen’: teise eest taganema ‘für einen anderen Bürgschaft leisten’ (WWB 1106)


Obwohl die geringe Anzahl der sowohl bei Wiedemann als auch bei Müller nachgewiesenen Verben eine Verallgemeinerung nur eingeschränkt stützt, kann man davon ausgehen, dass die adpositionale Ergänzung mit eest schon zur damaligen Zeit gängig war, denn auch weitere Verben zeichnen sich durch sie aus, so kaitsma ‘jemanden vor etw. schützen’ oder kiitma ‘jemanden für etwas loben’: Kohnretti eddest kaitze meidt ‘Vor dem Satan schütze uns’ (Müller 15.1.6); sesama hee tegkomeße eddest, olkut Iūal kytetū emˇis igkewest ‘für diese gute Tat sei Gott gepriesen, bis in alle Ewigkeit’ (Müller 1.12.34).

Die Übereinstimmungen der Verwendung von es. eest und dt. vor/für, mnd. vör sprechen stark dafür, dass eine Beeinflussung durch den deutschen Sprachgebrauch vorliegt. Wie auch im Falle des Komitativos konnte anhand der vorliegenden Daten allerdings kein Grammatikalisierungsweg nachgezeichnet werden, vielmehr stehen stark und weniger stark grammatikalisierte Verwendungen bereits in den frühesten überlieferten Schriftdenkmälern nebeneinander, so dass das Vorliegen von Lehnübersetzungen nahe liegt. Auch die Tatsache, dass als
Entsprechungen der deutschen Präpositionen sowohl das lokativische *ees*, das direktionale *ette* und (mit klarem Vorsprung) das separativische *eest* nebeneinander stehen, kann als Hinweis auf fremden Einfluss gewertet werden. Das favorisierte *eest* ist mit seiner separativischen Grundbedeutung eigentlich nicht das „natürliche“ Äquivalent der deutschen Präpositionen, das direktionale *ette* und das lokativische *ees* liegen da näher. *Eest* wiederum steht dem angenommenen Ausgangspunkt, nämlich der Verwendung des Partitivs oder Elativs (wie im Finnischen anzutreffen) näher. Diese Grundstruktur einer separativischen Rektion konnte auch durch den anzunehmenden deutschen Einfluss nicht überdeckt oder verdrängt werden.

3. *järele und taga ‘nach’*

Bei der Adposition *järele* handelt es sich um die Allativform des heute noch gebräuchlichen Substantivs *järg* ‘Reihe, Folge’. Neben ihrer lokalen (genauer: direktionalen) Bedeutung ‘hinter (...) her, nach’ hat sie auch modale Bedeutungskomponenten ausgebildet, die denen der deutschen Präposition *nach* gleichen (vgl. Ausdrücke wie *reeglite järele käima* ‘nach den Regeln gehen’, *kellegi pilli järele tantsima* ‘nach jemandes Pfeife tanzen’).


(16) *koolduma* ‘sich beugen’: *kondid koolduvad selle töö järele* ‘die Knochen gewöhnen sich an diese Arbeit’ (WWB 357)

(17) *koolutama* ‘biegen’: *kingad jala järele koolutama* ‘den Schuhen die Form des Fußes geben’ (WWB 358), wörtl. ‘die Schuhe nach dem Fuß biegen’

(18) *lööma* ‘schlagen; gelangen’: *inimesed löövad siis selle tahtmise järele* ‘die Menschen gewöhnen sich dann an diese Vorschrift’ (WWB 534)

(19) *paenduma* ‘sich beigen, sich fügen’: *mu keel ei paenu selle järele* ‘ich kann es nicht aussprechen’ (WWB 747), wörtl. ‘meine Zunge biegt sich nicht danach’

(20) *riivima* ‘reiben; sich bewegen’: *laev riivib tuule järele* ‘das (vor Anker liegende) Schiff treibt vor dem Winde’ (WWB 964)

(21) *talbuma* ‘sich beigen’: *jalad ei talbunud selle tantsu järele* ‘die Füße waren zu steif für diesen Tanz’ (WWB 1112), wörtl. ‘die Füße bogen sich nicht nach dem Tanz’

Äquivalent zu der deutschen Präposition *nach* weist *järele* auch kausal-finale Verwendungsweisen auf (vgl. dt. *nach etwas fragen*), wobei es sich dann um verbsubklassenspezifische Ergänzungen handelt. Als Entsprechung von *nach* tritt in dieser Verwendung auch die bedeutungssähnliche Adposition *taga* ‘hinter’ auf. Hinzuweisen ist darauf,
dass die finnische rein kausal-finale Postposition takia ‘wegen, für’ derselben Herkunft wie es. taga ist, hier also ähnliche Prozesse der Bedeutungserweiterung vorliegen. Doch ist diese Ableitung vermutlich eine jüngere Bildung und lässt nicht unbedingt Aufschluss auf das Alter der entsprechenden Verwendungsweise im Estnischen zu. Mittelniederdeutsche Vorbilder lassen sich ebenso leicht finden: mî langet nâ ‘mich verlangt, ich habe Verlangen nach’ (MNDHWB Bd. 2/1, Sp. 730), vrâgen nâ ‘fragen nach, sich kümmern um, Rücksicht nehmen auf’ (MNDHWB Bd. 2/1, Sp. 1047), stân, wesen na ‘trachten nach, ausgehen auf’ (Lübben 1888: 239), sik såten nâ ‘streben nach’ (MNDHWB Bd. 2/1, Sp. 1047).

und der Partitiv (für das Partialobjekt). Derartige Konstruktionen als Partikelverben zu klassifizieren erscheint somit verfehlt.\(^5\)


\(^{(22)}\) *äilitama ‘nachspotten’: teise järele äilitama ‘nachspotten’ (WWB 68)*

\(^{(23)}\) *arvama ‘denken’: ühe asja järele arvama ‘einer Sache nachdenken’ (WWB 47)*

\(^{(24)}\) *kaebama ‘klagen’: teise järele kaebama ‘sehr nach einem verlangen’ (WWB 178)*

\(^{(25)}\) *kahetsema ‘bedauern’: ma kahetsen selle järele ‘ich bereue es, ich trauere dem nach’ (WWB 183)*

\(^{(26)}\) *katsuma ‘versuchen, anschauen’: töö järele katsuma ‘nach der Arbeit sehen’ (WWB 223)*

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\(^5\) Näheres zur diachronen Entwicklung von Partikelverbverbindungen im Estnischen in Müller & Schlotthauer (2011).
(27) mõtlema ‘denken’: mõtle selle järele ‘denke darüber nach’ (WWB 148)

(28) mõõnama ‘ebben, abfließen’: kirg mõõnab selle järele, kelle käest ta on välja paesend ‘das Feuer folgt dem nach, durch dessen Hand es entstanden ist’ (WWB 622)

(29) nõudma ‘trachten’: teise järele nõudma ‘nach einem fragen, sich um einen bekümmern’ (WWB 688)

(30) haukuma ‘bellen’: koer ei haugu tema taga ‘kein Hund bellt nach ihm’ (WWB 54)

(31) inisema ‘wimmern’: lehm iniseb vasikat taga ‘die Kuh schreit nach dem Kalbe’ (WWB 122)

(32) kurtma ‘klagen’: lojus kurdbab oma karjas-maad taga ‘das Vieh trauert, hat Heimweh nach seiner Weide’ (WWB 417)

(33) lükkama ‘stoßen; sich bewegen’: lesed lükkavad poiste taga ‘die Witwen gehen den Burschen nach’ (WWB 558)

(34) mälestama ‘gedenken’: inimest taga mälestama ‘einen Menschen im Andenken behalten’ (WWB 585)

(35) manama ‘heruntermachen’: ta manab sind / sinu taga ‘er verleumdet dich, redet dir Böses nach’ (WWB 570)

(36) nutma ‘weinen’: nuttis meest taga ‘sie weinte um ihren Mann’ (WWB 696)

(37) vaakuma ‘krächzen, schreien’: mis sa vaagud mu taga ‘was schreist du mir nach, lässt mich nicht in Ruhe’ (WWB 1323)

(38) varastama ‘stehlen’: ta varastab mu taga ‘er bestiehlt mich’ (WWB 1309)

(39) varuma ‘Vorsorge tragen’: teise järele varuma ‘einem auflauern’ (WWB 1316)

Dass uns hier zwei unterschiedliche Adpositionen (järele und taga) als Entsprechung des nhd. nach begegnen, findet seine Parallele im

Auffällend bei den folgenden Beispielen sind die Beobachtungen, dass erstens in mehreren Fällen offensichtlich eine freie Varianz zwischen den Postpositionen *järele* ‘nach’ und *peale* ‘auf’ besteht und zweitens die nhd. Entsprechung die Präposition *auf* enthält (und somit auf den ersten Blick nicht als Vorbild für eine Lehnübersetzung in Frage kommt). Die finnischen Äquivalente zeigen allesamt Partitivrektion.

(40) *ootama* ‘warten’: *teise järele ootama* ‘auf jemand warten’ (WWB 725)

(41) *oskama* ‘verstehen’: *oskavad kavalaste küll mõne-suguse töö peale/järele* ‘sie verstehen sich geschickt genug auf allerlei Arbeiten’ (WWB 715)

(42) *passima* ‘passen; abpassen, auflauern’: *passisid laevade järele/peale* ‘sie lauerten den Schiffen auf’ (WWB 773)

(43) *valvama* ‘wachen’: *teise järele valvama* ‘einem auflauern, einen heimlich beobachten’ (WWB 1303)

(44) *varuma* ‘Vorsorge tragen’: *teise järele varuma* ‘einem auflauern’ (WWB 1316)


Von den anderen ostseefinnischen Sprachen zeigt das Livische einige mit dem Estnischen übereinstimmende Konstruktionen, deren Beweiskraft dafür, dass eine eigenständige ostseefinnische Entwicklung vorliegt, aufgrund des engen Kontakts zum Lettischen nicht sehr stark ist: liv. niem iīgōb vaaškiz tagaan ‘die Kuh schreit nach dem Kalbe (wörtl. hinter dem Kalbe her)’ (Sjögren 1861: 219), liv. ma īlgēp tā m tagān ‘ich sehne mich nach ihm’ (Kettunen 1938: 71), liv. ta ųkkōb_eīths jelāmis_tagān ‘er strebt danach, eine eigene Wirtschaft zu haben’ (ebd.: 423).

4. käest kätte ‘von der Hand / in die Hand’

Bei beiden Adpositionen, deren konkrete Verwendungen den Übergang in jemandes Besitz (kätte ‘in die Hand’) bzw. den Übergang aus jemandes Besitz (käest ‘aus der Hand’) ausdrücken, spricht ihre semantische Transparenz, ihre deutlich sichtbare Herkunft von dem Substantiv käsi
‘Hand’, dafür, dass es sich hierbei um Adpositionen jüngerer Datums handelt.

In den finnischen Äquivalenten der folgenden Belege entspricht der separativischen Variante käest regelmäßig der Ablativ (vgl. fi. vaatia joltakulta ‘von jemandem fordern’):

(45) ahvatama ‘anlocken,weglocken’: rahe teise käest ahvatama ‘einem sein Geld ablocken’ (WWb 10)

(46) kuulama ‘nachfragen’: kuulas naise käest ‘er erkundigte sich bei dem Weibe’ (WGR 551)

(47) küsima ‘fragen’: küsi tema käest ‘frage ihn’ (WWb 435); ma küsisin, ostsin, sain tema käest ‘ich fragte od. verlangte, kaufte, bekam von ihm’ (WGR 551)

(48) nõudma ‘trachten,fordern’: ühe käest nõudma ‘von jemandem fordern’ (WWb 688)

(49) paistma ‘scheinen; dringen’: ta paistis seda minu käest ‘er drang es mir ab’ (WWb 753)

(50) petma ‘betrügen,heimlich entwenden’: teise käest midagi petma ‘einem etwas abschwätzen’ (WWb 804)

(51) usutama ‘beschuldigen’: minu käest usutati ‘ich wurde inquiriert’ (WWb 1264)

(52) vingima ‘zwingen’: teise käest vingima ‘einem abzwingen’ (WWb 1366)


(53) andma ‘geben’: ta andis raamatud mu kätte ‘er übergab mir die Bücher’ (WGR 324); ennast joogi kätte andma ‘sich dem Trunke ergeben’ (WWb 32)

(54) surema ‘sterben’: haavade kätte surema ‘an den Wunden sterben’ (WWb 254)
(55) 

uskuma ‘glauben’: *ennast teise kätte uskuma ‘sich jemandem anvertrauen’; *ei ma usu tuld teiste kätte mitte ‘das Feuer überlässe ich anderen nicht’ (WWb 1262); *temal on luba teize kätte oma õiguzi uskuda ‘er hat die Erlaubnis, seine Rechte einem Anderen zu übertragen’ (WGr 638)

Somit haben wir es hier mit einer bloßen Ersetzung einfacher Kasus durch entsprechende Adpositionalphrasen zu tun, eine Umgestaltung der Rektionsmuster wie z.B. bei der Ausbreitung des Komitativs liegt hier nicht vor.


In der modernen Schriftsprache steht kätte in vielen Fällen in freier Variation mit dem Illativ bzw. Allativ (Suri sõjas saadud haavade kätte ~ haavadesse [ILL]. ‘Er starb an seinen im Krieg davongetragenen Wunden.’): in gleicher Weise besteht oft eine freie Variation zwischen einer Konstruktion mit käest und dem Ablativ (Laenasin temalt [ABL] ~ tema käest 3 krooni. ‘Ich lieh mir von ihm 3 Kronen.’). Vom ostseefinnischen Wort *käsi abgeleitete Adpositionen existieren auch in

Diese eindeutigen Parallelen zwischen dem Estnischen und seinen am nächsten verwandten Sprachen sprechen eher gegen eine deutsche Einflussnahme. Das völlige Fehlen dieser Adpositionen bei Müller in den bei Wiedemann anzutreffenden, abstrakteren Verwendungen kann im Gegenteil sogar in der Weise ausgelegt werden, dass diese der estnischen Volkssprache entstammen und dem nur mit der Tallinner Umgangssprache vertrauten Müller unbekannt geblieben sind. In diese Richtung argumentiert auch Ross (1999: 17), indem sie angibt, im alten Schriftestnisch bei Müller und Stahl (in seinem Hand- vnd Haußbuch 1632-1638) seien die käsi-Formen sowohl als eindeutige Übersetzungen als auch „typisch estnisch“ (d.h. in grammatikalisierter Form) gebraucht worden. In letzteren Fällen seien frühere Quellen zitiert worden, die von Personen stammen, die das Estnische besser beherrscht haben als Müller und Stahl selbst.6 Habicht (2000: 33) geht allerdings in ihrer Untersuchung zu den Adpositionen in Texten Müllers und Stahls davon aus, dass sich diese Konstruktionen erst durch die Übersetzungstradition aus dem Deutschen im Estnischen etabliert haben. Denn in der deutschen Bibelsprache gibt es

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zahlreiche Ausdrücke dieser Art: Haben wir das gute empfangen von der Hand des Herren – Ollemme meije se heh sahnut / sest Issanda kehjjest.,


5. peale ‘auf’

Der Großteil der Belege von Wiedemann mit der Postposition peale ‘auf (ad locum)’ zeigt eine rein lokale Bedeutung, in deren Fall die
Adpositionalphrase ohne Bedeutungsveränderung durch einen lativischen Kasus ersetzt werden kann.


Für das Mittelniederdeutsche weist Lübben (1888: 448) bei der Beschreibung der modalen Verwendung von up, uppe („Thätigkeit bez. sowol im freundl. als besonders im feindlichen Sinne: zu, über etc.“) explizit darauf hin, dass es besonders häufig „nach Verben des Klagens, Streitens, Raubens etc.“ in Sinne von „wider, gegen etc.“ gebraucht werde. Dies steht ganz im Einklang mit den im Folgenden aufgeführten Verbindungen, die wir im Estnischen vorfinden:

(56) ammuma ‘den Mund aufsperren, brüllen’: mis sa ammud mu peale ‘was zankst du mit mir’ (WWb 31)
(57) ängama ‘anbieten’: sa ängad seda minu peale ‘du beschuldigst mich dessen’ (WWB 71)

(58) hakkama ‘ergreifen’: teise peale hakkama ‘einen anfallen, angreifen’ (WWB 20)

(59) haukuma ‘bellen’: ühe peale haukuma ‘einen anbellen’ (WWB 54)

(60) hüüdma ‘rufen’: laste peale hüüdma ‘die Kinder berufen, ermahnen’ (WWB 1278)

(61) kaebama ‘klagen’: kui su mõtte su peale kaebavad ‘wenn dein Gewissen dich anklagt’ (WWB 178); kas mina olen sinu peale kaewand ‘habe ich gegen dich geklagt’ (WGr 578)

(62) kärastama ‘zanken’: kellegi peale kärastama ‘einen andonnern’ (WWB 246)

(63) kärgatama ‘auffahren’: ta kärgatas mu peale ‘er fuhr mich an, schrie mich an’ (WWB 247)

(64) kohutama ‘aufblähen, aufregen’: kohutas ennast mu peale ‘er fuhr mich an’ (WWB 327)

(65) pattama ‘beschuldigen’: meie pattame selle peale ‘wir messen ihm die Schuld bei’; se pattab küll mu südame peale ‘ich mache es mir wohl zum Vorwurf’ (WWB 775)

(66) põrutama ‘erschüttern, schelten’: põrutas mu peale ‘er fuhr mich an’ (WWB 868)

(67) röökima ‘brüllen’: kellegi peale röökima ‘einen anschreien, heftige Vorwürfe machen’ (WWB 979)

(68) taplema ‘zanken’: mis sa tapled mu peale ‘warum schiltst du mich’ (WWB 1119)

(69) tülistama ‘zanken’: ta tülistab mu peale ‘er macht mir Ungelegenheit, erhebt Ansprüche an mich’
Die im Falle dieser Verbgruppe außerordentlicharen Belege bei Müller – nur das Verb *kaebama* ist nachgewiesen – deuten auf einen zwischen *peale* und dem Allativ schwankenden Gebrauch hin.

Daneben erscheint eine Vielzahl von Verben, die eine Adpositionalphrase mit *peale* als Komplement bei sich haben und an übertragene Verwendungen von nhd. *auf* erinnern. Im Falle einer Komplementsfunktion von *auf* wird laut GDS (S. 2123) an die locale Bedeutung angeknüpft, indem „der Aspekt eines stützenden, eine Grundlage konstituierenden Oberflächenkontaktes“ als Übertragungsmotiv dient (GDS 2124); bei Verben wie *füßen auf*, *bestehen auf* ist diese Übertragung noch recht transparent. Die Inhalte, die diejenigen Komplemente vermitteln, deren Übertragungswege weniger durchsichtig ist, lassen sich in verschiedene Kategorien einteilen, die hier kurz referiert werden sollen (GDS 2125f.):

– „künftige Basis“ bei Verben wie *sich verlassen auf*, *sich einstellen auf*, *sich einlassen auf*

– „Gewolltes“ bei kognitiven Verben und Einstellungsverben wie *dringen auf*, *hoffen auf*, *spekulieren auf*

– „Ziel“ bei Verben wie *abzielen auf*, *richten auf*, *wirken auf*

– „Ziel/Stimulus einer Emotion“ wie in *böse auf*, *Zorn auf*, *Eifersucht auf*

– „zeitliches Nacheinander/Ursache“ wie in *reagieren auf*, *antworten auf*, *folgen auf*, *hören auf*.

Für jede dieser inhaltlichen Kategorien lassen sich auch im Estnischen Beispiele finden, die mit *peale* angeschlossen werden. Eine tatsächliche Valenzbedingtheit der Adposition *peale*, wie sie für ihre deutschen Entsprechungen zutrifft, ist in diesen Fällen nicht zu beobachten; in der estnischen Gegenwartssprache ist sie immer durch den Allativ ersetzbar. Der auch bei diesen Verben hervortretende Gegensatz zwischen einer

(73) halastama ‘sich erbarmen’: halastab minu peale ‘er erbarmt sich über mich’ (WGr 560)

(74) harima ‘bürsten; sich gewöhnen’: ta on harinud se peale ‘er ist es gewohnt’; vale peale harinud ‘im Lügen geübt’ (WWB 40)

(75) ihkuma ‘wetzen’: on se peale ihutud ‘er ist darauf geübt’ (WWB 113)

(76) jääma ‘bleiben’: kellegi nõuu peale jääma ‘jemandes Rat annehmen’; ühe usu peale jääma ‘bei einem / auf einen Glauben beharren’ (WWB 152)

(77) julgema ‘zuversichtlich sein, sich trauen’: ühe asja peale julgema ‘sich an eine Sache wagen’ (WWB 167)

(78) kihutama ‘erregen, antreiben’: kuri kihutab iga asja peale ‘das Böse reizt, treibt zu allem’ (WWB 279)

(79) kinnitama ‘befestigen; sich verlassen auf etwas’: ma kinnitan teie peale ‘ich verlasse / baue auf euch’ (WWB 285)

(80) lootma ‘hoffen, vertrauen’: ma loodan selle peale ‘ich verlasse mich, vertraue darauf’ (WWB 530)

(81) märkama ‘verstehen, merken’: asja peale märkama ‘auf eine Sache acht geben’ (WWB 589)

(82) mõistma ‘verstehen; zuerkennen’: vene-keele peale ma mõistan küll ‘auf das Russische verstehe ich mich wohl’ (WWB 615); see on teie peale mõistetud ‘das ist euch beschieden’ (WWB 616)

(83) mõtlema ‘denken’: mõtleb minu peale ‘er denkt an mich’ (WGr 560)

(84) ūpetama ‘lehren’: ühe asja peale ūpetama ‘zu etwas abrichten’ (WWB 740); mitme tarkuze peale ūpetama ‘vielerlei Wissenschaften lehren’ (WGr 344)
(85) öppima ‘lernen’: ühe asja peale öppima ‘etwas studieren, zu erlernen suchen’ (WWB 741)

(86) oskama ‘verstehen’: oskavad kavalam te küll mõne-sugise töö peale/järele ‘sie verstehen sich geschickt genug auf allerlei Arbeiten’ (WWB 715)

(87) paenduma ‘sich biegen, sich fügen, sich gewöhnen’: selle asja peale paedund ‘darauf geübt, daran gewöhnt’ (WWB 747)

(88) pakkuma ‘bieten’: ennast ammati, kiriku peale pakkuma ‘sich um ein Amt, eine Predigerstelle bewerben’ (WWB 757)

(89) panetama ‘sich schicken in etwas’: panetand selle järele/peale ‘darauf erpicht, versessen’ (WWB 765)

(90) passima ‘passen; abpassen, ausflauen’: passisid laevade järele/peale ‘sie lauerten den Schiffen auf’ (WWB 773)

(91) suurustama ‘groß tun’: suurustama teise peale ‘auf einen anderen sich verlassen’ (WWB 1097)

(92) tähendama ‘bezeichnen; hinweisen, anwenden auf etwas’: kes teab, kumma peale tema tähendab ‘wer weiß, auf welchen von beiden er zielt, anspielt’; enese peale tähendama ‘auf sich beziehen’; sõna teise asja peale tähendama ‘ein Wort anders anwenden, deuten, für etw. anderes gebrauchen’ (WWB 1128)

(93) truuvida ‘trauen’: mina ei või ennast selle peale truuvida ‘ich getraue mich dessen nicht, wage es nicht’ (WWB 1201)

(94) uskuma ‘glauben’: kes usub minu ühe peale ‘wer glaubt mir allein, meiner alleinigen Aussage’; ei või neid enese peale uskuda ‘man kann sie nicht sich selbst überlassen’ (WWB 1262)

(95) vanduma ‘schwören’: asja peale vanduma ‘eine Sache beteuern’; ma vandun oma vere ja hinge peale ‘ich schwöre auf mein Blut und Leben’ (WWB 1305); vandus oma õiguse peale ‘er beschwor sein Recht’ (WGR 560)

Von den genannten Verben sind in Müllers Texten allein lootma ‘hoffen’, mötlema ‘denken’ und märkama ‘verstehen’ belegt; diese bestätigen die Verwendung von peale: sinu peele laße meidt lotada ‘auf dich lass uns hoffen’ (Müller 15.1.7), et meyë meddy Ïbsanda Ihesuße Christuße
tullemes peele piddame motlema ‘damit wir an das Kommen unseres Herrn Jesus Christus denken werden’ (Müller 1.1.16).

Die Beleglage kann durch die Einbeziehung weiterer Verben, welche im Deutschen ebenfalls die Präposition auf fordern, aufgebessert werden. Pragnantestes Beispiel dafür ist ootama ‘auf jemanden warten’, das bei Müller ohne Ausnahme durch eine Ergänzung mit peale gekennzeichnet ist (Jumala pæle piddame othma ‘auf Gott müssen wir warten’; Müller 34.3.23), was sich aber nicht in die Volkssprache eingebürgert hat, in der wie im Finnischen ein Partitivobjekt üblich ist. Auf die mnd. Entsprechung bê(i)den ‘warten’, deren Ergänzung mit na ‘nach’ angeschlossen wird, wurde bereits hingewiesen; mnd. warden mit up ist ebenfalls belegt: (…) de ok dar up ghewardet hadden (Gloyer 1973: 136).


(96) kölbama ‘taugen’: iga asja peale kölbama ‘zu Allem taugen, brauchbar sein’ (WWB 368)

Diese übertragenen Verwendungsweisen von ‘auf’ sind den anderen ostseefinnischen Sprachen nicht unbekannt: wot. vätši tämää päälee suutuub ‘die Leute werden böse auf ihn’ (Ariste 1968: 110), wot. minu pääle elä loottaa ‘hoffe nicht auf mich’ (VKS 3: 149), wot. täm minun päälee õökkaab ‘er ist wütend auf mich’ (VKS 4: 391); liv. jumal päl
luotte⁷ ‘auf Gott vertrauen’ (Kettunen 1938: 208), liv. usk jumal päle ‘Glaube an Gott’ (ebd.: 458).


6. sistze ‘in’


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⁷ Liv. pääl ist zugleich Adessiv und Allativ.
⁸ Vgl. das russische сердиться на ‘auf jemanden böse sein’ und vergleichbare Verwendungen mit na ‘auf’.
Abweichend vom heutigen Deutsch war im Mittelniederdeutschen und im Frühneuhochdeutschen die Verwendung von in in Verbindung mit dem Verb glauben gebräuchlich (FRNHDWb Bd. 8, L. 1, Sp. 60), so dass hier von vornherein Konvergenz zwischen dem Deutschen und Ostseefinnischen vorliegt. Im Estnischen hat sich hier der Gebrauch einer Adposition, im Gegensatz zu den zahlreichen Konstruktionen mit peale, eest und järele, nicht bis in die Gegenwart erhalten; eine vollständige Grammatikalisierung, die eine Verwendung als obligatorische Ergänzung bedeuten würde, ist nicht eingetreten. Üblicher ist heute der Illativ, vgl. es. uskuma jumalasse [ILL] ‘an Gott glauben’.

(97) andma ‘geben’: ennast hoora-elu sisse andma ‘sich einem lüderlichen Leben ergeben’ (WWB 32)

(98) jätma ‘lassen’: ta on ennast jätuned viina-joomise sisse ‘er hat sich ganz dem Trunk ergeben’ (WWB 151)

(99) uskuma ‘glauben’: jumala sisse uskuma ‘an Gott glauben’ (WWB 1261)

Erwartungsgemäß verwendet Müller anstelle des Illativs in allen Fällen die entsprechende Adpositionalphrase: Ke jumala sisse vssub, ninck tæma pæle lotab. ‘Wer an Gott glaubt, und auf ihn hofft.’ (Müller 15.6.11).


(100) muutma ‘verwandeln’: muudab ennast inimese nåu sisse / inimeseks ‘er verwandelt sich in einen Menschen’ (WWB 636)


10 Neben der lativischen Ausdrucksweise im Zusammenhang mit dem Verb uskuma, die der deutschen Konstruktion ‘in/an etwas glauben’ entspricht, existiert sowohl im Estnischen als auch im Finnischen eine Verwendungsweise mit Partitivrektion im Sinne von ‘etwas glauben’, die auch in Müllers Texten vorkommt.
7. üle ‘über’

Die Postposition üle ‘über, über (...) hin, über (...) hinweg’ drückt neben ihrer lokalen Bedeutung auch abstraktere Inhalte aus, die denen ihrer deutschen Entsprechung über gleichen. So wird über als Ergänzung gebraucht von

(1) Verben für mentale und kommunikative Tätigkeiten, bei denen sie das Thema der Äußerung (reden über) anschließt,

(2) Verben der emotionalen Einstellung, bei denen sie den Gegenstand der Emotion anschließt (sich ärgern über, sich freuen über, sich wundern über), hier kommt auch eine „kausale Note“ hinzu (GDS 2129), sowie

(3) Verben, die ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis ausdrücken (herrschen über).

Diese Verwendungsweisen sind der finnischen Adposition yli, die als Post- wie auch als Präposition benutzt wird, völlig unbekannt, deren Vorkommen ist auf lokale und temporale Zusammenhänge beschränkt. Je nach Verb entspricht dem es. üle im Finnischen ein Partitivobjekt oder eine elativische Ergänzung (ausgenommen das Verb nauraa ‘lachen’, das über eine allativische Ergänzung verfügt: nauraa jollekulle [ALL] ‘über jemanden lachen’).

(101) kohkuma ‘erschrecken’: kohkusin selle röõmu üle ‘ich erschrak über diese Freude (d.h. hatte einen freudigen Schreck)’ (WWb 322)

(102) naerma ‘lachen’: ühe asja üle naerma ‘über eine Sache lachen’ (WWb 644); mis sa naerad mu üle ‘warum lachst du über mich’ (WGr 568)

(103) vihastama ‘ergrimmen, böse werden’: ärge vihastage minu sõnade üle ‘zürnet nicht über meine Worte’ (WGr 568)

Der Gebrauch von üle in kausalen Zusammenhängen, d.h. speziell in Verbindung mit Emotionsverben, ist bereits in Müllers Texten anzutreffen, neben vihastama ‘zürnen’ u.a. bei röõmustama ‘sich freuen’, heituma ‘sich ängstigen’, istema ‘sich wundern’: Tahat sina sīβ igkewest v’lle meidt wihasta ‘Willst du nun ewig über uns zürnen’ (Müller 32.3.33).

Im Deutschen gehören gerade die Emotionsverben zu den Verben, bei denen sich das Genitivobjekt noch bis ins Frühneuhochdeutsche und darüber hinaus gehalten hat. Gleichzeitig sind Präpositionalphrasen mit


Für Verben, die ein Herrschafts-/Hierarchieverhältnis ausdrücken, ist der Gebrauch von üle ebenfalls in den Texten Müllers nachzuweisen (et tæma v‘lle keicke aßiade piddab wallitzema ‘dass er über alle Dinge herrschen muss’; Müller 36.11.8). Im Deutschen lässt sich ein derartiger Gebrauch von über wiederum bis ins Mittelhochdeutsche zurückverfolgen (so für gebieten, herrschen, richten, wachen; Waldenberger 2009: 159/160):

(104) kaitsma ‘schützen’: kaitse oma rahvast / oma rahva üle ‘behüte dein Volk’ (WWB 188)

(105) muretsema ‘sorgen für etwas’: ta muretseb selle üle ‘er hat dafür zu sorgen, darüber zu wachen (als Vorsteher)’ (WWB 631)

(106) valitsema ‘herrschen’: valitseb meie üle ‘er regiert über uns’ (WWB 1273); ta valitseb teiste üle ‘er ist, herrscht über die Anderen’ (WGR 568)

8. Schlussbemerkung

Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchung waren die starken Abweichungen, die zwischen den Verbrektionen des Estnischen und des Finnischen zu beobachten sind. Charakteristikum dieser Unterschiede ist, dass der


Mit den zahlreichen Alternativen, die das Estnische als freie Varianten im Bereich der Verbrektion bietet, stellt es sich als ein Sprachsystem dar,

Literatur


MÜLLER = Georg Mülleri jutlused (1600-1608), http://www.murre.ut.ee/vakkur/Korpused/Myller/myllerj.htm


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**Abkürzungen**


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Ever since it was originally proposed by Chomsky (1981, 1982), the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) has puzzled at least one full generation of linguists.\(^1\) Originally the principle stipulated that finite clauses (in English at least) must have a grammatical subject. The stipulation may furthermore be satisfied in a number of ways – for instance, by inserting an expletive, raising a thematic object DP, having the thematic subject occupy that position, inserting a locative phrase, or even by head movement. An even more mysterious generalization emerged later, which required that the specifier positions of functional heads of any type may be in need of filling, optionally or obligatorily (Chomsky 2000).\(^2\)

Faced with this sort of descriptive hodgepodge, many linguists have tried to explain it away either by means of reducing it to something that makes more sense (Brattico & Huhmarniemi 2006; Martin 1999; Holmberg 2000; Moro 2000; Rosengren 2002) or by pulverizing the EPP from the theory of grammar (Grohmann, Drury & Castillo 2000; Bošković 2002; see Landau 2007 for a recent summary). At any rate, while a substantial volume of controversy has evolved around this matter, the Principle itself has proven resistant. Thus, the “mysterious property EPP (...) has been an annoying problem ever since it was originally formulated” (Chomsky 2008: 156).

\(^{1}\) I will use the following abbreviations in this article: EPP = Extended Projection Principle; GEN = genitive case; phi = phi-features like number, gender and person; PRT = partitive case; SG = singular number.

\(^{2}\) A reviewer of this article points out, correctly, that this generalization follows if the EPP is reinterpreted as a feature, not as a principle of grammar.
In this squib, I would like to argue that the reductionist approaches are futile; instead, as suggested by Chomsky (2000), functional heads arrive to the derivation as irreducibly marked for the EPP diacritic that requires their Spec to be filled. But beyond that, there is no further logic. In other words, we have to learn to live with the EPP as an irreducible quirk of the human ways of speaking.

As a preliminary to our argument, we need an uncontroversial grammatical prism to recognize the presence/absence of the EPP itself. The following two conditions below (1a–b) will achieve this for us. Note, however, that we will not be giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for EPP itself, only certain overt characteristics which will allow us to detect the EPP.

We begin from the fact that when a functional head H has the EPP property, it triggers movement to Spec-H. In one incarnation, that element is a full DP. It may well be something other than a DP (Holmberg 2000; Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 1998), but certainly if it is a DP we have minimized the risk of misdiagnosis.

Second, in several cases the EPP is correlated with Agree in the sense of Chomsky (2000, 2004), such that the Case feature of the moved element and the phi-set on the target head H change as a function of the EPP. EPP/Agree may not need to be constitutively tied to each other, but it nevertheless adds credibility to the claim that H has the EPP property if filling of Spec-H comes with full Agree.\(^3\) Note that it is for this reason that many of the reductionist approaches to the EPP rely on Case and/or phi-Agree. Let us therefore stipulate that in addition to DP-movement to Spec-H, we would like to see Agree(H,DP) as well (Condition 1b below). In summary, I propose looking for the following two properties:

\[(1) \text{ Conditions on EPP} \]
\[
\text{A functional head H can be suspected of having the EPP property if}
\]
\[
a. \text{H triggers } \text{DP-movement to Spec-H},
\]
\[
b. \text{Agree}(H,DP) \text{ takes place (Case valuation for DP and phi-valuation for H).}
\]

Note once more that I do not wish to imply that (1a–b) constitute a definition for the EPP; rather, they deliver a conservative method for recognizing it, whatever its underlying implementation. Some instances of

\(^3\) Landau (2007) proposes a generalization according to which Case- and phi-features constitute only one type of “anchor features” on which the EPP may dwell, like a parasite.
EPP may violate these conditions, as they sometimes do, but clearly if we have something that satisfies (1a–b) we have at least minimized the risk of false positives. I will also hold that if some functional head H fails all these tests, then the chances are that it does not have the EPP feature.

With an EPP gauge now at hand, let us look at the behavior of Finnish adpositions. Here we look at three varieties of Finnish adpositions that can be described as follows (Manninen 2003; Vainikka 1989). In the first group, there are adpositions which behave similarly to the English equivalents. They involve a particle-like adposition (or preposition) followed by a DP-complement that takes the object Case, the partitive (Vainikka 2003). Example (2) illustrates this.

(2) kohti taloa
   towards house.PRT
   ‘towards a house’

In the second group, we have adpositions, which take an overt DP-argument in (what looks like) the Spec-P position. The DP-argument takes the genitive Case, and it bestows full phi-features to the adposition (3). In Finnish a prehead DP argument of an adposition can therefore agree with the adposition in full phi-features. The DP-argument cannot normally occur in a postadpositional position (4a) and it can never take the object partitive Case (4b).

(3) minun kanssa-ni
    I.GEN with-1SG
    ‘with me’

(4) a. *kanssa-ni minun
    with-1SG I.GEN

For one, there are many ways in which EPP can presumably be implemented without accompanying Agree (Collins 1997; Holmberg 2000; Miyagawa 2001), successive-cyclic movement being the prime example. This violates condition (1b). Second, some authors have argued that the EPP can be satisfied via head movement (Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 1998). This violates condition (1a) in the sense that then there is no DP that is moved to Spec-H.

A reviewer points out that similar facts are attested in many other languages, e.g. Dutch, German or Afrikaans.
The third category contains expressions which allow both strategies.

(5)  

a. lähellä minu-

near I-PRT

‗near me‘

b. minun lähellä-

I. GEN near-1SG

‗near me‘

Notice, in particular, that (5a–b) are synonymous. In addition, these PPs have virtually the same syntactic distribution: whenever one can occur, so does the other.

There is a logical connection between the third group and the first two groups. The third group appears to be a disjunction of the other two groups. This leaves us with a binary choice of (2) or (3). That binary choice is between two types of behaviors: one, in which the argument of the functional head remains stationed in its complement and there is no Agree; and another, in which the argument occurs at Spec-H and is accompanied by Agree. According to conditions (1a–b), the first characteristic satisfies -EPP behavior while the second characteristic satisfies +EPP behavior.

As far as descriptive adequacy is concerned, the hypothesis that adpositions fall into three groups – +EPP, -EPP and ±EPP – leaves very little room for complaint. Since this behavior profile is not restricted to adpositions (Chomsky 2000), it gains independent support that is hard to resist. Yet, the descriptive victory comes with a difficulty in the explanatory agenda.

At the heart of the problem lies the observation that the pair (5a–b) in particular shows that the ±EPP constitutes a primitive choice that the grammar must make for its functional head(s), such that the choice affects necessarily neither the distribution nor the semantics of the PP. It is a primitive and phrase-internal affair with no function, no purpose, and nothing to offer to, or gain from, its grammatical surroundings. It may be lexicalized, as is the case with the first two groups, or it may be just grammaticalized but not lexicalized, as is the case with the third group. Either way, it represents lexical entropy.
Suppose, for instance, that we propose to reduce this behavior to the theory of Case by positing that DPs move to the Spec-P in order to “check” the genitive Case. Still each adposition needs an irreducible mark that determines whether it allows a genitive DP in its complement; this is just the same EPP again, cloaked in different terminology.

Could we navigate out of this problem by proposing reduction to something extra-linguistic? There may exist a neurobiological or general supramodal cognitive rationalization for these facts, but since a binary decision has to be made for each adposition, either in the lexicon or freely during the derivation, we are always left with the to-EPP-or-not-to-EPP decision.

Could it be that something in the grammatical context of the PP causes the EPP behavior, as argued for Finnish by Brattico & Huhmarniemi (2006) and Brattico & Saikkonen (2010)? It would be hard to demonstrate any effect of this type, it seems, as the distribution of the two PPs – one with EPP and another without – is identical. (On the other hand, bear in mind that this is not to say that EPP is never correlated with a change in grammatical context; the present data shows that such correlations cannot constitute the EPP.)

One possibility is to accept the conclusion that the EPP behavior must be specified lexically, but deny the claim that it is irreducible or unexplainable. This might be a viable alternative, because one could still maintain that the EPP behavior is an instance of some mechanism or requirement that has a broader application in grammar. Suppose, for instance, that it is speculated to be part of linearization. We could then conclude that while functional heads must be marked idiosyncratically by a feature determining whether their specifier must be filled, such marking has a much broader application. We would be claiming that the “EPP features” are not just a privilege of functional heads, but found from many other places and in many guises. On the other hand, even under this proposal the original EPP property – namely, that the specifiers of certain functional heads must be filled, optionally or obligatorily – would remain an irreducible and annoying quirk. Whether some functional head has this property cannot be derived, and hence justified, from any independent property or principle, and it is this difficulty that linguists have been trying to solve by invoking various reductive strategies.

There is much literature and speculation that the EPP effects can be reduced to independently motivated semantic properties. Some EPP operations do have clear semantic effects, mostly certain surface effects
that have to do with definiteness, scope, or information structure. The adposition data speaks against the view that EPP reduces to a semantic mechanism. As the adpositions in the third category exhibit mixed behavior, we can examine whether ±EPP indeed has an effect on semantic interpretation. It does not have any effect, as the expressions in (5a–b) are synonymous (see the translations). In other words, it does not necessarily matter in terms of semantic interpretation if the argument of the adposition is in Comp-H or in Spec-H(+Agree). I suspect that much of the same could be true of many other functional heads, such as Spec-T. This vindicates the intuition that has surfaced in so many guises over the years in connection with the EPP theorizing – namely, that the EPP constitutes a grammatical quirk that lacks direct participation in semantics.

What else is there to try? Perhaps nothing. The EPP is not disappearing from linguistic theorizing. Where does that lead us?

Of course, it is important to know that we have reached the bottom of things. We learn that EPP may be optional or lexically specified. I think this too was always suspected to be the case. The finite tense node in English, for instance, behaves like the adpositions in the second group, both being lexically specified as +EPP. But this is not a predetermined outcome; a functional head may have a negative specification for its EPP, or it may be freely associated with either choice during lexical insertion and/or derivation. This leaves considerable room for description and explanation of word order facts and agreement patterns, both cross-linguistically as well as within a given language. It may be a liberation that leads to insights regarding other parts of grammar (Landau 2007; Holmberg 2000).

And the prospects for genuine explanation are not as gloomy as they first seem. What these facts suggest is that the EPP is irreducible; to begin with it does not force us to make the same conclusion for Agree. The correct direction of a putative reduction between EPP, Case and phi-features, if we suspect that such a reduction is desirable in the first place, must consider taking the EPP diacritic as a primitive property and deduce the rest from a theory which includes EPP in its axiom block. This may help to disambiguate the explanatory labyrinth leading towards the correct

\[\text{6 There is evidence that, particularly regarding A-bar movement, fronted constituents are associated with topic/focus interpretation (Huhmarniemi 2009, 2010). This may well be true of Finnish adpositions as well, but it appears not to be true of the examples discussed here. Therefore, it may be that such operations sometimes have semantic consequences, but not semantic causes.}\]
theory of such matters. And, as pointed out by a reviewer, we can pose further questions concerning the EPP, even if it were irreducible: why does it trigger overt, and not covert, movement; why does it involve case alternations and phi-agreement; how is it implemented; and how is the mechanism constrained?

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Compte rendu de Christophe Cusimano

Dans cet ouvrage récent qui traite du *paradoxe*, comme son titre l’indique, Katarzyna Wołowska, rejetant tout d’abord une approche pluridisciplinaire trop délicate à mettre en place, propose de s’inscrire dans une perspective interprétative. L’auteur se situe alors dans la droite lignée des auteurs comme Culler (1973) et Smith (1996) pour qui le paradoxe n’existe pas en lui-même, si l’on peut dire, mais en tant que produit d’une interprétation. Le risque de tomber dans un regard subjectif des faits est un des reproches que l’on pourrait alors envisager de formuler. Mais le support théorique solide de la sémantique interprétative de Rastier (1987), théorie de tradition herméneutique et donc onomasiologique qui définit les signifiés en langue, permet de le réduire à sa portion congrue ; d’autant que le paradoxe est une unité de *discours*, même si celui-ci se construit aussi à partir des lexies et de ce fait, répond aussi de la *langue* : le titre de l’ouvrage trouve donc sa justification dans cette introduction. Il n’en reste pas moins, comme dans tout procédé abductif (cf. Cusimano 2010/2011), que le recours à l’intuition demeure primordial dans la recherche de paradoxes, ce que l’auteur reconnaît volontiers (pp. 75–76) :

« (…) pour constituer un corpus d’analyse et ensuite pour dégager les traits pertinents du phénomène décrit, il est nécessaire d’avancer certaines hypothèses. Celles-ci peuvent se fonder soit sur des intuitions, soit – ce qui est le plus fréquent et même indispensable dans les textes de recherche – sur le contexte intertextuel englobant la littérature spécialisée consacrée au problème analysé. La présente étude systématisait ainsi un travail analytique préalable, et les hypothèses avancées avant d’être illustrées d’examles sont en réalité le résultat de ce travail analytique, et non pas de véritables hypothèses. »

Il est intéressant de noter que cette difficulté est centrale dans ce début d’ouvrage, et a des répercussions dans tous les travaux en sémantique ou

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1 « *Affirmation surprenante en son fond et/ou en sa forme, qui contredit les idées reçues, l’opinion courante, les préjugés*, » selon le Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé.

presque. Mahmoudian (1997) avait déjà fait plus qu’effleurer la question de la place du sémanticien face à son objet. Selon Wołowska, c’est à la fois l’intuition et l’intertexte qui, dans le cas du paradoxe, guident l’interprétation (p. 76).

Après le passage obligé par les différentes disciplines qui ont traité du paradoxe, point trop long, l’auteur en vient à traiter de la question du point de vue de la sémantique textuelle. Tout en présentant les différents courants de cette discipline, Wołowska essaie de ne pas perdre de vue son objet d’étude et maintient son cap avec rigueur. On aurait apprécié un éclaircissement sur la notion de sémème (pp. 68–70), du fait que toutes les analyses qui suivent la prennent pour socle. Au lieu de cela, Wołowska propose de fines précisions sémiques, complexifiant plus encore que François Rastier la classification couramment admise : sèmes inhérents / afférents, d’une part, et d’autre part sèmes micro-, méso- ou macro-génériques / spécifiques. Pour mieux décrire la « tension sémantique » opérée par le paradoxe, l’auteur se dote en effet de plusieurs paramètres qui viennent s’appliquer à ces deux dichotomies qui, rappelons-le, sont combinables. Wołowska se dote alors des termes nié, neutralisant et évaluatif. Ces distinctions l’aideront à remplir les objectifs qu’elle s’assigne. En effet, l’intérêt de l’ouvrage réside surtout dans (i.) une réelle méthodologie interprétative pour isoler les paradoxes ; (ii.) une définition sémantique des paradoxes ; et (iii.) une typologie remarquable des oppositions sémiques qui produisent les paradoxes. C’est donc ce qu’il convient de développer ici.

Le premier objectif, réalisé sur la base d’un exemple-type, en l’occurrence Il n’y a de honte qu’à n’en point avoir, donne lieu à une série d’étapes : il faut tout d’abord isoler les sémèmes dont l’opposition est potentiellement porteuse de tension. Ceci amène Wołowska à poser deux sémèmes ‘honte’, en d’autres termes à reconstruire à partir de en un sémème ‘honte1’. La négation ne...point vient compléter le tableau. Il convient ensuite de repérer les sèmes des sémèmes qui produisent la tension. Selon l’auteur, « quant au Sm ‘honte1’ (=en’), il diffère de ‘honte2’ par le fait d’entrer dans un autre taxème, avec des Sm comme ‘modestie’, ‘pudeur’, ‘décence’, etc. liés par le SMicroGI /retenue/ ; dans cet ensemble, ‘honte1’ se distingue des autres éléments grâce aux SSI /désagréable/, /infériorité/, /humiliation/, /troublant/ ». La négation n’a pas vraiment pour rôle de faire disparaître le contenu de en mais d’en nier la partie positive des sèmes : c’est pourquoi l’auteur préférera parler de sèmes afférents niés plutôt que virtualisés. L’étape suivante, si l’on omet la
recherche de nouveaux réseaux d’affectence, consiste dans le repérage d’oppositions sémiques : dans le cas de cet exemple, le fait que ‘honte_1’ (=‘en’) soit nié le différencie de ‘honte_2’, comme nous l’avons vu. L’énoncé relève donc du paradoxe dont on peut désormais risquer une définition, que nous abrégeons faute de place (v. pp. 120–121) :

« Le paradoxe de langue apparaît ainsi comme une tension sémantique locale (...) qui présente les caractéristiques suivantes :
(i) ses éléments constitutifs sont des sèmes validés / actualisés dans le contexte discursif,
(ii) ils sont considérés en paires,
(iii) ils entrent dans des oppositions binaires constituées à base des relations sémantico-logiques (...)
(iv) les sèmes pertinents peuvent être de différente nature (...)
(v) au moins une des paires sémiques oppositives doit comporter des sèmes spécifiques ;
(vi) la séquence paradoxale doit être isotope (...),
(vii) les sèmes opposés doivent être discursivement joints (...). »

La suite de l’ouvrage, dont l’essence se situe selon nous dans cette citation, n’est pas d’une teneur aussi théorique et se situe dans une démarche typologique : il s’agit alors de dresser un inventaire plutôt exhaustif des différentes structures permettant d’engendrer un paradoxe, ou si l’on préfère, le voir d’un point de vue interprétatif, des structures qui permettent d’inférer un paradoxe. Sont tour à tour envisagés les différents coordonnants (et, ni, mais, etc.) puis les constructions (selon qu’elles prennent pour pivot un substantif, un adjectif...), mais encore les marqueurs discursifs qui jalonnent les paradoxes. Enfin, Wołowska offre au lecteur une série de remarques très pertinentes sur les procédés d’assimilation et de dissimulation sémantiques par lesquels un paradoxe peut notamment se trouver neutralisé. Ces procédés, bien connus en sémantique interprétative mais finalement peu usités, sont ainsi révisités.

Bref, cet ouvrage grouille de remarques pertinentes et la conclusion rappelle habilement les enjeux posés dans le titre : « Le paradoxe apparaît ainsi comme une tension sémantique nouée – et ensuite dénouée – en discours (...). Lié au social (opinion contraire à l’opinion commune) au même titre qu’au sémantique (union de contraires), le paradoxe de langue apparaît en fait comme un phénomène complexe et multidimensionnel » (pp. 237). Ces enjeux semblent avoir donné lieu, grâce à l’optique interprétative adoptée par l’auteur, une délimitation du périmètre d’action...
sémantique du paradoxe qui interdit de fait toute confusion avec l’*absurde*, notamment. La rigueur des investigations menées devrait ainsi en faire à la fois un ouvrage utile pour un panorama interdisciplinaire de la question, mais aussi un bel exemple des possibilités d’application, toujours plus nombreuses, de la sémantique interprétative.

**Références**


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Reviewed by Arnaud Fournet

As the title indicates, the work under review is a thematic issue of the journal *Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung* (*STUF*) dedicated to the Estonian language. To some extent it has intermediary features between a journal and a book. It focuses on a particular language but remains structured like a journal, with no numbered chapters and papers having their own references after their conclusions. A first impression about the copy in hand is that the papers could have been presented in a different – and possibly more logical – order, for example: phonology, then parts of speech and morphology, then grammatical issues, etc. No apparent rationale for the order of the papers can be found.

Rather conventionally the journal comprises a preface and eight articles, for a total of 164 pages, the table of contents being on the fourth cover. The preface shortly describes Estonian and the history of the language, and offers a summary of each paper. Generally speaking, the papers are both descriptive of Estonian and address specific issues at the same time. There are numerous examples, some of them being data taken from actual sources. Most of the papers are data-oriented and not theory-oriented, which makes them definitely informative about Estonian. It is not absolutely necessary to be familiar with Estonian prior to reading the papers but not infrequently it is not clear how words in examples should be parsed. Extra lines with a detailed parsing would have been welcome. Sometimes one wishes descriptions were more detailed with more data so that issues and relevant data could be more easily and more thoroughly understood. Maybe this situation is due to space limitations and guidelines, each paper having approximately 20 pages at most. On the whole, the papers provide an extensive overview of Estonian both as a language per se and in comparison with Finnish, its closest relative, and (Indo-)European languages, which are used as a kind of absolute and/or areal reference. Although published in a journal expected to focus on typology, several papers do not have a truly typological content but an areal comparative perspective or even amount to describing Estonian on a synchronic basis.
Several papers mention the fact that the standard literary language is different from the regional varieties and also (slightly) different from an emerging common Estonian spoken koine. From a sociolinguistic point of view, Estonian would then seem to know a double-deck diglossia. This situation could have been dealt with in a separate paper on a typological basis.

“Typological overview of Estonian syntax” by Mati Ehelt is a very dense article that nearly amounts to a grammatical digest. It is highly informative, although the absence of parsing in the examples is a very unfortunate hindrance. The survey often relies on a “top-down” semasiological approach: for example, it divides clauses as existential, possessive, experiential, etc. and examines their formal, typological and semantic features. “Bottom-up” formal criteria are also used: regular or inverted, adverbial, etc. So is sometimes semantics: modality, measure adverbial, etc.

“Linguistic strategies and markedness in Estonian morphology” by Martin Ehala assesses to which extent Estonian can be considered agglutinative or inflectional when it comes to nouns, adjectives and verbs. Morphology is to be understood as marking case, degree, or tense. Derivational morphology is conspicuously absent when the same issue could be raised in the case of words derived by affixes from other items (with similar or different lexical classes). The methodology followed in the paper is cleanly and linearly described: it hinges on stem alternations and segmentability between the stems and the suffixes. The word strategy is used but it is not clear what in particular is thereby implied. The second part of the paper surveys whether and how a number of grammatical categories, such as case, tense, mood, persons, etc. are indicated or “marked” by explicit segments. Estonian is at the same time compared to universal tendencies (as first surveyed by Greenberg, etc.). The paper reaches the conclusion that verbs follow an agglutinative pattern while nouns follow a mainly inflectional one.

“Estonian grammar between Finnish and SAE: some comparisons” by Helle Metslang examines typological features of Estonian when compared to its genetic relatives like Finnish, or to its neighbors or superstrates. It begins with a painful reminder that Estonian has been under foreign influence for centuries, by Low German, Russian and now English. The first part compares Estonian with Indo-European languages and does so through the grid of SAE features of Haspelmath, which in my opinion is not clearly representative and focuses on details rather than the most
prominent features: for example, it does not include grammatical gender or resort to a copula like *to be*. In all cases Estonian does not appear to be SAE according to that grid, and neither does Finnish. The second part examines the differences between Estonian and Finnish and endeavors to show they may be caused by direct influence from either German or Russian. To some extent the paper deals with two issues at the same time. It might have been interesting to deal only with the second issue and then to add regional forms of Estonian or Baltic German to the picture. On the whole, these issues are extremely complex and would need much more space to be addressed. Some examples are striking: Estonian relative pronoun *sina, kes sa* = German *du, der du*, a clear calque. An interactionist or structuralist approach may also add a causalist perspective to the paper.

“The voice system of Estonian” by Reeli Torn-Leesik examines the relationships between the so-called personal (or active), impersonal and passive “voices” or verbal forms in Estonian. It is different from the other papers both in tone and purpose. The style appears somewhat critical and opinionated, and the issues are more theoretical. It contains sentences taken from real sources, although cited in indirect and incomplete ways (as far as I checked some), but it is not clearly as descriptive as the others and aims to “prove” personal stances on a topic that the references intuitively reveal as a complex and controversial one about Estonian, and more generally Balto-Finnic. The issues discussed are indeed stimulating but on the whole the paper does not enable the reader to figure out what the issues really are and what to conclude. To begin with, it would have been interesting to define and discuss what a “voice” is, in general and in Estonian. As the issues are complex, typological insight would have been most fruitful. It is also odd to read that the Active or Personal voice is not listed among “the two main voices” of Estonian. In addition one of the premises underlying the conclusions of the author is that “the passive voice is a valence-reducing operation, whereas the impersonal merely constraints argument realization” (p. 72). This sounds like a postulation, as formal, semantic, pragmatic, grammatical features and considerations are not so easy to distinguish and disentangle. In all cases it would have been interesting to compare Estonian with Celtic (mentioned in the paper) and Latin (not cited) where a similar formal and semantic porosity between passive and impersonal forms exists. In Celtic, Impersonal forms are not a separate voice but belong to the Active voice. The reasons to posit Estonian Impersonal forms as belonging to a full-fledged separate “voice” are not obvious on the basis available in the paper. The trichotomy of Personal
(instead of Active), Passive and Impersonal “voices” nearly amounts to a lexical artefact. In addition, the so-called Impersonal formative *aksse* is apparently cognate with Mokshan frequentative *kšni*, used for multi-occurrences of the process, so that one is left to think whether one issue is not that the term Impersonal itself is inadequate and should be replaced by Collective, Indefinite or the like, which incidentally happens to be already proposed by Shore (p. 75). I do not speak Estonian but it seems to me that in most examples indefinite agents like *people*, *somebody*, *one*, *they* are potentially adequate translations of the so-called Impersonal, which is anything but “impersonal” or “subjectless”. The paper indeed stresses the “humanness constraint” of this form. Ultimately the premise of the author above seems false and I would favour exactly the opposite conclusion: the so-called Impersonal is a valence-reducing form (not voice), whereby the subject is determined a priori as indefinite, hence no longer available to a free choice, as is the case for the unrestrained Active voice.

"Acquisition of Estonian: some typologically relevant features" by Reeli Argus develops interesting crossfertilizing considerations between native-language acquisition and typological features. This seems to be a recent topic, with fewer than 15 years’ traceability. The paper discusses the speed of acquisition of Estonian morphology, which is rather inflectional, in comparison to other languages like Finnish or Turkish, which are more transparently agglutinative. It also indirectly discusses how adults tend to facilitate acquisition of Estonian morphology and features by their offspring: for example, by replacing gradational stems with non-gradational ones. As a mirror, the underlying issue raised by the paper is to understand what kind of “child-oriented speech” adult speakers produce, as it would seem that Estonian parents adapt their utterances to the competences of their children following (conscious) schemes or some (intuitive) scale of difficulties. This seems to be a completely uncharted territory.

"Dynamics of Estonian phonology" by Karl Pajusalu first presents a number of phonological features of Estonian dialects. Considering the complexity of Estonian phonology and morphology, it is unsurprising that the language has a significant dialectalization. The standard spelling appears not to represent gradation faithfully. Estonian is gradually acquiring voiced consonants as marginal units thanks to loanwords. At the same time loanwords tend to be nativized and show consonantic gradation. A recurrent problem with the paper is the unclearly phonetic or phonemic status of the data and issues discussed. More data and more minimal pairs
would have been advisable in a phonological survey. The grapheme <ä> is not a phonetic symbol either.

“Pronouns and reference in Estonian” by Renate Pajusalu first describes Estonian pronouns and anaphorics and then examines the use of see and üks as instable definite and indefinite articles. The framework is traditional and purely semantic. The paper is conspicuous for addressing issues that are typical of enunciation theories: anaphora, deixis, hic-et-nunc markers and not mentioning them in any way.

“Taboo intensifiers as polarity items: evidence from Estonian” by Peter Kehayov is a corpus-based study of a number of phrases and sentences involving “taboo” words like gods, devils, deities, illnesses built according to the pattern of taboo-word + knows + wh-question word. Polish provides a first sample of cases following that pattern. The paper then shows that the items thus patterned tend to have implicit negative value. It ends with a comparative survey of similar examples from Latvian. This paper is unusual because of its mix of corpus-based, apparently classical linguistics and its unexpected semantic inferences and consequences. In my opinion this is the most perplexing paper of the journal. It is intriguing that a topic so innocuous at first look can raise so many questions of practical and theoretical scope at the same time. The paper only sketches a Pandora’s box of issues.

On the whole, I would say that the reviewed issue *Estonian in Typological Perspective* is a very pleasant, informative and stimulating reading. It provides an extensive overview of Estonian from a mainly synchronic and areal point of view. Ultimately one would like to read more about the Estonian language.

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Response written by Maria Kela

I was delighted to notice that volume 23 of *SKY Journal of Linguistics* included a review by Kalle Korhonen of the publication *Kielissä kulttuurien ääni*, and I curiously read through the review – of course focussing on what was said about the article I had contributed to the publication. To my astonishment, in the eleven lines where my article is discussed, the reviewer manages to present two peculiar “facts” that cannot be found from my article – and to top of it all – that are totally untrue.

First, Korhonen claims that I took the metaphor ‘horns of Moses’ as an example of a difficult biblical metaphor. I did not, because such a metaphor does not exist in the whole Bible. The metaphorical ‘horn’ has its origin in the shape of the ancient Jewish altar where the sacrifices were carried out – it has nothing to do with the appearance of Moses. Korhonen may have been thinking of the famous mistranslation by Saint Jerome in Vulgata (405), where Exodus 34:29 seems to suggest horns to Moses, who is descending Sinai. The Finnish Old Testament translations (1642, 1776, 1933, 1992) never repeated this lapse and thus this mistranslation is not included in my corpus.

Second, he suggests having read from my article that the phrase *Ihmisen Poika* (‘Son of Man’) “has disappeared from the most recent Finnish Bible translation” (p. 352). This is of course not true and by no means have I ever presented such a claim. A quick check from the electronic Bible tells that there are at least 78 occurrences of *Ihmisen Poika* in the newest edition of the Finnish-language Bible (1992).

As a review editor of the oldest Finnish linguistic quarterly, *Virittäjä*, I know that the process of producing literary reviews often demands active dialogue between the reviewer and the review editor. Unfortunately it seems to me that this time there has been a gap in the process.
**References**


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